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INTRODUCTION 
The seventeenth century philosopher Francis Bacon 
once wryly noted that philosophers "make imaginary laws 
for imaginary commonwealths, and their discourses are as 
the stars which give little light because they are so high." 
This observation could be applied equally to our present-
day poets and philosophers who weave dreams of a perfectly 
harmonious and oeautiful world. Unfortunately conservation 
policymaking is not that simple; rather, the wise use of 
our natural resources often involves a complexity of human 
affairs, personal piques, bureaucratic conflicts, tough 
lobbying, and Dwight Eisenhower correctly perceived. 
this process: "But the other power is exercised by lobbies 
and congressional blocs, power contesting with power, for 
motives sometimes obvious, sometimes obscure, with little 
of the resulting contest revealed fully and accurately to 
the public for whom the fight is presumably waged. 111 In 
other words, politics is often the dark and bloody ground 
upon which the real conservation battles are fought and 
decided. To the victors of these battles go the spoils--
and these spoils--oil, natural gas, electric power, timber, 
land, water and atomic energy--are indeed valuable prizes. 
Thus, if we are ever to acquire- that beautiful and harmonious 
1Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: 
The White House Years (New York, 1963), 394. 
1 
2 
environment the poets and philosophers envisage, we must 
first come to fully appreciate the political process out 
of which our federal conservation policy is forged. Ac-
cordingly, this dissertation has a dual purpose: first, to 
investigate the importance of conservation in the nineteen 
fifties and, secondly, to gain a glimpse into the historical 
workings of the American political process. 
CHAPI'ER I 
THE NEW DEAL AS BOLD RELIEF 
With the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold 
War, certain issues involving the formulation of a coherent 
federal natural resources policy made their impact immedi-
ately. In 1952, Stephen Raushenbush correctly forecasted 
that the three fundamental questions awaiting the attention 
of professional conservationists and public servants during 
the Eisenhower presidency would be: (1) "How is the national 
need [for natural resources] to be met at reasonable prices 
when resource owners (particularly the small areas) refuse 
or are unable to adopt good conservation practices and the 
higher immediate costs that attend them?;" (2) " ••• How can 
the governmental part of the conservation job be done effi-
ciently?"; and, (3) " ••• For whose benefit should national 
aid to conservation and development be undertaken?"1 WhiJe 
men of widely differing political faiths could easily agree 
on the need for conservation, questions such as those raised 
by Raushenbush evoked widely different answers. For exam-
ple, David Lilienthal felt that industrial bigness and free 
"""--· 
. enterprise was an undeniable asset to better conservation 
of natural resources, while Barrow Lyons pointed a hostile 
1stephen Raushenbush, "Conservation in 1952," Annals 
of the.: :Ainer:ican Academ~ of Poli ticaJ. and Social Science, 261 
(Philad"'"eo1p.hia, 1952), • 
3 
--
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finger at the past performance of American industry in this 
area. 2 If industry's increased need for resources was not 
enough reason for a consistent federal resources policy, 
the rising rate of population with all its accompanying de-
mands certainly pressed hard for one. In the 1940's the 
American population increased nineteen million; between 1946 
and 1955 it rose 16.9 percent.3 
But it was in the political arena that these questions 
were raised, debated, and some of the answers .;'inally fo~d. 
The Eisenhower Administration's answer to these.conservation 
questions was summed up in one word: partnership. Essential-
ly this policy constituted a strongly conservative, free 
enterprise, and anti-New Deal orientation that ~ad laid fal-
low during much of the thirties but had gained great accep-
~ance in the forties. This philosophy was in sharp contrast 
to the New Deal. 
The New Deal was not so much the beginning of something 
new as it was the culmination of a long process of attempt-
ing to come to grips with the basic problems of .the twentieth 
century. For the fundamental question facing post-Civil War 
America had been how to bring a semblance of order out of 
the chaos in which the new dominant industrial economy found 
itself. And the answer eventually agreed upon was govern-
mental management and regulation of the economy through 
2David Lilienthal, Big Business: A New Era (New York, 
1952); Barrow Lyons, Tomorrow's Birthrir:ht: A Political and 
Economic Interpretation of Our Natural Resources (New York, 
1955). 
3Lyons,·iromorrow's Birthright, ch. 3, "Fertility Uncon-
trolled.""· 
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bureaucracy. A vague notion of bureaucracy probably dated 
from the nineteenth century movement for civil service reform. 
Before the inception of the New Deal there existed two 
types of federal bureaucracy, management and regulatory. The 
Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, National Park 
Service, Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service 
fell into the management category. Ea.ch bureau was charged 
with the responsibility of managing a particular area of the 
federal domain. The regulatory bureaucracy was born as a 
result of the Progressive Era's attempt to confront the gnaw-
ing problem of unfettered industrial monopoly. The Federal 
Trade Commission, Federal Power Commission, Food and Drug 
Administration, Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Fed-
eral Reserve System are examples of regulatory bureaucracy. 
The New Deal simply brought this trend toward bureaucratici-
zation of the American economy and government to a head. 
Several new regulatory agencies, such as the Securities .Ex-
change Commission, were introduced and, in at least one in-
stance, a former management bureau even became regulatory. 
Under the Taylor Grazing Act (1934) grazing on the public 
domain now became subject to regulation by the Department of 
Interior--an objective supported by many conservationists 
dating from the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy of the Progres-
sive Era,. 
While it established some order in the economy, the growth 
of bureaucracy also created new problems. Many of the bur-
eaus found themselves at cross purposes. The Forest Service 
6 
and Bureau of Reclamation tangled during the heated Ballinger-
Pinchot controversy; the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of 
Reclamation often fought over commonly desired western areas 
for dam construction; and the Bureau of Reclamation.often 
attempted to invade areas under the protective arm of the 
National Park Service. With a view toward streamlining the 
bureaucracy and eliminating such conflicts, commission after 
commission has been established to study the situation and 
to make recommendations. And repeatedly these recommenda-
tions have not been enacted. Furthermore, a serious question 
has been raised regarding the actual independence of the regu-
latory commissions: Are the regulated actually running the 
regulatory agencies, rather than vice versa? There is, for 
example, substantial reason to suspect that the Federal Power 
Commission, which is charged with overseeing the activities 
of the electrical and natural gas industries, is actually run 
by industry representatives. An integral part of the New Deal 
was governmental intervention in the economy and the bureau-
cracy was Franklin Roosevelt's tool for accomplishing this 
end. The New Deal was thus the bold relief against which the 
politics of partnership was arrayed.4 
During Franklin Roosevelt's first term a policy of dir-
ect governmental intervention in the economy emerged and it 
certainly was not anywhere more apparent than in the 
4For a detailed background on FDR's conservation policy 
see Anna Lou Reisch, "Conservation under Franklin Roosevelt" 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 
1952). 
7 
.Administration's attitude toward conservation. Under the 
New Deal public power became an established fact. The Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA) was one of FDR's earliest 
accomplishments, followed in 1935 by passage.of the contro-
versial Public Utilities Holding Company Act and the creation 
of the Rural Electrification Administration (REA). Under tre 
leadership of Harold .Ickes the Department of Interior advo-
cated greatly increased federal planning and construction of 
dams. The Department's Bureau of Reclamation was thus an 
important political instrument for advancing the New Deal 
philosophy. · Soil conservation was not neglected either as 
the Soil Conservation Service (SCS)·was created within the 
Department of Agriculture. Furthermore, the Civilian Conser-
vation Corps (CCC) provided thousands of youths with jobs.5 
Politically, the conservation policy of the New Deal 
translated its b~geoning bureaucracy into a political weapon 
for the enforcement of the President's and his administrators' 
own philosophy. By creating agencies such as the TVA, REA, 
SCS, CCC, and others, the President created wholly new con-
stituencies which, over the long run, made valuable contribu-
tions toward sustaining himself and his successor, Harry s. 
Truman, in office for five consecutive terms. The Rural 
Electrification Administration was a case in point. Under 
5The growth of bureaucracy·and its impact on American life 
has received voluminous treatment. The following is only a 
sample of the scholarship in the area: Samuel P. Hays, Conser-
vatiort and the Gosnel of Efficiency. The Progressive Conserva-
tion Movement, 1890-1920 (New York, 1959); Gabriel Kolleo, The 
.Trium h of Conservatism. A Reinter retation of American His-
tory, 1900-1916 Chicago, 1963 ; and Robert H. Wiebe, The 
Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967) and Businessmen 
and Reform, A Study of the Progressive Movement (Chicago, 1962). 
8 
Morris Llewellyn Cooke the REA revolutionized life in rural 
America and it became an obvious success. Cooke took an ac-
tive personal interest in the creation of nonprofit co-opera-
tives. After six years in existence, four out of ten American 
far.ms had electricity; in 1950, it was nine out of ten. 6 The 
National Rural Electric Co-Operative Association was formed to 
influence legislation favorable to the REA and, conversely, to 
defend the REA from anti-New Deal attacks. Other pressure 
groups were also created tb accomplish like.results for their 
interests. The TVA became so politically potent that no poli-
tician from a TVA state dared defy it, lest his or her politi-
cal life be cut short. The Soil Conservation Districts pro-
tected the Soil Conservation Service. The National Reclama-
tion Association was organized in 1952 when the Bureau of 
Reclamation.appeared threatened by Congress. The Association 
feared the Bureau's appropriations would be cut and its func-
tions transferred to the Department of Agriculture. Organized 
labor, always an important element in FDR's coalition, also 
came to the aid of the New Deal conservation program. 
Economically, the New and Fair Deals introduced certain 
innovative and controversial principles. Under FDR deficit 
spending became an accepted fact of economic life. In terms 
of public power the New Deal planted the principle of pref er-
ence more firmly in the soil of American law. The principle 
simply stated that in the sale of power from federal dams and 
6william E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, 1963), 158. 
9 
other power installations preference would always be assured 
to public power agencies and cooperatives over private enter-
prise. In other words, the federal government would give 
preference to the TVA, REA, and other public power groups. 
Moreover, the federal government was actively competing with 
th~ private sector of the economy. The TVA most poignantly 
demonstrated the extent to which FDR would actively push the 
federal government into the economy. Here the federal govern-
ment directly owned and operated a power installation. When 
the critics called it "socialism," FDR explained that the TVA 
actually represented only a "yardstick" by which to measure 
the price rates charged by the private electric firms.7 
The New Deal did not face any serious opposition to its 
programs until after FDR's stunning re-election in 1936. A 
coalition of businessmen, disgruntled over the President's 
meddling with the free enterprise system, conservative southern 
Democrats, convinced their position in the Party was dwindling, 
and, of course, the Republicans, yearning to throw the Demo-
crats out of office, took definite shape. The business commun-
ity had to a large extent initially feared FDR anyway, but, 
because many business and community leaders had been discredit-
ed by the depression, many congressmen reluctantly went along 
with the Administration's legislative proposals. By 1937, 
however, the business community no longer feared whatever 
7For a brief background on the growth of the public power 
philosophy see John D. Hicks, Re~ublican AscendencyE 1921-1933 
(New York, 1963), 124-26; specifically for FDR's pu lie power 
philosophy see Reisch, "Conservation under Franklin Roosevelt," 
298-99. ' 
10 
chaos might ensue from open dissent to the New Deal. Many 
congressmen, disenchanted with the New Deal for a variety of 
reasons, now listened more attentively to these influential 
businessmen. 8 
Through the congressional seniority system "the solid 
South" gradually regained the political influence it had lost 
during the Civil War. Southern political leaders willingly 
supported the New Deal so long as it did not disturb southern 
agricultural, industrial, or social patterns. But after the 
1936 elections, when the northern wing of. the party, dominated 
by minority groups and labor unions, began to predominate, a 
southern revolt became inevitable. While southern political 
leaders might buck the national party, there was no chance they 
would officially turn Republican since southern voter antipa-
thy for Republica~s remained strong and the South's political 
power depended on its committee chairmanships. Of course this 
did not preclude southern political leaders from quietly work-
ing for the same objectives as their Republican ideological 
counterparts.9 
The crux of Southern opposition to the New Deal derived 
from a difference in economic philosophy. Dixie had been one 
of Woodrow Wilson's leading supporters for a regulated economy. 10 
8James T. Patterson, Con~ressional Conservatism and the 
New Deal (University of KentuCkY Press, 196?), 335-36. 
9Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 132. 
10John Robert Moore, "Senator Josiah w. Bailey and the 
'Conservative Manifesto' of 1937," Journal of Southern History, 
XXXI (Feb. 1965), 21-39; Anna F. Scott, 11A Progressive wind 
for the South., 1906-1913," J·ournal of Southern History, XXIX 
11 
So long as the New Deal did not venture beyond that the South 
remained loyal to FDR. But by 1936 the New Deal had gone a 
step beyond the Wilsonian regulatory state to more direct in-
tervention in the economy. Southern political leaders inter-
preted this development as a threat to the burgeoning economy 
of "the new South." As it had become industrialized in the 
twentieth century the South took on a "growth psychology" which 
made her conservative in economic complexion. Thus, the 
South's thinkbg was heavily biased in favor of states' rights, 
a balanced budget, and free enterprise. Obviously, deficit 
spending and support for labor unions and minorities were dia-
metrically contrary to these concepts. By 1940, the South 
found herself on the threshold of her greatest economic growth. 
Reflecting these attitudes, such important Southern senators 
\ 
as Walter F. George of Georgia, Tom Connally of Texas, and 
Josiah Bailey of South Carolina began to openly oppose the 
economic policies of the New Dealo11 
The circle of o~position was completed by the Republican 
party. Roosevelt's first administration had so routed the 
G.O.P. that after the 1936 elections there was serious specu-
lation the Republican party might never recover. 12 As a result 
(Feb. 1963), 53-70; Arthur s. Link, "The Progressive Movement 
in the South, 1870-1917," North Carolina Historical Review, 
XXIII (April, 1946), 172-19$. 
11More, "Senator Josiah Bailey," 22; Patterson, Congres-
sional Conservatism, 44-45, 112-13; George Brown Tindall, The 
Emer ence of the New South 1913-194 (Louisiana State-Univer-
' ; George 1owry, The Urban Nation (New 
York, 1965), 246-47; Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Pol-
itics (Uew York, 1956), 118-20. 
12As a result of the election the Republicans occupied 
88 seats in the House and 16 in the Senate. 
r 
. 12 
of this sad state of affairs Republican congressional leader~ 
under the leadership of Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, 
agreed upon a strategy of silence. The Republicans would 
henceforth vote as a bloc with Democratic conservatives but 
would let their newly-found bedfellows lead the vocal attacks 
on the New Dea1. 13 
Until 193?, the anti-New Deal coalition had not been 
firmly knitted together. In that year Republicans and Dixie-
crats worked together to oppose the sit-down strikes, a wages 
and hours bill, and government reorganization. What finally 
cemented the coalition together, however, was Roosevelt's 
attempt to pack "the Supreme Court. Under Vandenberg's leader-
ship the Republicans pursued their strategy of silence, con-
tent to let the southerners denounce the plan. Senator Charles 
McNary, one of the leading Republican opponents of the court 
packing scheme, commented: "Let the boys across the aisle [the 
southern Democrats] do the talking. We'll do the voting." 
Their strategy forced FDR to relent.14 As a result of this 
victory, in December, 193?, the coalition leaders collaborated 
in writing a conservative manifesto. Nearly all of the Demo-
crats who had fought the court packing scheme, particularly 
Senators Millard Tydings of Maryland and Walter George, as 
13cr. c. David Tompkins, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: 
The :&Iler ence of a Modern Renublican 1884-1945 (Michigan 
tate University Press, 1 , c • XII, "The Crisis of Roose-
velt's Leadership;" and Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 
102 t 108-09. ' 
14Tompkins, Vandenberg, 145-50; Moore, "Senator Josiah 
Bailey," 23-24; Tindall, :Emergence of New South, 60?-49; Pat-
terson, Congressional Conservatism, lol-07; Leuchtenberg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 254. 
13 
well as several Republicans, notably Vandenberg and Senator 
Warren R. Austin of Vermont, joined in the preparation of 
this ten-point declaration. The document, "An Address to the 
People of the United States," was a direct prelude to the 
Eisenhower philosophy of partnership. Briefly, the document 
expressed a desire for free enterprise, states' rights, a 
balanced budget, and opposition to "unnecessary" government 
competition with free enterprise. They contended that Roose-
velt was leading the nation down the dangerous path of social-
ism. The newspapers got hold of it and published it premature-
ly, making it politically necessary for the participants to 
deny any collusion. Nevertheless, the document pointed to 
the formation of a congressional alliance between Dixiecrats 
and the Republican party.15 
Roosevelt recognized the danger this coalition presented 
and decided to blunt it in the off-year elections of 1938. By 
the end of 193? the President's liberal, northern, urban ad-
visors, Harry Hopkins, Tommy Corcoran, Harold Ickes, and James 
Roosevelt, the President's son, began to explore the possibil-
ity of purging the Democratic party of some of the leaders of 
the conservative opposition. When Calude Pepper of Florida 
and Lister Hill of Alabama, both ardent supporters of the New 
Deal, won their primary contests for the Senate, the "elimina-
tion committee," as it was dubbed, decided to work actively 
for the defeat of select Democratic anti--New Dealers. Roosevelt 
l5Tompkins, Vandenber§, 145-50; Tindall, Emergence of 
New South, 624-25; Moore, Senator Josiah Bailey, 11 21-39. 
r 
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personally campaigned against such powerful Senate figures 
as Walter F. George, Millard Tydings and Cotton Ed Smith of 
South Carolina. Roosevelt's efforts failed, however, as all 
·three men were returned to the Senate. 
The 1938 elections had even greater significance for the 
Republicans, for the G.O.P. once again became a viable poli-
tical force. The Republicans picked up eighty-one seats in 
the House, eight in the Senate, and captured thirteen governor-
ships. No Republican incumbent running for the House suffered 
defeat. The President's close political advisor, James A. 
Farley, correctly called this election "the great turnover. 1116 
With the 1938 elections the conservative, anti-New Deal 
coalition came into undisputed control of Capitol Hill. In 
years to come, the coalition showed its fiber by preventing 
passage of further liberal programs. Administration-sponsored 
measures repeatedly felt the sting of defeat. For example, 
the coalition turned back efforts to create "seven little 
TVAs," to establish a permanent National Resources Planning 
Board, and to initiate a Columbia Valley Authority. 17 
16Lubell, Future, 13; Milton Plesur, "The Republican Con-
gressional Comeback of 1938," Review of Politics, XXIV (Oct. 
1962), 525-62; Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, chs. 8-
9; Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 266-73; Reisch, "Con-
servation under Franklin D. Roosevelt," 144; Tindall, Emer-
~ence of New South, 625-30; James MacGregor Burns, TheDead-
ock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America (New Jersey, 
1963), 166-6?. 
l?Reisch, "Conservation under Franklin D. Roosevelt," 
259-8?; Charles McKinley, Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest: 
Federal Management of Natural Resources in the Columbia River 
Valley (Berkeley, 1952), 543-617; Leuchtenberg,"Roosevelt, 
Norris, and the 'Seven Little TVAs,'" Journal of Politics, 
XIV (August, 1952). 
15 
The Republican victories of 1938 insured that the Party 
would once again be an important national political force. 
In that year Robert Taft of Ohio was elected to his first 
term in the Senate. Under Taft's and Vandenberg's leadership 
the Republican party increased its influence in Congress. 
And from 1938 onward the Party made steady gains in the House. 
By 1942 the Republicans reduced formal Democratic control of 
the House to five seats and, finally, in 1946, the G.O.P. 
won control of both houses of Congress. The Republicans from 
the Midwest and West, whose thinking lay much closer to the 
old progressivism than to the liberalism of the Eastern Repub-
licans, took control of the congressional party. Robert Taft 
became majority leader of the Senate, Kenneth Wherry of Neb-
raska the majority whip, Eugene Milliken cf Colorado chairman 
of the Republican caucus, and Styles Bridges of New Hampshire 
chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Moreover, Taft and 
Vandenberg agreed to split their official duties, with Taft 
representing the Party on domestic issues and Vandenberg on 
foreign affairs. Basically the Republican leadership was fis-
cally conservative and pre-New Deal in its social theory. It 
was overwhelmingly representative of nonurban states or those, 
like Ohio, with a strong tradition of conservative voting. 
In its rural and ideological background, the Republican leader-
ship shared much in common with the conservative Southern 
Democrats. In fact Taft wanted to be the Republican party's 
spokesman for domestic affairs precisely so he could expand 
his ideological alliance with the South. Taft, harboring 
presidential ambitions, knew full well that southern votes 
would be important to satisfying that thirst. 18 
16 
The Republicans had dented the "solid South" in 1928 and 
the Party's appeal continued to increase throughout the for-
ties. Between 1940 and 1948, for example, the Republican 
presidential vote in the South leaped fifty percent. The 
Republicans made gains particularl;r'.in the most urbanized 
states, Texas, Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina. During 
this period the G.O.P.'s tally in Houston and Dallas more 
than doubled. In the 1948 election Truman lost four states 
in the deep South. In 1950 Southern liberalism suffered two 
crushing primary defeats when Claude Pepper of Florida and 
Frank Graham of North Carolina lost their bids for the Senate. 
Significantly, a precinct-by-precinct breakdown in the major 
cities revealed a remarkably close corelation between the vote 
cast against Graham and Pepper and the Republican-Dixicrat 
showing of 1948. Furthermore, the Republicans made substan-
tial gains in the November, 1950 elections. The G.O.P. in-
ereased its Senate membership from 42 to 47 and its House mem-
bership from 171 to 199.19 Thus, by 1952, the Republican-
Dixicrat alliance was in a firm position to seize control of 
both the presidency and congress. 
18Mowry, Urban Nation, 228-29; Tompkins, Vandenber§, 178; 
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers or ;enator 
Vandenber5 (Boston, 1952), 318-19; Malcolm E. Jewell, Senator-
ial Politics and Foreign Policy (University of Kentucky, Press, 
1962), 72-74. 
l9Mowry, Urban Nation, 225-28, 234-35; George H. Mayer, 
The Republican ~ar -1966 (New York, 1967), 479; Lubell, 
Future, 107, 11 -1 , • 
l? 
In 1952, Robert Taft, the undisputed leader of Republican 
conservatives, dominated the Party's thinking and was the logi-
cal candidate for its presidential nomination. Taft feared 
that if the New Deal-Fair Deal policies continued to prevail, 
the American political system would give way to government by 
pressure groups unrelated to the old political constituencies. 
He, therefore, was more interested in curtailing the power of 
the New Deal interest groups and bureaucracy than in indis-
criminately repealing FDR's legislation. Taft clearly dis-
tinguished between the legitimate recovery measures that con-
formed to American political, social, and economic principles 
and the New Deal innovations that he felt would revolutionize 
the fabric of American society, thereby retarding the country's 
growth. Conssquently, the Taft-Hartley Act was not aimed at 
destroying labor unions so much as it was an attempt to restore 
a balance between labor and management. The Ohio senator also 
supported subsidies for low-cost housing and even tolerated 
the social security program. But Taft, an intransigent dis-
ciple of free enterprise, vigorously opposed projects like the 
TVA. To him the TVA, or 11King Kilowatt," as its conservative 
critics called it, was destroying the private utility industry 
and was operating as an a~tonomous monopoly almost beyond con-
gressional control. In a more general sense, then, Taft and 
his followers equated the New Deal with socialism, likening it 
to a malignant cancer that must be cut from the American body 
politic. During the 1938 campaign Taft succinctly explained 
his opposition to the New De~l and the idea of a regulated 
economy: 
In spite of manipulation of the currency, in spite 
of devaluing the dollar, in spite of deficits amount-
ing to $15 billion and the pouring out of public 
funds, in spite of unlimited power given to regulate 
farm industry, the coal industry, the utility indus-
try, and the issue of securities, in spite of count-
less additional powers as great as could be granted 
within the constitution, we are faced today with 
complete failure. 
18 
This was a theme to. which Taft and his followers repeatedly 
returned in attacking the New Deal-Fair Deal. Instead of 
government intervention, Taft advocated a balanced economy, 
states' rights, and the other traditional principles that had 
already been outlined in the conservative manifesto of 1937. 20 
The Republican convention in 1952 was not the lovefest 
one might have expected now that it finally appeared the Demo-
crats could be beaten; instead, the Party split wide open 
between the old guard conservatives and the Ea.stern liberals. 
Robert Taft was the easy choice of the Party's conservative 
wing. After a couple of primaries the Eastern liberals nar-
rowed their choice to Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Ea.stern Re-
publicans believed Taft's ideological rigidity would doom.the 
Party to defeat; this conviction was confirmed by various 
opinion polls. Eisenhower fitted neatly into their bill of 
particulars. As Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in 
World War II and Commander of the NATO forces, he was a popu-
lar military leader. 21 More than anything else, Eisenhower's 
20Ru~sel Kirk and James McClellan, The Political Princi-
ples of Robert A. Taft (New York, 1967), 16-17, 19, c4-25, 49-
55; I1ayer, Republican Party, 483. 
21Mayer, Republican Party, 487. 
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qualifications for the Republican nomination rested on the 
fact that as an unknown political quantity he had not offended 
anyone, as Taft had over the years. Ike possessed the image 
of a fair man and appealed to all colors in the political 
spectrum. 
Eisenhower had been reluctant to enter politics while 
still in uniform. Nevertheless, after Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts urged him, Eisenhower issued a 
statement in January 1952, testifying to his membership in 
the Republican Party. With this concession, Ike's supporters 
went to work. They showed their potential strength by defeat-
ing Taft in the New Hampshire primary in March and by picking 
up 100,000 write-in votes in the Minnesota primary. In April, 
however, Taft laid to waste any illusions that he might be an 
ineffective campaigner by defeating both Governor Harold Stas-
sen of Minnesota and Governor Earl Warren of California in the 
Wisconsin primary. When it became clear that Taft could wrap 
up the nomination unless Eisenhower departed from Paris and 
returned to the United States to actively campaign for the 
nomination, he resigned as Supreme Commander of NATo. 22 
Ironically, the crucial fight for the nomination turned 
on the seating of the delegates from Texas, Georgia, and Louis-
iana. The Southern wing of the Party was supposedly one of 
Taft's strongholds and the Eisenhower forces conceded that if 
Taft's delegates from these states were seated at the 
22~·t 482. 
. 20 
convention, the senator from Ohio could conceivably win a 
first ballot nomination. The Eastern Republicans determined 
to stop Taft by charging his forces with blatant delegate 
fraud in these states. Eisenhower even described this so-
called fraud as a "betrayal of the whole Republican party and 
its principles." Rather than fraud, however, the real issue 
was control of southern Republican state politics. 
For decades the southern Republicans had been reluctant 
to broaden the Party's appeal by bringing new blood into the 
Party, even.though some southern states had occasionally de-
serted Roosevelt and Truman. Since the local Republicans fed 
from the small trough of patronage supplied by the Taft wing, 
their object was not to win elections. On the contrary, they 
desired to keep the local party small and exclusive so that 
the Washington spoils would not_ have to be divided too thinly. 
But the South was crucial to the election of Eisenhower. This 
meant the Party's appeal would have to be broadened beyond 
anything the Republican regulars had ever envisioned. The 
die was cast by the time the convention convened. 23 
The Taft-controlled Republican National Committee offered 
a compromise whereby 16 of the 38 Texas seats would go to Ike. 
Lodge, Eisenhower's campaign manager, refused the offer and 
instead vowed to take the issue to the floor of the convention. 
Aiid this Eisenhower's strategists did. 
After dispensing with the preliminaries the Eisenhower 
forces wasted no time getting to the heart of the matter. 
23Burns, Deadlock, 183-84. 
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When Senator John W. Bricker qf Ohio offered the usual motion 
that the convention follow the 1948 rules, Governor Arthur 
Langlie of Washin~ton jumped to his feet with a substitute 
motion that had been carefully prepared by Eisenhower's strat-
egists. Langlie requested that the contested delegations of 
Georgia and Texas and thirteen delegates from Louisiana be 
denied the right to participate in the convention or on any. 
of its committees until their qualifications had been settled 
upon by ~ majority of the convention. A bitter debate ensued. 
Clarence J. Brown, a Taftite, offered a compromise motion that 
the convention turned down. Langlie's motion finally carried 
without a roll call vote. The Eisenhower strategists thus 
stymied a potential Taftite bandwagon before it had gotten out 
of first gear. The rest was anti-climactic. wnen Eisenhower 
received 595 votes on the first ballot, just nine short of 
nomination, Senator Ed.ward Thye of Minnesota changed his state's 
votes to Eisenhower. But the convention had left deep politi-
cal wounds in its wake. As Governor J. Bracken Lee of Utah, 
a diehard Taftite, bitterly recalled a few years afterwards: 
"I think actually, at the [1952] convention, if there hadn't 
been dishonest manipulation of the vote, Eisenhower would 
never have been nominated." Later this fissure was partially 
spliced together at the Morningside Heights Conference in New 
York, when Eisenhower and Taft held a long discussion about 
the upcoming election and Republican politics and philosophy. 
Afterwards T~ft announced that the two agreed on domestic 
policy and disagreed only on foreign policy. They agreed, in 
22 
short, on the need for an anti-New Deal domestic policy. 24 
In November Eisenhower won handily. His popular victory 
was 33,936,252 to 27,314,992 for Stevenson; in the Electoral 
College his margin was even more impressive-~39 states (442 
votes) to 9 states (82 votes). Significantly, Eisenhower car-
ried Texas, Florida, and Virginia as well as several border 
states. This southern vote was all the more impressive than 
Hoover's in 1928. This time the G.O.P. had presented many more 
candidates for state and local offices. Also, a large number 
of Northern Republicans had been enticed to move South by either 
financial opportunities or retirement prospects and they natur-
ally retained their Republican voting habits. Certainly Tru-
man's civil rights policy also had convinced many native 
southerners to shift their allegiance. 
Besides electing their first President since 1928, the 
Republicans also gained a slim margin in Congress. In the 
Senate the G.O.P. held a 49 to 47 edge and in the House a 221 
to 214 margin. While Eisenhower received 55.1 percent of the 
popular vote, the Republican candidates for the federal legis-
lature received only a li tt;le more than 50 percent. 25 Never-
theless,- Congress was not simply a tool to be used easily by 
24Mayer, Republican Party, 489-91; Merlo J. Pusey, Eisen-
hower the President (New York, 1956), 20; Sherman Adams, First-
hand Re ort: 'l'he St or of the Eisenhower Administration (New 
York~ 1961 , 16; J. Bracken Lee, "Eisenhower Adminis ration," 
transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted by Ed Edwin 
(Columbia University, for Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History 
Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas), 20; 
Mowry, Urban.Nation, 239. 
25Mayer, Republican Party, 494-95. 
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the new President. Robert Taft, still the leader of the Re-
publican legislators, was determined that Ike would live up 
to his campaign promises on domestic affairs. Moreover, the 
Dixicrat-Republican coalition remained as tacit as ever. 
While .they had serious differences over foreign policy, 
.Taft and Eisenhower agreed in their views on conservation. 
They were intransigently opposed to the New Deal initiatives, 
such as the TVA. Moreover, they felt the business community 
should be allowed more freedom from governmental intervention 
in developing the nation's natural resources. The new admini-
stration's policy of "partnership" was as much a reflection of 
TaftJs philosophy as it was of Eisenhower's. Conservation was 
one area where Taft and his followers would have no reason to 
complain about Eisenhower's leadership. 
CHAPTER II 
PARTNERSHIP PROFILE 
The Ei~enhower Administration's philosophy on natural 
resources development--called "partnership"--reflected the 
economic and social views of the Taft-Hoover wing of the 
Party, as well as their bedfellows, the Dixicrats. The core 
of the partnership philosophy did not involve repealing the 
New ·Deal recovery measures, but was an attempt to restore fis-
cal integrity to the federal budge.t, to cut runaway government 
spending by reducing the growing bureaucracy, and to give in-
centives to the business community and other local enterprises. 1 
Repeatedly Eisenhower and his appointees drove home their 
belief in these first principles. In his first State of the 
Union message, the President sought to reassure his critics 
that he had no intention of pulling the federal government 
complet.ely out of the field of natural resources development. 
"Soundly-planned projects already initiated should be carried 
out," he said. "New ones will be planned for the future." But 
he also· made plain his antipathy for the federal bureaucracy. 
"The best natural resources program for America will not result 
from exclusive dependence on Federal bureaucracy. It will 
1For a brief' sketch of the background to partnership see 
Raymond Moley, New Republican Onportunity (New York, 1962), 60-
61, and Arthur Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party (New 
York, 1956).-
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involve a partnership of the states and local communities, 
private citizens and the Federal Government, all working to-
gether. This combined effort will advance the development of 
the great river valleys of our nation and the power they can 
generate. 112 Later, in a Message to the Congress Relative toa 
Program Designed to Conserve and Improve the Nation's Resour-
ces, the President again stressed the central pillars on which 
his conservation policy rested: "To do this within the frame-
work of a sound fiscal policy and in the light of defense 
needs will require the maximum cooperation among the states 
and local communities, farmers, businessmen, and other private 
citizens, and the Federal Government."3 Should the Federal 
Government not reduce its expenditures, Treasury Secretary 
George Humphreys warned, there would be !'the destruction of 
all that we hold dear. 114 Eisenhower repeatedly invoked this 
inspiration from a Republican predecessor, Abraham Lincoln, to 
sum up what he conceived to be the proper role of the Federal 
Government in conservation: "The legitimate object of Govern-
ment is to do for a.community of people whatever they need to 
have done but cannot do at all or cannot do so well. In all 
that the people can individually do so well for themselves 
Government ought not to interfere."5 In other words, the 
2New York Times, Feb. 3, 1953, 15. 
3Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Paners of the President, 
1953 (Govt. Printing Office, 1960), 5~9. 
4Nathaniel R. Howard (ed.), The Basic Papers of George M. 
Humphrey, 1953-57 (Cleveland, 1965), 46. 
5speech ·at the opening of the Garrison Dam, North Dakota, 
June 11, 1953, in Public Papers, 1953. 
26 
Federal Government ought to minimize its role and allow local 
communities and business initiatives to do as much as they 
can--sooething they thought the New Deal had stifled. Signi-
ficantly, to implements its desire for fiscal integrity the 
Administration reduced expenditures for natural resources 
development; as the gross national product increased 15 per-
cent from fiscal years 1953 to 1956, federal spending for 
natural resources rose only 2 percent. 6 
The Republican and Democratic platforms in 1952 had ac-
curately shown the wide differences between the partnership 
and New Deal philosophies. The Republican platform called 
for legislation to better define the rights and privileges of 
grazers and other cooperators and users, for the end of arbi-
trary bureaucracy, and for protection of the grazers by 
independent judicial review board against administrative inva-
sions of the grazers' rights and privileges. The platform 
came out foresquare on the issue of water policy: "We vigor-
ously oppose the efforts of this [New Deal-Fair Deal] national 
Administration, in California and elsewhere, to undermine state 
control over water use, to acquire paramount water rights 
without.just compensation, and to establish all-powerful Fed-
eral socialistic valley authorities." On the controversial 
issue of offshore oil the Republican platform miequivocably 
championed restoration of this rich oil to the states. The 
Democrats, on the other hand, wrote a litany commending the 
6seymour E. Harris, The Economics of the Political Par-
~ (New Yor~, 1962), 303-04. 
r 
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New Deal-Fair Deal conservation efforts. In applauding the 
success of their Soil Conservation Service, and the new agri-
cUltural, forestry, and research progr8.I!ls, the Democrats 
.flatly stated: "These programs have revolutionized Atlerican 
agriculture and must be continued and expanded." They also 
pointed out that in 1935 only 10 percent of American farm 
homes had electricity and that in 1952 it was 85 percent. 
They further pledged to continue this effort and those like 
·the TVA and other river basin projects. Significantly, how-
ever, the Democrats fell silent on the volatile offshore oil 
issue.? Thus the Republicans were pledged to get the federal 
government out of resources development insofar as it was con-
sistent with national defense while the Democrats would contin-
ue to build on their past efforts. 
The Administration's emphasis on states' rights and local 
initiative produced an immediate appeal to many of the nation's 
governors who had been seeking to regain some of the lost power 
that, in their opinion, Washington had grabbed during the de-
pression and war. In early May 1953, the President met with 
forty-four state and territorial governors to discuss various 
problems facing the states. One of the most important topics 
of discussion was future participation of the states in natural 
resources development. The governors stressed their opposi-
tion to the "usurpation" of the states' prerogatives by·the 
Federal Power Com.mission in the development of hydroelectric 
?New York Times, July 11, 8; July 21~, 1952, 16-1?; Mayer, 
Republican Party, 491. 
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power and natural gas transmission lines. They further de-
clared the TVA a success but opposed the adoption of similar 
plans for the development of the Missouri and Columbia River 
basins. Generally they complained that agencies of the .Exec-
utive Branch inherently overrode established state policies 
and disregarded the rights of the states. Finally, the states' 
leaders voiced a protest that had arisen only since the end 
of the War. They viewed the rapid extension of natural gas 
lines as another instance of federal usurpation. 8 The Admini-
stration's ear was particularly receptive.to many of these 
complaints. For example, Arthur Larson, a member of the Ad-
ministration, fully articulated the need for "striking a new 
federal-state balance." Simply put: "If you have an Administra-
tion which lapses·comfortably into the habit of applying sweep-
ing federal remedies for all ills, you may look for another 
era of concentration of power in Washington and withering-away 
of state governments--this time perhaps forever •••• "9 Conse-
quently, the Eisenhower philosophy of partnership was well 
tailored to serve the protests against the federal government's 
encroachment on the rights of the states. 
The men Eisenhower appointed to his cabinet, subcabinet, 
Federal Power Commission, ~nd Atomic Power Commission fully 
agreed with the President's general philosophy and Republican 
platform. It is not entirely an exaggeration to say that the 
8New York Times, May 10, 1953, IV, 9. 
9Larson, A Republican Looks, 37-38. 
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Eisenhower cabinet was composed of "nine millionaires and a 
plumber," for admittedly, it was indeed a wealthy and conserva-
tive group. And the hand of Taft was felt everywhere. 10 Be-
cause he was better versed in foreign affairs than domestic 
issues, Eisenhower leaned heavily on his cabinet. Moreover, 
considering his military background, it was only logical for 
him to establish a chain of command by which he· delegated 
broad areas of responsibility to his subordinates. 11 Conse-
quently, the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture were deci-
sive in carrying out the Administrative partnership policy. 
The Department of Interior especially was a representa-
tive case of the Administration's orientation. As perhaps the 
most influential agent in the formation of a natural resources 
policy, the interior department had become a center of great 
notoriety during the New Deal, especially under the direction 
of Harold Ickes. Thus the man picked to fill this post would 
have to be wholly in tune with the Administration's partnership 
policy. Traditionally one of the essential qualifications was 
that the Secretary had to come from the West. Since the 
lOMoWry, Urban Nation, 240; Eric Goldman, The Crucial 
Decade--And After, America, 1945-60 (New York, I96o), 24042. 
11Mayer, Retublican Party, 495; Clarence Davis, "Eisen-
hower Administra ion," transcript of a tape recorded interview 
conducted by Ed Edwin (Columbia University, for Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Oral History Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 
1968), 13. In his interview Davis noted: "But on domestic 
issues, I.would feel that the President was a long ways from 
being an expert on the national economy, labor, a lot of. 
things that are prominent national issues, and therefore he 
was governed pretty largely by the views of the Cabinet man 
who had that particular field within his domain. That showed 
up at many of these cabinet meetings." 
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partnership philosophy stressed a bigger role for the states, 
it was only fitting that Eisenhower searched for a governor 
to fill the post. Governor Arthur Langlie, who had played an 
important role in Eisenhower's nomination victory, could have 
had the job but decided otherwise since he had just been 
elected to another four year term as governor. Also it was 
rumored that Governor Dan Thornton of Colorado might receive 
the nod but Eisenhower discarded him; as one insider put it, 
"they thought he would be a bull in a China shop." Senator 
Guy Cordon of Oregon declined the Secretaryship but recommen-
ded the governor of his state, Douglas McKay. When Eisenhower 
offered the position to the governor.it was accepted.12 
Douglas McKay was virtually unknown outside Oregon and 
Republican circles. Born in Portland in 1893, he worked his 
way through Oregon State College as a janitor, and, in 191?, 
received a Bachelor of Science degree in agriculture. After 
receiving his degree McKay became a successful automobile 
salesman. In 1933, he was elected mayor of Salem, Oregon. 
Except for a brief tour in the Army during World War II, he 
served as state senator from Marion County from 1935 to 1949. 
In 1948 McKay was elected governor of the state and was re-
elected two years later.13 In presidential politics Governor 
12Davis, OH, 5?; Adams, Firsthand, 62-66; Eisenhower, Man-
date, 86-87; Raymond Moley, Newsweek (Nov. 17, 1952), 120. ~ 
~Department of Agriculture, Federal Power Commission, and 
the Atomic Energy Commission will be dealt with in detail in 
later chapters. 
l3New Yo~k Times, nov. 12, 1952, 18; 
Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 
of Governor Dou las McKa to be Secretar 
uary 3 , • 
Senate, Committee on 
1st Sess., Nomination 
of the Interior (Jan-
r 
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McKay supported Thomas Dewey's nomination in 1948 and fully 
supported .Eisenhower's drive for the nomination four years 
hence. On the eve of the forty-fourth governors' conference 
in 1952, McKay and Governor Thornton launched an offensive 
designed to convince the uncommitted colleagues that Taft 
would weaken the Republican ticket in the Pacific and Mountain 
states. McKay also became involved in the delegate fight over 
Texas. Along with Governors Sherman Adams of New Hampshire 
and Dewey of New York, McKay sent a telegram to the Republican 
National Committee in Chicago urging the seating of the Eisen-
hower delegates from Texas. They claimed it was "important to 
the honor and integrity of the Republican Party that the Eisen-
hower delegation from Texas be seated at the national conven-
tion. ii At the convention McKay played a leading role in ob-
taining West Coast delegates for Eisenhower; for example, he 
attempted to woo his friend, Governor Earl Warren,into releas-
ing the California delegation.14 
McKay's outspoken social and e~onomic views, in the opin-
ion of Sherman Adams, the President's political confidant, were 
"probably more conservative than anyone else in the consider-
ably conservative Eisenhower Cabinet. 1115 In a statement rank-
ing only second to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson's, McKay, 
shortly after· accepting the Interior appointment, made unequi-
vocally clear his mission: "We're here in the saddle as an 
14New York Times, June 30, 8; July 2, 16; July 9, 9; 
Nov. 21, 1952, 1. 
l5Adams, Firsthand, 236. 
32 
administration representing business and industry. 1116 And his 
views on states' rights, local initiative, and natural re-
sources development were in perfect conformity with the thrust 
of the partnership philosophy. McKay made it perfectly clear, 
for example, that he opposed the New Deal's rural electrifica-
tion program because it damaged free enterprise. He was admit-
tedly in complete agreement with the Republican platform plank 
on public works and water resources. 17 
The men serving under McKay were cut from the same cloth. 
Before coming to Interior, Clarence Davis had represented the 
electrical industry in western Nebraska. He was first appoin-
ted Solicitor and two years later was promoted to Under Secre-
tary of Interior. Davis, who had been recommended by his 
friend Senator Butler of Nebraska,,was familiar with the Bur-
eau of Reclamation. He opposed much that had gone on under 
the Ickes and Oscar Chapman stewardships. In his opinion: 
We're at the point now ••• where the power in Washing-
ton can control elections, it can control economic 
life, it can decree economic death, it can do this, 
that and the other. And slowly, therefore, the pat-
tern is set for a completely socialized America.18 
Fred A. Aandahl, formerly a governor and congressman from 
North Dakota, became Assistant Secretary of Interior. As a 
congressman he had voted five times out of seven against public 
16Harris·, Economics of Political Parties, 11; Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr.t Kenned or Nixon: Does It Hake An Difference? (New 
York, 1960;, • Wilson ad said: What is good for General 
Motors is good for the United States." 
17senate Hearin:::s, Nomination of McKay, 4-6, 12, 17-18. 
18Davis OH, 3-4, 10, 11~ 61. 
It. . 
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power programs. As a congressman from Montana, wesley D'Ewart 
had been a leading advocate of turning public grazing lands 
over to private interests. After he was defeated for the Sen-
ate in 1954, D'Ewart was named Assistant Secretary of Interior 
in charge of lands and reclamation.19 
McKay's appointment was greeted by mixed emotions. Ray-
mond Moley, generally sympathetic to partnership and openly 
hostile to Ickes and the Bureau of Reclamation, concluded that 
McKay had already begun to attack the bureaucracy, Meley pre-
dicted that the New Deal "propaganda machine he inherited 
will vanish. He will economize." The wall Street Journal 
also gave him a favorable review: "McKay is a proponent.of 
public power and of government reclamation projects--but with 
a difference. He wants the people of the states affected to 
have voice, and he wants to let private utilities do the dam 
building wherever they are able and willing. One token of his 
position: He had opposed the idea of creating any Columbia 
River Authority, modeled on the TVA." On the other hand, Berg-
man, writing for the New Republic, expressed serious reserva-
tions about the appointment. It was his belief that McKay was 
too business-minded and conservative. He asked: 
Will Douglas McKay--like Harold Ickes and Oscar Chap-
man before him--fight for the principie that public 
power sh-0uld be used for the benefit of all the people, 
not for the private-power companies? •• oWill McKay keep 
them in the public domain where the government can 
charge reasonable rates to the big and little stock-
men alike? Will he protect our too rapidly dwindling 
~WIS~ 15Y a,.,,~ 
l..oyo 1> 
UAJtv l4 U'> ( c~s,.,.."Y 
l13~ARy 
l9Harris, Econonics of Political Parties, 
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.forests froo exploitation by lumber interests? 
Needless to say he was quite sceptica1. 20 
Eisenhower found little congressional opposition to the 
confirmation of his high-level cabinet and commission appoint-
ments, but this was hardly the case with his bureaucratic 
appointments. One of the initial problems confronting the 
new Secretary of Interior was the dismissal of bureaucrats 
imbued with the philosophy of the New and Fair Deals. To 
make matters difficult, Truman had revised the civil service 
rules to insure the retention of his appointments after he had 
departed the White House. After taking office, Eisenhower 
ordered that all positions "of a confidential or policy-. 
determining character" should be removed from the merit system. 
FeW'-~bservers could disagree, for instance, that the direc~or­
ship of the Bureau of Land Management was a policy-determining 
position and therefore should not be in the category of classi-
fied service. 21 "The crux of the problem," Under Secretary 
Ralph Tudor explained, 
lies in the inability of the Secretary rof Interior] 
to replace bureau heads and their assistants, regional 
directors of various bureaus, attorneys and others to 
whom, in an organization as large and diversified as 
Interior, must be delegated the authority and respon-
sibility to make policy. Virtually all of these of-
.fices are now occupied by persons fully protected 
against removal or transfer by the administration of 
Civil Se.rvice. 
20Moley, "Take, But Don't Grab," Newsweek, 42 (May 11, 
1953), 112; Bergman, New Republic (Dec. 1952). 
21Herman Miles Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the 
Change in Administration," American Political Science Review, 
48 (March, 1954) , 141-43. 
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Consequently, Tudor "strongly urged that Civil Service b.e im-
portuned to take a realistic look at requests for transfer of 
policy-making positions to Schedule •c•. 1122 Clarence Davis 
concurred, asking: " ••• but what do you do to make your ideas 
effective in a big Department when the chiefs of the bureaus 
••• are all owing allegiance to somebody besides you and have 
very small regard for your notions about things? 1123 McKay 
.iwasted no time making known his feelings. He told a meeting 
of the Department's employees that they need not fear a big 
shake-up, but he did warn there would be changes in top-level 
posts; where "we Will put in some new people sympathetic with 
the position of the Administration. 1124 
There was little doubt that the Bureau of Reclamation 
would be one of McKay's first targets. As early as April, 1952, 
one writer predicted that 
if there is a G.O.P. victory at the polls next Novem-
ber, they vow that one of the first orders of business 
will be separating the Interior Department from its 
loudest and least repressible mouth [Michael Strauss, 
Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation].25 
Soon after his appointment, McKay confirmed that prediction 
by announcing that Michael Strauss' dismissal would be high on 
his list of priorities. Taking this hint, Strauss declared 
his intention to submit his resignation on the day Eisenhower 
22Memo, ·sept. 16, 1953, Tudor to McKay, Tudor Papers, Box 
1, Eisenhower Library. 
23navis OH, 18-19. 
24New York Times, Jan. 27, 1953, 15. 
25 . P. F. Healy, "Our Most Arrogant Bureaucrat," Saturday 
Evening Post, 224 (April 19, 1952), 150. 
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was sworn into office. 26 While getting rid of Strauss proved 
easy, it was no simple trick finding a suitable successor. 
Under Secretary Tudor first recomraended Lyman Wilbur, 
chief engineer of the Morrison-Knudson Company, for the posi-
tion. Tudor considered him "quite capable" both as an engin-
eer and administrator. 27 Nevertheless, McKay chose Marvin 
Nichols, a pro-Eisenhower Democrat from Fort Worth, Texas. 
Nichols had the full endorsement of both Texas senators, Lyn-
don Johnson and Price Daniel, plus Jack Porter, the state's 
Republican National Committeeman. 28 The White House staff, 
however, was sceptical of his past connection under the Truman 
administration with a government-owned nickel mine and plant 
at Niccaro, Cuba. The Nichols nomination thus was held up 
for over two months. In a confidential memorandum to Charles 
F. Willis, Jr., a Special Assistant to the President, Under 
Secretary Tudor insisted there was "nothing in the records 
available to us that would indicate that he [Marvin Nichols] 
performed his assigned job in a manner other than entirely 
proper and to the advantage of the United States Government. 1129 
Nevertheless, on June 27, 1953, Nichols withdrew his name, in-
dicating that the White House Staff had opposed his appointment. 
26New York Times,. Dec'. 17, 1952, 24; Newsweek, 40 (Dec~ 
29 ' 19 52) ' 18 .. 
27Memo, April 13, 1952, Tudor to McKay, Tudor Papers, Box 
1, Eisenhower Library. 
28New York Times, April 23, 1953, 24. 
29Memo, May 15, 1953, Tudor to Willis, Tudor Papers, Box 
1, Eisenhower Libra~y. 
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McKay accepted the withdrawal and on July 9 recoI:l.Dended Wil-
bur Dexheimer, who had served as a Lt. Colonel in the Corps 
of Engineers, principally in China. After the War Dexheimer 
had been employed by Morrison-Knudsen for railroad, highway, 
and port surveys in China. \./hile at that company he had served 
as Ralph Tudor's "principal assistant." In 194?, Dexheimer 
became the Assistant Chief Construction Engineer in the Bureau 
of Reclamation's Denver office.3° He was appointed, and fin-
ally, after seven months of wrangling between the White House 
Staff and the interior department, there was now a Commissioner 
of the Bureau of Reclamation. 
McKay also sought to replace Albert Day as Director of 
the Fish and Wildlife Service. Tudor recorded in his diary 
that Day was ;;a little different and over the years has become 
a rather tyrannical bureaucrat. ,,-3l Day had been a career biol-
ogist in government service for nearly thirty-five years and 
had been Director for seven years. In return for stepping 
down as Director, McKay offered him another position with the 
Service. John L. Farley of Seattle, a community relations 
director of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, was designated 
30New York Times, July 14, 1953, 15; July 9, 1953, McKay 
to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-E, Box 118, and Confidential 
Letter, August 24, 1953, Tudor to Nichols, Tudor Papers, Box 
1, Eisenhower Library; Phillip Sirotkin and Owen Stratton, 
The Echo Park Controversy (Inter-University Case Program, 
1959), 65. 
3l"Notes Recorded While Under Secret;ary, Department of 
Interior, March, 1953-Sept., 1954," Tudor Papers, Box 1, Entry 
for April 26, 1953, Eisenhower Library. 
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his successoro32 When Day charged that his removal came as a 
result of "special interests," particularly the California 
duck _hunters and salmon packers, several congressmen and pro-
fessional conservationists agreed. Senator Estes Kefauver 
warned that McKay had "decided to use one of the principal 
scientific and conservation agencies of the Federal Government 
for political purposes." Rachel Carson, author of the best-
seller, The Sea Around Us, viewed Day's ouster as "one ominous 
threat to the cause of conservation and strongly suggests that 
our national resources are to become political pawns." Nature 
Magazine and John B. Oakes of the New York Times added that 
the ouster might discourage others from seeking careers as 
government conservationists. The Emergency Committee on Natur-
al Resources, an organization composed of thirty-two conserva-
. 
tion groups, was especially distressed by the Day affair. "We 
believe," the Committee wrote Eisenhower shortly after the in-
auguration, "that such agencies ••• should be administered and 
operated by professionally trained individuals selected under 
the Civil Service System and not subject to replacement for 
political reasons." On February 19, the Committee protested 
the Day dismissal to McKay, explaining that the Service "has 
done a good job in guarding this resource [wildlife], and in 
placing the i·nterests of the resource above that of any group 
which seeks it exploitation." Although the Committee subse-
quently met with Eisenhower to discuss the matter of career 
32New York ·rimes, April 18, 1953, 22. 
p 
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conservationists in federal employment, the specific subject 
of Day's removal was not brought up. At a press conference 
the President defended the Day dismissal, as well as others, 
saying that "if these people could not support those [Ad.mini-
stration] policies and their positions, they had no other re-
course but to resign, as he saw it." Farley succeeded Day.33 
Unlike Day, Marion Clawson, Director of the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM), did not accept his dismissal quietly. 
Clawson had been Director since 1948 and a career official 
since 1929. The Administration considered him too indepen-
dent and, as one put it, "primarily a semi-socialist." Clar-
ence Davis, for example, expressed this opinion: 
Marion Clawson has the philosophic belief that all 
land ought to be under the control of the government, 
that they LBLMJ could manage it much better than the 
private owners could manage it, and he was just total-
ly out of touch with what we roughly call the free 
enterprise, opportunity system that the Republican 
Party by and large has stood for, and certainly McKay 
has stood for. 
In a twelve-page letter to McKay, Clawson, rather self-serving-
ly, argued that his dismissal has "set back for twenty years 
or more a sound program of conservation and management of 
Federally owned lands and resources." Further, he called 
McKay's charges of "insubordination" false and asked to be 
33navid ·cushman Coyle, Conservation: An American Stor~ of 
Conflict and Accomnlishments (Rutgers University Press, 19 ?), 
236; "Careers and ()onservation," Nature Ma~azine, 46 (June, 
1953), 313; John B. Oakes, "Conservation; olitical Issue," 
New York Times, May 3, 1953, II, 28; Memo, April 15, 1~53, 
McKay to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-4-F, Box 119, Eisenhower 
Library; "Wildlife Chief Dismissed, Science News Letter, 63 
(May 2, 1953), 279; New York Times, April 20, 20; April 21, 20; 
April 24, 16-17; April 29, 17; June 9, 1953, 22. 
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retained in office. McKay, of course, did not complyo "It is 
evident," the Secretary replied, "that we would not be able to 
work together in any harmony under the circumstances and there-
fore your removal will serve to promote the efficiency of the 
Federal service." A deal, however, was worked out by which 
Clawson was offered a job in the Middle East. Ed.ward Woozley, 
an Idaho State Land Commissioner, replaced him.34 
Finally, McKay and Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah recom-
mended that Charles Forbes be replaced by Tom Lyons as Direc-
tor of the Bureau of Mines. John L. Lewis of the United Mine 
Workers protested the Lyon appointment. Like the others, 
Forbes had been a forty-year career man and Director of the 
Bureau since 1951. But when Lyon testified he had no respect 
for the mine safety program, protests erupted from Congress 
and the White House had to withdraw the nominee from considera-
' tion.35 
Besides installing its own men in key bureaucratic posi-
tions, the Administration also faced the difficult task of 
reorganizing and trimming the bureaucracy. One of Eisenhower's 
major campaign themes, in fact, had been government inefficien-
cy due to the runaway growth of bureaucracy; he had pledged 
to cut the bureaucracy and thus government spending. It was 
easier said t-han done, however. One of the departments that 
. 34Davis OH, 18-21; New York Times, April 23, 20; April 22, 
1953, 32; Somers, "Federal Bureaucracy," 144. 
35New Yo.rk Times, April 26, 1953, IV, 2; Somers, "Federal 
:.. .. Bureaucracy," 138-39; Adams, Firsthand, 77. 
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had especially swelled in size during the New Deal had been 
Interior. Between 1932 and 1952 the staff of the Department 
had almosttripled in size. Such unchecked growth, the Admini-
stration contended," constituted an unmitigated danger to Amer-
ican liberty.36 Moreover, it was a fact that interagency con-
flicts often resulted in needlessly increased expenditures and 
overlapping responsibilities.37 Past attempts to reorganize 
the multitude of conservation agencies had met with failure. 
The Corps of Engineers had been a special target. Two commis-
sions were thus established by the Eisenhower administration 
to study the problems of government reorganization. 
The President's Advisory Commission on Government Organi-
zation, known as the Rockefeller Commission, was established 
by Eisenhower at the end of November 1952, and was composed 
of Nelson Rockefeller, its chairman, Milton Eisenhower, the 
President's brother, and Arthur Fleming, Director of the Office 
of Defense Mobilization. The Commission submitted twenty-one 
unpublished studies to the President.38 The Commission, seek-
ing to reorganize the departmental functions of la.nd management 
and water resources, recommended that land management of the 
36Moley, Reuublican Otportunit~, 64-68. In 1932, the 
Department of Interior emp~oyed 20, 86 and in 1953 it was 59,369. 
37For examples of these interagency conflicts, cf. Coyle, 
Conservation, 139-41; Grant McConnell, Private Power and Ameri-
can Democracy (New York, 1966), 221-22, 244-45; Arthur Maas, 
Huddy ~.Ja ters: The Army Engineers and the Ha ti on' s Rivers (Cam-
bridge, 1951 ). 
38somers, "Federal Bureaucracy," 133. 
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Federal Government be unified under a single head. To do 
this the Commission suggested that the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment in the Department of Interior be transferred to the De-
partment of Agriculture.39 Reflecting conclusions of earlier 
studies, the Rockefeller Commission also advised that the 
civil functions of the Corps of Engineers be transferred to 
the Department of Interior.40 Furthermore, the Secretary of 
Interior should continue to exercise exclusive appointive power 
over the Directors of the Bureau of Mines, Indian Affairs, 
Reclamation and the Geological Survey. "This recommendation," 
the Commission said, "is consistent with the principle of 
strengthening the executive authority of the department heads." 
The power planning functions and investigation of gas resources 
should, the GoID.11lission felt, be transferred from the Federal 
Power Commission to the Department of Interior. The First 
39President's Advisory Co:mnittee on Government Organiza-
tion, Memorandum No. 9, March 12, 1953, Central Files, OF-103-
A, Eisenhower Library. McKay objected to this proposal. In-
stead, he felt the Forest Service in the Department of Agri-
culture should be transferred to Intetior. He gave two reasons: 
(1) that the Department of Interior should be a "Department of 
Natural Resources," and (2) that land nanagement activities 
are an element of the functions of such other bureaus of the 
Department of Interior as the Indian Service, Bureau of Reclama-
tion, the Fish and Wildlife Service, Geological Survey, and 
the National Park Service. The Committee, on the other hand, 
contended that "public lands management is not the major pur-
pose of Bureaus such as the Indian Service, Geological Survey, 
and the Natiqnal Park Service." 
40rbid., 5. The Co:mnittee correctly said: "Because the 
Corps of"Eiigineers has projects in most Congressional districts, 
and because of, the close relationship between the Corps and 
Congress, the rabove] proposal will probably encounter'the 
most determined opposition of any reorganization proposal un-
der consideration." The Second Hoover Commission was equally 
critical of the Corps. Cf. Commission on Or~anization of the 
Executive Branch of the Government (June, 1955.),802-21. Perci-
val C. Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget (New York, 1970), "" 
170-71 .• 
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Hoover Commission (1949), established by President Truman to 
study the Executive Branch, had recommended this as well. The 
Rockefeller Com.mission hoped this recommendation would "make 
the functions more susceptible to executive direction and in-
tegration with the broader programs of the Executive Branch." 
In the past the FPC, jealous of its prerogatives, had opposed 
any such transfer. 41 
The Republican Congress also established another comm.is-
sion to investigate mainly power and water resources. Former 
President Herbert Hoover, the Commission's chairman, had been 
openly hostile to the New Deal's water and power policies. In 
1953 Hoover outlined his general views. "The first step toward 
socialization," he contended, 
was taken when the Federal Government undertook itself 
to generate and distribute this electric power from 
multiple-purpose dams. And now the Federal Government 
has taken further socialistic leaps by building stream 
and hydro plants solely for the generation of electric 
power. 
Hoover recommended that "a temporary Commission" be set up to 
study a reorganization of the Federal Government's role in 
water and power resources. He became the head of that Commis-
sion and his views were strongly reflected in its report.42 
In effect the Commission on the Organization of the Execu-
tive Branch of the Government (the Second Hoover Commission) 
gave a blanket endorsement to the Administration's partnership 
41Ibid., 4. 
42Herbert Hoover, "Socialization of Electric Power; There 
Must Be Checks on Government as Well as Private Economic 
Powers," Vital Speeches, 19,.No~ .3 (1952-53), 425. 
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philosophy: 
It is apparent from the foregoing summary and analysis 
of the present status of Federal power authorities 
that Government economy and efficiency can be effected 
in the field of power by reducing expenditures·, abol-
ishing activities not necessary to the efficie~t con-
duct of Government, and eliminating nonessential activ-
ities which are competitive with private enterprise.43 
The Commission asserted that the preference clause,· one of the 
bulwarks of the New Deal's power program, had accomplished 
its goal and now privately owned utilities should be permitted 
to purchase power generated at Federal projects.44 In short, 
the Commission warned that: 
Presently the only areas in the country where serious 
electric pm·:er shortages are anticipated in the future 
are those where the Government's power activities have 
become so dominant that the normal local non-Federal 
utilities have not been in position to function as the 
rest of the country.45 
The Commission was thus opposed to projects like the TVA. It 
re~soned that such "c,ompeti ti on by the Federal Government with 
private enterprise in the power field is more extensive than 
in any other single governmental field and has taken on many 
aspects which are the negation of our fundruµental economic sys-
tem. "46 The purpose of the Commission's analysis was to reduce 
4 3c · · 0 · t · f th 1:'..r t · B h f om.mission on rganiza ion o e LAecu ive ranc o 
the Government (June, 1955), 305. 
44commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of 
the Government, Task Force Re)ort on Water Resources and Power 
(Washington, D.C., June, 1955 , II, 3?6. 
45rbid., 291-93. Cf. also Neil NacNeil and Harold W. 
Metz, The'"lioover Re ort What It Means to You As 
Citizens and · ..... axpayers New York, 1 , 1 • 
46Metz and MacNeil, The Hoover Report, 132. 
....__ 
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the impact of the Federal Goverru:ient on private enterprise; 
that is, to lessen the government's competition with private 
utilities. The Com.mission's recommendations regarding the 
construction of steam plants and transmission lines, the sale 
of power to preference customers and the fixing of rates to 
be charged on Federal projects were all designed to meet this 
objective. 4? 
The Comr:i.ission's report was also sharply critical of the 
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. It found 
these two agencies were "not realizing in its sales prices of 
power eit~er the fair value or the full economic cost of the 
electric energy produced by it." To remedy this situation, 
the Commission concluded that "complete authority should be 
lodged in the Federal Power Commission to see that rates for 
all federally produced power conform at all times with the 
established standard. 1148 
Finally, the Commission recommended that local and state 
agencies and organizations should undertake water resources 
development except when it was needed to safeguard the national 
interest or to accomplish some other national objective. The 
Federal Government should assume responsibility only when the 
means are beyond the local and state bodies.49 
An integral part of the Administration's attempt to 
47Hoover Commission, Task Force Report, I, 36. 
48
commission on the Ex:ecutive Branch of the Government 
(June, 1955), 309. 
49Hoover Commission, Task Force Report, I, 36 • 
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reorganize the Federal Government was decentralization. Ac-
cording to this view the Federal Government's bureaucracy had 
become too centralized under the New Deal and there was now a 
need to decentralize the various agencies. After all, how 
else can local initiatives take precedence? In fact, McKay 
had recounted that when he took office in January 1952, he 
"faced bureaucratic concentration of resource management re-
sponsibility approaching the dangerous point." Under Secretary 
Tudor found the same thing: 
While the authorities and responsibilities of the 
Assistant Secretaries are well defined, the bureaus 
act to a large extent independent of the Secretaries. 
Every opportunity should be taken to insure that the 
bureaus do, in fact, answer to the secretaries. 
McKay resolved to rectify this deteriorating situation.50 
Two of the most independent bureaus, Reclamation and Land 
Management, became special targets for decentralization. 
The Bureau of Reclamation was one of the first bureaus to 
undergo decentralization. In August 1953, McKay set up a com-
mittee to study reorganization of the Department of Interior. 
The Committee concluded that one of the major defects of the 
Department was that too much time and money were concentrated 
in Washington. It therefore recommended that the Bureau of 
Reclamation's Washington Office be reduced so that only 
50McKay, Natural Resources of U.S. Reported to Local Con-
trol," The Oregonian, Oct. 18, 1954; Memo, May 6, 1953, Tudor 
to McKay, Department of Interior, Special Office Files, no 
box number, National Archives. Tudor also sent McKay two 
other detailed memos on "Department Reorganization," and 
"Staff Reorganization," in Tudor Papers, Box 1, Eisenhower 
Library. 
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essential staff and liaison functions would be performed there. 
All responsibilities for technical analysis, review, and deci-
sion should be vested in the Denver office. While this region-
al concept should be continued, it said, all district offices 
should be discontinued. The report's suggestions were approved 
and made effective on October 28, 1953. As part of this ef-
fort to streamline, the Bureau's staff was cut by 10 percent 
in the first six months after McKay took office. The new Com-
mission of the Bureau of Reclamation, Wilbur Dexheimer, ex-
plained the need for decentralization to the National Reclama-
tion Association. 
We [the Bureau of Reclamation] will be glad to assist, 
of course, but the major responsibility--the initiative 
--is yours, for you are the people who know best what 
you want and why you want it. Rather than have the 
Bureau act as salesman we ask you to be the sal~sman-­
both locally and in Congress.51 . 
While replacement of bureaucrats and studying how to re-
organize the Executive Branch were important, the heart of the 
Administration's partnership policy was presented in concrete 
terms by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB). Wielding the Admini-
stration's budget cleaver was Joseph M. Dodget, a Detroit 
5l"Report on Reorganization of the Bureau of Reclamation," 
(mimeographed), Sept. 30, 1953, Department of Interior, Spe-
cial Files, no box number, National Archives; in the same 
source also see Memo, Aug. 26, 1953, Aandahl to Dexheimer, and 
Speech, Adams-, Oct. 14, 1953, before the National Reclamation 
Association, Reno, Nevada; New York Times, Oct. 29, 1953. For 
background information on the centralization of the Bureau, 
see Frederic Cleaveland, "Administrative Decentralization in 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation," Public Administration Review, 
XIII (Winter, 1953), 17-29. The decentralization of the Bur-
eau of Land I1.anagement is discussed in a later chapter. 
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banker, who became the first Director of the Bureau. The New 
neal's natural resources policy was immediately put on his 
chopping block. And it must be noted that when BOB spoke, it 
did so for the President; simply put, no executive-initiated 
legislation could escape coming under the Bureau's scrutiny. 
In short, BOB, in dollar terms, set the tone for, if not the 
actual policy to be followed by the cabinet departments. 
Shortly after the November election Dodge was dispatched 
to Washington to help prepare the budget for the coming fis-
cal year. As part of this work he reviewed the previous ad-
ministration's land and water resources policy. The Truman 
policy was changed by the incoming Director through BOB Cir-
cular A-47. The Circular set temporary economic standards to 
be followed by the federal Agencies dealing with the "censer-
vation, development and use of water and related land resour-
ces" until the President's Advisory Committee on Water Resour-
ces Policy could file its report. Essentially the Circular 
attempted to translate Eisenhower's partnership philosophy 
into actual economic practice. In other words, it attempted 
to reduce the role of the Federal Government in resource man-
agement activities. In an administratively confidential memo 
to the President about a year after issuance of Circular A-47, 
Dodge plainly revealed the Bureau's policy: 
The objectives of a resource policy should be to pro-
vide pe1'.'manent solutions to clearly established needs, 
developed and continued according to sound practices, 
a minimum of Federal investment, including as much 
local participation as possible in operation, control 
and eventual ownership; and an adequate interest return, 
with appropriate terms of repayment on reimbursable 
projects.52 
Following these guidelines, McKay issued a new power 
49 
policy statement for the Department of Interior. Before it 
was drawn up the. statement had been discussed in detail with 
representatives of the White House, Corps of Engineers, Bur-
eau of the Budget, Federal Power Commission, and the Cabinet. 
Each of these agencies agreed with its general principles. 
The new statement reversed the one established in 1946 by 
President Truman. The upshot: "The Department of Interior 
will particularly emphasize those multipurpose projects with 
hydroelectric developments which, because of size or complex-
ity, are beyond the means of local, public or private enter-
prise." But: 
It is recognized that the primary responsibility for 
supplying power needs of an area rests with the people 
locally •••• The Department does not assume that it has 
the exclusive right or responsibility for the construc-
tion of dams or generation, transmission and sale of 
electric energy in any area, basin, or region.53 
52A copy of the Bureau of the Budget Circular A-47, Decem-
ber 31, 1952, can be found in Central Files, OF-72-B, Eisen-
hower Library; Thomas L. Stokes, "Budget Bureau's Powers Grow," 
washington Star, May 3, 1955, in John S. Bragdon Staff Files, 
Box 7, Eisenhower Library; Somers, "Federal Bureaucracy," 133; 
"New Rules Will Cut U.S. Dam Building," Business Week (Dec. 
25, 1954), 22; Percival F. Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget 
(New York, 1970), ; Memo, Administratively Confidential, 
November 23, 1953, Dodge to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-
155, Box 825, Eisenhower Library. 
53Tudor, "Notes on Power Policy Statement," July 30, 1953, 
Tudor Papers, Box 1, Eisenhower Library; Confidential Letter, 
July 31, 1953, Tudor to Senator Hugh ButJ_er, Tudor Papers, Box 
l; Commission on the Organization of the .Executive Branch of 
the Government (June, 1955), 1112-19, gives the Interior power 
statenent under Eisenhower and Truman. 
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The new power policy of the Interior Department received 
a mixed reaction. The National Reclamation Association passed 
a resolution in 1953 endorsing the new power policy. But the 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association objected, not-
ing that the new policy "would make the preference clause mean-
ingless, would undermine all Federal power programs and ulti-
mately would destroy the farmers' electrification program in 
many areas. 11 .54 
In defending itself, interior department representatives 
explained they intended to follow the laws regarding prefer-
ence rights. But, as Fred Aandahl said, the Administration 
was "deeply disturbed when ••• those who even at this early 
stage are crusaders for a Federal power monopoly try to use 
the Rural Electric Cooperatives and their associations to fos-
ter Federal monopoly." Moreover, the Department stressed the 
need for economy on the part of the Federal Government. In 
1954, McKay told the National Reclamation Association simply: 
Frankly stated, the task is too vast, especially in 
the present state of the budget, to be done by the 
Federal Government alone. We cannot carry the tremen-
dous defense expenditures of the moment and also at 
the same time sponsor all of the projects for water 
use and control which may be desirable. 
Hence: "There is convincing evidence that local initiative, if 
given the chance, is prepared to tackle local water problems 
54November 17, 1953, Clyde H. Seybold to Eisenhower, Cen-
tral Files, OF-l-J-2, Box 10, Eisenhower Library; Clyde T. El-
lis, A Giant·sten (New York, 1966), 121; Wesley D'Ewar~, "Ei-
senhower Adlllinistration Project," transcript of a tape recor-
ded interview conducted by Ed Ed.win (Columbia University, for 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History Project, Eisenhower Library, 
Abilene,Kansas, 1967). 
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vigorously and constructively."55 
The Administration's new water and power policy was offi-
cially formulated by the President's Advisory Committee on 
Water Resources Policy. The Committee, established on May 
26, 1954, was directed "to undertake a comprehensive review 
looking toward modernization of Federal policies and programs 
in the field of water resources." It was composed of repre-
sentatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare, Defense, Commerce, and Interior, and the 
Bureau of the Budget. At its meeting on October 20, 1954, 
the Committee agreed that "the role of the Federal Government 
should be in general that which has been expressed again and 
again by the President and members of the Cabinet; i.e., the 
basic partnership policy ••• " The Committee's report, delivered 
in December 1955, concluded that there was no national water 
problem. "Instead," it said, 
there are nationwide problems relating to the use and 
development of water resources which vary widely be-
tween different sections of the country and frequently 
between local areas •••• A uniform national blueprint 
for water resources development is neither practicable 
or desirable. 
55The representatives of the Department of Interior de-
fended the new policy. Some of the speeches: Aandahl to NRECA, 
Miami, Florida, Jan. 12, 1954; McKay, Address to the National 
Reclamation Association, Oct., 1953, Reno, Nevada; Proceedings 
of the T\"1enty-Second Annual Meeting, National Reclamation As-
sociation (washine;ton, D.C., 1953), 113-14; Senator Pat Mccar-
ran before the NRA, Reno, Nevada, Oct. 1953; Dexheimer, speech 
before the Association of Western State Engineers, Kansas City, 
Kansas, Aug •. 26, 1954; McKay, speech before NRA, Portland, 
Oregon, Nov. 8, 1954; McKay, speech before 344th meeting of 
the National Industrial Conference Board, Pittsburgh, Pa., 
Nov. 19, 1953, in Elmer Bennett Papers, Boxes 10-11, Eisen-
hower Library. 
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Thus, each area of the country ought "to be considered in the 
light of its own present and anticipated problems." To accom-
plish this objective the Committee recommended the establish-
ment of strengthened water resources committees for coordinat-
ing state and federal resources activities. In 1958, Con-
gress authorized these interagency committees. The Committee 
also recommended the establishment of an advisory Inter-Agency 
Committee on Water Resources, to operate as a "medium for 
coordination" for the Departments of Agriculture, Army, Health, 
Education and Welfare, Interior and the Federal Power Commis-
sion. In the Executive Office of the President there should 
be established an office of Coordination of Water Resources. 
Further, the Committee suggested that a Board of Review be 
created within the Executive Office. The members of this 
Board would be completely separated from the Federal agencies 
dealing with water policy and it should not be involved in 
projects coming before it. The Board would report to the 
President through the Coordinator of Water Resources.56 
By the end of its first year, the Eisenhower policy of 
partnership had encountered the wrath of most conservationists. 
The mutual suspicion between the two was no more evident than 
56Davis OH, 25-31; D'Ewart OH, 16-17; May 26, 1954, Eisen-
hower to McKay, in Public Papers of the PresidentnR 1954, 509-
10; :Memo, Nov. 2, 1954, McKay to Adams, "?regress eport--
Cabinet Committee on Water Resources Policy," and Water Re-
sources Policy, A Report by the President's Advisory CoI!lIDittee 
on water Resources Policy (December 22, 1958), in Central 
Files, OF-155-I, Box 840, Eisenhower Library; Irving K. Fox 
and Isabel Picken, The Unstream-Downstream Controvers . in the 
Arkansas-White-Red-Basin urvey n er-Universi y ase Pro-
gram, 1960), 1. 
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in the preparation for the Mid-Century Conference on Resources 
for the Future. During the campaign of 1952 both contestants 
agreed that a conference on natural resources should be held. 
Not long after his inauguration Eisenhower agreed to the con-
vening of such a conference and. instructed the appropriate 
government ·agencies to cooperate.5? 
The Mid-Century Conference was funded by the Ford Foun-
dation and organized by Resources for the Future, Inc., an 
independent organization dedicated to studying and evaluating 
federal conservation policies. One of Resources for the Fu-
ture's leading spokesmen was Horace M. Albright, a well-known 
conservationist. Since he was both a Republican and a business-
man, Albright was ably suited to act as a bridge between the 
White House and the conserv-a.tionists.58 
From the beginning, the White House was suspicious of the 
organizers of the Conference. The President's chief political 
advisor, Sherman Adams, felt the staff and Board of Directors 
of Resources for the Future was biased in favor of the New 
Deal; he saw them as "idealists" and "planners." Joseph 
Dodge, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, took an equally 
negative view. "As far as the over-all objectives of the 
5?Albright, OH, 813; Feb. 21, 1953, Albright to Eisen-
hower-, Central Files, OF-134-G, Eisenhower Library; March 6, 
1953, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1953, 91-92; New York 
Times, March?, 1953, 11; also·ci'. menos, undated, Hauge to 
Arthur Burns (Council of Economic Advisors), McKay, Dodge, 
Fleming, and the Director for Mutual Security, Central F.iles, 
OF-134-G, Eisenhower Library. 
58nonalu Swain, Wilderness Defender, Horace M. Albright 
and Conservation (University of Chicago, 1976), 293. 
Conference go," he wrote Eisenhower, "I have my fingers crossed; 
I still believe its emphasis will be to the left, New Dealish, 
and Democratic, and that the forces really in control are not 
friends of the Republican party." He then suggested that in 
his speech convening the Conference, Eisenhower ought to say 
that the conservation movement is stagnant and "has not had 
a new thought for fifty years." After all, "The hard core 
conservationists, to a great extent, belong to those groups 
who think the government can do everything •••• " To assuage 
these feelings the Conference leadership agreed that no policy 
suggestions would be made by the Conference. Also the leader-
ship allowed the President to renege. on his commitment to hold 
the Conference at the \./hite House.59 
For the past year the conservationists had been openly 
critical of the partnership policy. The offshore oil, Hells 
Canyon, mineral resources, Echo Park, grazing and atomic energy 
controversies each elicited a torrent of criticism for the 
Administration. Observing this concern, Albright wrote Dr. 
Gabriel Hauge, a presidential assistant, that the President's 
speech to the Conference ought to "strongly" confirm the poli-
cies established by Theodore Roosevelt. He warned that "a 
general impression has spread over the country that this 
59swain, Wilderness Defender, 297; Memo, undated, Dodge, 
Central Files, OF-155, Box 825, Eisenhower Library; Albright 
OH, 815-18; Memo, March 2, 1953, Hauge to Eisenhower, Central 
Files, OF-134-G, Eisenhower Library. Hauge advised the Presi-
dent to write a positive letter to Albright endorsing the Con-
ference: "In recommending this action, I want to say that Al-
bright and company couldn't have .been nicer in letting us 
get out of the White House Conference commitment which they 
had on the basis of campaign correspondence." 
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administration is somehow or other going to weaken the conser-
vation policies that have been built up to control our renew-
able and non-renewable resources since the days of Theodore 
Roosevelt." This impression, he said, had been created by 
the offshore oil issue, the D'Ewart grazing bill, the dismis-
sal of certain civil service employees (e.g., Day and Claw-
son), and concern over Olympic National Park and Glacier View 
Dam. The President's speech, to his mind, was thus an oppor-
tunity for the Administration to reassure conservationists 
that it understood and was sympathetic to. their problems. 60 
The Mid-Century Conference, held in December 1953 at the 
Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C., was attended by about 
1,600 conservationists, business leaders, labor officials, 
\ scientists and representatives of i'ederal, state and local 
governments. Practically all the important conservationists 
attended. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, however, refused to endorse the Con-
ference. The Conference discussed a wide range of resource 
topics. Significantly, though,Eisenhower's opening remarks 
were short and noncommital. After telling the Conference he 
was "delighted" to see such a meeting convened, the President 
reminded them: "You are not going to waste your time taking 
notes· and forming a lot of conclusions. In other words, this 
looks to me like a body that is really going to work on the 
for 
Box 
60swain, Wilderness Defender, 301-02·; 
!"ir. Gabriel Hauge, 11 November 27, 1953, 
4, Eisenhower Library. 
Albright, "Notes 
Bryce Harlow Files, 
56 
subject." And he was right. The Conference did not spark 
originality; rather, it became immersed in cliches about water, 
minerals, land, trees, grazing, and wildlife resources. Never-
theless, the Conference at least gave the need for conservation 
some badly needed publicity and did assure the future of Re-
sources for the Future. The Administration's attitude toward 
the Conference did not help allay the fears of conservation-
. t . th 61 is s ei er. 
61swain, Wilderness Defender, 299-301; Resources for the 
Future, Mid-Century Conference \Washington, DoC., 1953); News 
Release, Dec. 4, 1953, Central Files, OF-134-G, Box 684, Eisen-
hower Library; New York Times, ·nee. 3, 1953, l; Business Week 
(Dec. 12, 1953), 188. 
CHAPTER III 
AN OPENING WEDGE: 
THE.OFFSHORE OIL CONTROVERSY 
Few natural resources have been more enveloped in contro-
versy than oil. The person of John D. Rockefeller, Sr., and 
the scandal of Teapot Dome serve as only two examples. The 
years following World War II certainly proved no exception. 
Off the coasts of California, Texas, and Louisiana valuable 
oil deposits lay ready for exploration. In 1894, oil was 
first discovered off the coast of California and in 1938, 
the Standard Oil Co. and Pure Oil Co. jointly constructed a 
/ 
successful oil well in the Gulf of Mexico. This offshore oil 
now became the central issue in a political, constitutional 
and economic controversy that was not finally resolved until 
Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president in 1952.1 
Since oil and natural gas were integral parts of the 
economy, not only of the three coastal states but of the 
entire Southwest as well, the question of ownership of the 
1This oil issue has often been mistakenly called "the 
tidelands oil controversy." Actually the oil involved in this 
controversy was not in the "tidelands." Rather it was located 
under· the marginal sea off the coasts of California, Louisiana, 
and Texas. Hence, the controversy was over what more accur-
ately is the offshore oil. 
In 1845, the Supreme Court, in Pollard's lesse v. Hogan, 
declared that the tidelands and the bottoms of the inland 
lakes and rivers were owned by the states and not the Federal 
Government •. The tidelands, therefore, were not at issue hereo 
Cf. J. Skelly Wright, "Jurisdiction in the Tidelands," Tulane 
Law Review, 32 (Feb. 1958), 175-86. 
57 
58 
offshore oil properties exerted a pervdsive influence. Oil 
and natural gas were basic ingredients in the future indus-
trial growth of the South and Southwest. By 1956, 49 percent 
of Texas, 47 percent of Louisiana, 45 percent of Oklahoma, 
42 percent of wyoming, and 52 percent of Florida were leased 
for oil exploration. Large oil companies meant badly needed 
managerial and labor skills, technology, new markets, and as-
sociated industries would soon flow into these regions. Out 
of oil and natural gas came the need for a chemical industry. 
As early as 1929, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana 
produced about 59 percent of the nation's oil and about 40 
percent of its refining capacity. Since oil was gradually re-
placing coal as the nation's most important energy resource, 
" the South and Southwest were especially receptive to the 
states' rights pleas of California, Texas, and Louisiana. 
And there was no doubt the prize was a big one. Based upon 
figures determined by the Geological Survey, Mastin G. White, 
Solicitor of the Department of Interior, estimated that in 
1952, the worth of the continental shelf beneath the marginal 
sea adjacent to the coasts of California, Louisiana, and Texas 
would have an aggregate value of $7,070,000,000 and that the 
minimum royalty would be $883,750,000. This then was no in-
significant controversy. 2 
2Robert Engler, The Politics of Oil: Private Power and 
Democratic Directions (University of Chicago Press, 1961), 
~' 395; Tindall, Emergence of the New South, 91, 463; June 13, 
1952, Mastin G. White, to Stuart French, Department of Inter-
ior, Office of the Secretary, Central Files, 1937-53, Box 
3284, National Archives. 
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The essential issue was Hhether these oil properties 
should be owned by the Federal Government or the individual 
coastal states. The Federal Government claimed paramount 
rights to the oil, while the states maintained_ they had rights 
to the oil extending to their historic boundaries. All three 
states insisted they had at least a three-mile boundary; Tex-
as, however, went further and laid claim to a ten and one-half 
mile historic limit. Finally, a hostility to the New Deal, 
particularly the Department of Interior, always lurked beneath 
the surface. The drama was fully played out in the courts 
and the political process. 
The Roosevelt and Truman Administrations had strongly 
urged retention of the offshore oil deposits in the hands of 
_,,.--· 
the Federal Government for the twin purpose of conservation 
and national defense. Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes, an 
irascible New Dealer, originally favored leasing the lands by 
the states but around 1937 he reversed that position and now 
advocated federal control of the lands. It ought to be noted, 
however, that the Department of Interior had a vested interest 
of its own in this oil. If Ickes harbored any reservations 
the war only served to convince him of the correctness of his 
new position. "The war has impressed us with the necessity 
for an ·augmented supply of natural resources," he wrote to 
Roosevelt in 1943. "In this conviction I draw your attention 
to the importance of the Continental Shelf not only to the 
defense of ou~ coUn.try, but more particularly as a storehouse 
of natural resources." He, therefore, recommended that the 
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Departments of Interior, Justice, and State, together with the 
National Resources Planning Board, investigate how this recom-
mendation could be implemented. Before the end of the war 
there was no doubt the offshore oil was extremely valuable. 
Ickes' recommendation also aroused considerable criticism; in 
fact, the lines for the confrontation were n<l'lclearly drawn. 
The Association of Attorneys General, for example, took violent 
exception: 
There is and can be no middle ground. If Mr. Ickes 
can seize one square foot of the tide or suomerged 
lands in any state and maintain his seizure, it will 
be the official duty of federal officers everywhere 
to complete the conquest of all like areas in all the 
states. 
In other words, according to this view, the encroachment of 
the bureaucracy of the federal government on the prerogatives 
of the states that had gained power under the New Deal must 
be stopped and the off-shore oil question was a good place to 
lay down the gauntlet.3 
In January, 1946, the offshore oil question struck poli-
tically sensitive nerves when President Truman decided to 
nominate Edwin Pauley as Undersecretary of the Navy. Pauley, 
a prominent California oil mogul, had exerted important 
3En.gler, Politics of Oil, 88; June 5, 1943, Ickes to Roo-
sevelt, and Memo, Aug. Io, 1944, Lee to Harper; "Brief of At-
torneys General in Support of Joint Resolutions Quieting Ti-
tles of States to Lands Beneath Tidewater and Navigable Waters," 
(1954)(their emphasis), in Department of Interior, Office of 
the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3278, 
National Archives. For an example of the political importance 
of oil, in general, during depression days in Texas, see Sena-
tor Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, !1y Name' Is Tom 
Connally (New York, 1954), 162-64. 
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influence in the Democratic party. Between 1941 and 1945~ 
Pauley had served in various high level positions with the 
Democratic National Committee. He had been, in fact, one of 
the "quartet of kingmakers" who, in 1944, had persuaded Roose-
velt to dump Henry Wallace and take Harry Truman as his run-
ning mate. Consequently, when Truman succeeded FDR, Pauley 
was one of the men who stepped into the President's inner cir-
cle. His fund-raising efforts as Treasurer of the Democratic 
National Committee erased the Party's deficit. What made 
Pauley front page news, however, was his close connection with 
the offshore oil issue. 
Pauley certainly understood that.good politics and good 
business mix well together. Thus, since·he had been the head 
of a modest-sized oil firm, the Petrol Corporation, Pauley 
naturally took a keen interest in the offshore oil develop-
ments. He strongly supported the claims of the states and 
admitted having used his political influence to introduce 
William W. Clay, the Assistant Attorney General of California 
and one of the bulwarks behind the state-ownership forces, to 
Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House, and to the chairmen of the 
House and Senate Judiciary Committees that would dispose of 
the oil issue. 
Harold Ickes brought the issue to the fore when he pub-
licly accused Pauley of attempting to bribe him with a large 
contribution for the Democratic Party. As part of the agree-
ment Ickes wa& supposed to request the Justice Department to 
drop a federal suit pending against California, Texas, and 
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other states concerning the offshore oil. This allegation 
was also substantiated by Abe Fortas, the Undersecretary of 
Interior. When Truman refused to withdraw Pauley's name, 
Ickes resigned from the Cabinet. At a press conference the 
former Secretary of Interior dramatically placed all his 
cards on the table: "I don't care to stay in an administra-
tion where I am expected to commit perjury for the sake of 
the party." The resignation had its intended effect, however. 
To save the Ad.ministration any further embarrassment Pauley 
reluctantly asked that his name be withdrawn and Truman com-
plied with his request on March 18, 1946. Now the offshore 
oil issue was fully before the public's eye.4 
In order the settle the matter Ickes had persuaded the 
U.S. Atto~ney General to bring the issue before the Supreme 
Court. In a suit brought against California the Court rendered 
a close verdict in favor of the Federal Government. Justice 
Hugo Black, a consistent New Dealer, declared in the majority 
opinion that the Federal Government possessed "paramount 
rights" to the oil and other subsurface minerals in the off-
shore area. He wrote: "Conceding that the state [of Califor-
nia] has been authorized to exercise local police power func-
tions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared 
boundaries, these do not detract from the Federal Government's 
paramount rights in and power over this area." In other words, 
4For details on the Pauley affair see Gerald Nash,-United 
States Oil Polic 1890-1964. Business and Government in Twen-
ie Century America Universi y o ?i s urg ess, , 
182-83; Cabell ?hillips, The Truman PresidencK. The Historh of 
a Triumphant Succession (New York, 1966), 41- ?; Goldman, ru-
cial Decade, 19; Engler, Politics of Oil, 341-48. ~ 
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the Federal Government must exert whatever power and dominion 
are necessary to protect the country from dangers to its 
national security and tranquility. In cases involving Louisi-
ana and Texas the Court made similar judgments.5 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision left many 
questions unanswered. As the Solicitor of the Department of 
Interior conceded to Texas Congressman Lindley Beckworth, 
the matter of who should administer the offshore lands of the 
continental shelf had not been resolved by the California 
d . . 6 ecision. Furthermore, the problem of how the proceeds from 
the development of the oil and gas resources in the continen-
tal shelf should be used and distributed was not settled. 
These were knotty problems that Congress would have to unravel. 
Thus, while the Federal Government had won a significant vic-
tory in the California case, it was still possible for Congress 
to give the oil to the states. 
Important local organizations in California and Texas pro-
tested the decision of the Supreme Court and exhorted their 
congressmen to push vigorously for passage of a bill transfer-
ring these lands to the states. Two examples ought to suffice. 
The Texas State Board of Education passed a resolution calling 
upon "all of the officials of Texas, particularly our Senators 
5united States v. California, 332 u.s., 19 (194?); United 
States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); and United States v. 
Texas, 339 U.S. ?o? (1950). Cf. also Wright, "Jurisdiction," 
178-79. 
6Mastin G. White to Rep._ Lindley Beckworth, Department 
of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Files, 1937-53, 
Box 3283, National Archives. 
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and Congressmen to continue to exert their uncompromising ef-
forts to procure the passage of an act of Congress removing 
said cloud from our title." The Harbor Island Causeway Com-
pany of California put it more bluntly: "We believe that the 
recent Supreme Court decision re: Ownership of California 
Tidelands, evidences a dangerous un-American trend toward a 
confiscatory principle as regards ownership of property."? 
Truman was nonetheless determined that control of the 
offshore oil should remain within the purview of the Federal 
Government. And on two occasions he vetoe.d bills which would 
have transferred these lands to the states. In his first 
veto the President explained that Congress should not deal 
with the problem while the Supreme Court was still consider-
ing the case. The second veto simply pleaded that the oil 
was essential for the nation's defense. In a speech to the 
Americans for Democratic Action in 1952 Truman, with character-
istic verve, summarized his reasons. He painted a dark pie-
ture of oil lobbies pressuring "us to turn over to a handful 
of states, where the_ powerful private oil interests hope to 
exploit it to suit themselves." He labelled the state owner-
ship idea "robbery in broad daylight--and on/a colossal scale." 
This did not mean, however,, that the Administration had been 
?Aug. 11, 194?, Texas State Board of Education resolu-
tion; Feb. 21, 1948, Harbor Island Causeway Company; among the 
local protesting groups were Optimist, Rotary, and Kiwanis 
clubs, VFWs, American Legion, Chambers of Commerce, local bar 
associations and city councils; see Department of Interior, 
Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, 
Boxes 3280-81, National Archives. 
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unwilling to strike a compromise of sorts. Senators Joseph 
O'Manoney of Wyoming and Clinton Anderson of New Mexico 
sought passage of a bill that would have given federal regula-
tion to all oil and gas leases in the submerged lands prior 
to December 1948, which were in good standing on June 5, 1950, 
when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Texas 
and Louisiana cases. The Secretary of Interior would then 
negotiate these leases. In return, the states would receive 
37>2 percent of the income derived from the portion of the 
shelf situated within their historic boundaries. Oscar Chap-
man, Secretary of Interior, later lamented, "I believe that 
if the O'Mahoney-Anderson proposal had been passed by Congress, 
it would have been signed by President Truman." But this over-
ture was unacceptable to the states; they would bargain no 
compromise.8 
• The Administration was not without support of its own. 
Labor endorsed the federalist position. For example, in the 
midst of the heated campaign of 1948, the International Assa-
ciation of Machinists intoned: 
The [oil trust] conspirators of 1948 will eventually 
be smoked, as were the Falls and Sinclairs of the 
1920's ••• We must forestall another Teapot Dome •••• 
You, Mr. President, have proven yourself a faithful 
champion of the people's rights in the tidewater oil 
resources •••• 
Also, R. V. Bottomly, the Attorney General of Montana, had 
8Aug. 30, 1952, Chapman to Maverick, Secretary of Inter-
ior, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-
53, Box 3284, National Archives; Ernest Bartley, ~he Tidelands 
Oil Controversy: A Legal n.nd Historical Analysis (University 
of Texas l~ess, 1953), 227-28. 
66 
previously sup:;:-orted the states but in 1947 he changed his 
mindo He now believedit "is apparent that the proponents of 
this legislation [to give the offshore oil to the states] are 
primarily the large [oil] companies ••• "9 
While the principal participants in the controversy were 
the states of California, Texas, and Louisiana, the State of 
Washington jumped into the fray in 1952, an election year. 
In late 1951, the Department of Interior learned that washing-
ton State was issuing oil and gas permits or leases on the sub-
merged lands underlying the open waters of the Pacific Ocean. 
Upon learning in February 1952, that the Union Oil Company of 
California had oil leases in Washington, the Secretary of 
Interior, Oscar Chapman, wrote Governor Langlie demanding that 
the practice be halted. Citing the doctrine of paramount 
rights, Chapman maintained that the oil in question "is not 
now and never has been owned by the State of Washington." 
Langlie disagreed, insisting that Chapman had no right to 
impose such an "edict" on his state. "Your statement," he 
wrote Chapman, 
that such area is not now and never has been owned 
by the State of Washington, attempts to secure for 
the Federal Government certain rights and controls 
which definitely lie within the scope of the powers 
of Congress to determine. It is one more instance 
of the usurpation of legislative powers by judicial 
and administrative decree. 
Langlie went on to make a case for Washington based on her 
9 Oct. 29, 1948, A. J. Hayes and Eric Peterson to Truman; 
and Dec. 5, 1947, in Department of Interior, Central Classi-
fied Files, 1937-53, Boxes 3280-81, National Archives. 
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historic boundaries, an argument similar to those of the three 
coastal states. Chapman again pointed out to the governor 
that the historic boundary question already had been laid to 
rest by the Supreme Court. He further warned Langlie that 
"Pending the enactment of legislation with respect to the 
submerged lands of the continental shelf adjacent to the coast 
of the United States, I am under a duty ••• to protect the inter-
ests of the United States in such lands by preventing the un-
authorized removal from them of oil and gas or other minerals." 
Senator Harry Cain (R-Wash.) countered that Chapman's logic 
could be applied equally to the inland waterways. The Secre-
tary of Interior vehemently denied this assertion. "With re-
gard to the tidelands and the beds of navigable inland waters 
situated within the boundaries of a State, it has been well 
settled by decisions of the Supreme Court for more than a 
hundred years that such lands belong to the State (or its 
grantees~" Chapman wrote O'Mahoney in the middle of the Lang-
lie.controversy. The secretary continued: "So far as I am 
aware, no responsible official of the Federal Government has 
expressed a contrary view at any time during the past hundred 
years." As we will see later, this particular aspect of the 
controversy did not cease here. In March, 1952, Chapman re-
quested that the Attorney General initiate "an appropriate 
judicial proceeding" against the recalcitrant Langlie in order 
that the controversy "may be resolved in the orderly, objective 
manner provided for in the Constitution." But the election of 
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1952--not the courts--settled the issue.10 
By 1952, the offshore dilemma had reached a political 
stalemate. The Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the Fed-
eral Government but the claims of state ownership enjoyed over-
whelming support in Congress. Twice Congress had voted a 
quitclaim for the states and twice Truman exercised a veto. 
At any time a bill favoring the states could be passed but 
there were serious doubts that the President's veto could be 
overridden in the Senate. Yet no bill advocating federal 
control was ever passed out of a congressional committee. 
Little hope existed that the issue would be finally resolved 
until there was a change in the White. House's attitude. 11 
In 1952, the two presidential candidates made their views 
on the subject unequivocal. Even before the two conventions 
1
°Feb. 19, 1952, Fred Bush, Union Oil Company of Calif-
ornia, to z. G. Snow, Oil and Gas Supervisor, Department of 
Interior; Dec. 20, 1948, Sam Grinsfelder, Vice President, 
Union Oil Company of California, to Otto A. Case; Feb. 12, 
1952, Chapman to Langlie; March 7, 1952, Chapman to O'Mahoney; 
March 20, 1952, Chapman to J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General; 
in Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central 
Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3284, National Archives. Sena-
tor Cain made his attack plain: "This doctrine of paramount 
power which the Secretary of Interior asks to impose on the 
sovereignty of the State of Washington violates the guaranties 
provided by our Constitution which protect private property 
and the riehts of States and unless this doctrine is stopped 
by the Congress it can lead to the nationalization of the 
natural resources of our Nation regardless of the State in 
which they may be located. If the Federal Government, alleg-
edly in the interest of national defense has this right of 
paramount power over the submerged lands and resources of Wash-
ington, California, Texas, and Louisiana, it has the same 
power over every farm, river, mine, and factory in every state 
in the Nation." Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 
v. 98, part 2 (March 5, 1952), 1890-92. 
11Bartle~, Tidelands Oil Controversy, 215, 229-30. 
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the differences between the two parties was explicit. All 
three leading candidates for the Republican nomination, Taft, 
Eisenhower, and Governor Warren of California, supported the 
claims of the stat;es. Among the Democrats, only Senator Rich-
ard Russell of Georgia, championed the rights of the states. 
Stevenson, of course, fully supported Truman. The issue was 
far from being partisan, however. In October, Senator Wayne 
Morse, a Republican from Oregon, announced he would sit out 
the campaign, saying it was "a sad thing that Eisenhower in 
apparent ignorance of United States Supreme Court decisions 
has been taken in by selfish interests who seek to steal tid&-
lands belonging to all the people of ·the.United States." 
Morse later endorsed Stevenson. But the issue divided the 
1? Democrats much more than the Republicans.~~ 
The oil issue was especially volatile in Texas and Louisi-
ana. In November, 1951, Congressman J. Frank Wilson of Texas 
told Chapman that a rumor was circulating to the effect that 
the Interior Department intended to take over and operate the 
offshore lands under the War Powers Act. Wilson did not think 
Chapman would seriously entertain doing such a thing but just 
in .case he issued this warning: "I believe the consequences 
of any such action will be more serious than is anticipated 
by those who favor any such move." And he was correct. In 
the 1952 election, Texas became a bitter political battle-
field between those Democrats who remained loyal to the 
- ... _ 
12Ne'W York Times, July 1, 14; July 11, 10; Oct. 14, 22; 
Oct. 19, 1952, 1. 
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national party and those who broke away over the oil issue. 
Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senator Lyndon Johnson both supported 
Stevenson, though they disagreed with his position on offshore 
oil. Johnson explained it this way: "I thoroughly disagree 
with Governor Stevenson on his views regarding ownership of 
the Texas tidelands; the fact that Governor Stevenson is wrong 
on this issue does not automatically make General Eisenhower 
right on all other issues."14 The Democratic candidates for 
governor and senator did not see it that way; they broke with 
the national party. Price Daniel, the Attorney General of 
Texas and an outspoken leader for state ownership, was the 
Democratic candidate for the Senate and he ran precisely on 
this issue. In a speech before the Fourth Annual Bankers' 
Clinic of the First National Bank, Daniel warned against the 
dangers of an overly centralized government. He noted: "No 
issue presents a better opportunity for Texans to act against 
this type of government than in the tidelands controversy. 1115 
14New York Times, Aug. 29, 1952, 11. 
l5"Three Papers Delivered at the Fourth Annual Bankers' 
Clinic of First National Bank," Houston, Oct. 20-21, 1951, in 
Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Clas-
sified Files, 1937-53, Box 3283, National Archives. Indica-
tive of how deep this political schism in Texas went, Senator 
Tom Connally decided not to run for reelection. Both Daniel 
and Shivers were, in the words of Connally, "bitterly anti-
Truman." He also records that there existed "detailed evidence 
of enormous anti-Truman feeling in the state." He contended 
that the Shivers-Daniel plan was to attack Truman and to close 
in.on himself through guilt-by-association. "As an example of 
how this [Shivers-Daniel strategy] would operate, the Shivers-
Daniel group were anti-Truman because the President vetoed the 
Tidelands Bill." One of the reasons Connally decided, after 
having served twenty-four years in the Senate, not to run for 
reelection was because of the rigorous campaign that would be 
required to defeat Daniel in the primary. Finally, Connally 
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Governor Allan Shivers, running for re-election, echoed the 
same sentiments. 
The Republicans naturally looked to Texas and Louisiana 
as possible soft spots in the Democratic underbelly. In Aug-
ust, Jack Porter, the new Republican National Committeeman 
from Texas, intimated the Republicans might put Shivers and 
Daniel on their ticket in an effort to attract Democratic 
and independent voters to Eisenhower. A few days later Shiv-
ers asked his fellow Texans to express their views on the 
offshore oil controversy after he had just announced he could 
not endorse Stevenson's views on the oil, civil rights, and 
filibuster issues. The same day Daniel called upon Texas Demo-
crats to "revolt" against the national ticket and all other 
Democrats favoring federal control of offshore oil. Subse-
quently, as Porter had thought they might, the Republicans of 
Texas, for the first time in the state's history, placed fif-
teen Democrats, including Shivers and Daniel, on their ticket. 
Then the stateownership advocates revolted. When the Democra-
tic State Convention met in September it went through the nor-
mal motions of placing Stevenson and Senator John Sparkman at 
the head of the ticket. But, by an overwhelming voice vote, 
the two thousand Democrats, declared their real sympathies for 
Eisenhower and Nixon. The importance of Shivers and Daniel 
to the Eisenhower campaign was obvious. Ben Guill, the Eisen-
put his finger on the reason why Stevenson lost Texas: '"A 
final factor in the 1952 election was the dissatisfaction of 
many southern Democrats. They were anti-Truman because of 
the Tidelands Bill, his civil-rights program and because of 
the long tenure of the party.in office." Connally, My Name 
Is Tom Connally, 358-610 
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hower campaign manager in Texas, wrote Sherman Adams on this 
subject. "I cannot overemphasize the necessity for these two 
men [Shivers and Daniel] to get all the way on the soap box," 
he said. "We are building a v.ery fine organization in Texas, 
and the first one, I might add, in its history; but Sherman, 
Shivers and Daniel are the 'Number One' factors in carrying 
Texas for the Genera1. 1116 
The oil issue was also a hot one in Louisiana. Senator 
Allen J. Ellender announced that he would vote for Stevenson 
out of party loyalty but due to their disparate positions on 
the oil issue he could not campaign for him. Governor Robert 
Kennon refused to support Stevenson; ·instead he openly cam-
paigned for Ike. Four Democratic electors from Louisiana 
resigned rather than support Stevenson. 17 
In October Eisenhower made a foray into Texas and Louisi-
ana, hitting hard on the issue of offshore oil. In New Orleans 
Ike was introduced by Governor Kennon who branded the Demo-
cratic platform "un-American" and said it was the right of 
every Louisiana Democrat to oppose Stevenson. Eisenhower then 
made a firm commitment: "Twice, by substantial majorities, 
both houses of Congress have voted to recognize the traditional 
concept of state ownership of these submerged areas. Twice 
these acts of Congress have been vetoed by the President. I 
would approve such acts of Congress." In Houston, the following 
l6New York Times, Aug. 24, 50; Aug. 26,. ?; Aug. 27, 17; 
Sept. 10, 1952, 1, 22; Oct. 1, 1952, Personal and Confidential 
Letter, Buill· to Adams, Sherman Adams Files, Box 36, Eisenhower 
Library. 
l?New York Times, Aue. 31, IV, 8; Aug. 27, 1952, l?. 
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day, Eisenhower praised Shivers and Daniel for their stands 
on the oil issue and then reiterated his commitment. Later 
Eisenhower telegramed Kennon and Shivers his thanks "for all 
you did for me. 1118 
The Republican strategy worked in November. Eisenhower 
carried Texas and Florida. An official caucus of the Florida 
House of Representatives had refused to endorse Stevenson and 
Sparkman until they changed their ideas on offshore oil and 
the filibuster. While Eisenhower did not win it in 1952, he 
took Louisiana in 1956, along with Texas and Florida again. 19 
With the fox now in the coop, the Truman Administration 
realized it must do something to save its chicken. Chapman 
and Truman discussed the problem on December 29, 1952, at 
which time the President decided he "would like to consider 
the feasibility of dealing with this problem through the estab-
lishment of a new naval petroleum reserve to include the sub-
merged lands of the continental shelf." Secretary Chapman and 
the Attorney General agreed that such a proposed executive 
order would be legal. Four days before Eisenhower's inaugura-
tion Truman issued an executive order making the entire con-
tinental shelf around the United States and Alaska a naval 
18New York Times, Oct. 14, l; Oct. 15, 1952, 24; Eisen-
hower, Mandate, 205-06; oc·t. 18, 1952, Telegrams, Eisenhower 
to Kennon and Eisenhower to Shivers, Sherman Adams Staff Files, 
Box 36, Eisenhower Library. 
. l9New York Times, Sept. 14, 1952, 74; Donald S. Strong, 
"Further Reflections on Southern Politics," Journal of Poli-
tics, 33 (May. 1971), 24-LH. 
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reserve. Once again the President gave national defense as 
his reason. The President felt "it would be the height of 
folly" .for the Federal Government to give the oil to the 
states, and later have to repurchase "this same oil at stiff 
prices for use by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in the 
defense of the Nation." Thus the administration of these 
lands was transferred from the Department of Interior to the 
Department of Navy. As might be expected, the order met con-
siderable criticism. Representative Wingate Lucas of Texas 
called Truman's action "another attempt on the part of the 
Socialists in the administration to find some way whereby 
they can perpetuate the injustice which the American people 
clearly voted in the last election to correct." Frank M. 
Porter, president of the American Petroleum Institute and the 
chief lobbying agent for the claims of the states, pronounced 
it "unsound and without basis. 1120 
Despite Eisenhower's campai5n assurances there was some 
doubt whether he would give his full support for the states 
when the oil issue came before Congress. First of all, the 
President had not included the issue in his State of the Union 
message. Also, there was some question whether he ought to 
revoke Truman's executive order. Gerald Morgan, an assistant 
to the President, thought it would be a good idea to simply 
rescind the order. His reasoning: "I don't know how widespread 
20nec. 30, 1952, Chapman to Truman, Central Files, OF-134-
F, Box 681, ~senhower Library; Hearings, Senate, Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Hear-
ings on SJ 13, S. 294, s. 107, Amendment, SJ Res. 18 (FeO:-::-
March, 1953), 1230-31; New York Times, Jan. ?, 1; Jan. 17, 
9; Jan. 24, 1953, 10. 
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this feeling is, but since the President took such a definite 
stand on the Tidelands issue, and because of his very stature, 
he certainly could not be accused of depriving the United 
States of a needed defense facility." Nevertheless, the Ad-
ministration decided against revoking Truman's order. Gover-
nor Shivers telegrammed Eisenhower and Adams that he "had 
been hopeful that you would revoke Truman's last action on 
Tidelands and [would] leave the matter entirely to Congress." 
He went on to note that he hoped the President would not 
"foreclose full settlement of the issue including the contin-
ental shelf at this session of the Congress." Adams explained 
to the governor that the oil issue was not mentioned in the 
State of the Union Message because the Administration felt 
Congress ;'can and will deal adequately with the ·problem, so 
that it was not deemed neces~ary that a Presidential order 
transferring the reserves to the Navy need be revoked." Since 
the leadership of the newly elected Republican Congress was in 
complete accord with Eisenhower's views on the subject there 
was little real reason for anxiety. Reflecting this view Sen-
ator Daniel said he was not worried the President had failed 
to make a positive recommendation on the oil issue in his State 
of the Union Message. The President's views were well-known, 
and, he said, "I am certain President Eisenhower will sign the 
stateownership bill, which will be presented to him by Congress. 1121 
21Memo, Feb. 5, 1953, Gerald Morgan to General Pearson, 
Morgan Papers, Box 9, Eisenhower Library; Telegrams, Jan. 28, 
1953, Shivers to Adams, and Shivers to Eisenhower; Telegr~, 
Feb. 2, 1953, Adams to Shivers, in Central Files, OF-1-134-F, 
Box 681, Eisenhower Library. Cf. also, Telegram, Jan. 28, 
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Concerning the matter of Truman's executive order, the 
new Administration advanced the position that the order did 
nothing more than merely "transfer to the Secretary of the Navy 
authority over the [offshore] lands which had previously been 
conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior •••• " Herbert 
Brownell, the Attorney General, told the Department of Defense 
that the former Attorney General under Truman had approved the 
order "on the understanding that it did not intend to, nor 
did it in fact or in law, create a naval petroleum reserve 
within the meaning of the statute." In order to create a 
naval petroleum reserve, Brownell opined, it was first neces-
sary to have an act of Congress, som13thing Truman had neglec-
ted to get. He based his judgment on the fact all previous 
naval petroleum reservas had been created by acts of Congrass. 
Thus, he concluded, no naval petroleum reserve had been legal-
ly created by Truman's executive order. Two opponents of 
state ownership, Senators James Murray (D-Mont.) and Clinton 
Anderson, disagreed, saying that "none of the lawyers who par-
ticipated in the discussions ever expressed any doubt concern-
ing the power of the President to set the lands aside for the 
future use of the Navy under the designation of a Naval petrol-
eum reserve. 1122 
1953, Shivers to Eisenhower, Department of Interior, Office 
of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3285, 
National Archives; New York Times, Feb. 3, 1953, 15. 
22Feb. 13, 1953, Brownell to Wilson; and for Brownell's 
testimony, cf. Hearings, House of Representatives, Judiciary 
Subcommittee .No. 1, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., HR 2948 and Similar 
Bills to Promote the Ex loration Develo ment and Conserva~ion 
of Certain Resources in the Submer ed Lands, ••• Fe .-March, 
3 , 1- ; or Anderson s an ·Iurray s rebuttal see New 
York Times, Feb. 18, 1953, 19. 
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Reversing the opinions of their New Deal predecessors, 
the Secretaries of Interior and Navy concurred with Brownell. 
Secretary of Interior McKay explained, in effect, that the 
needs of national defense could be fully met provided the 
United States retained the oil beyond the traditional boundar-
ies. He frankly thought the logic of Truman's order was spe-
cious. The Department of Navy fully agreed. Rear Admiral 
Ira H. Nunn, speaking for the Secretary of Navy and the De-
partment of Defense, told the House Judiciary subcommittee 
that the defense needs of the country would not suffer in the 
least if the states were allowed to develop the oil. 23 
The Senate was presented with four bills and an amendment 
dealing with offshore oil. Two bills gave the lands to the 
states. A bill sponsored by Senator Spessard Holland {D-Flor-
-ida) and thirty-eight other senators sought to transfer the 
oil located within the historic boundaries-to the states. 
This bill was fully supported by the senators from the oil 
and gas producing states. Senator Daniel proposed a more ex-
treme measure, providing for "jurisdiction, use, and control 
of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf lying out-
side of the original [historic] State boundaries." The oppo-
sition presented two bills and an amendment of its own. Sena-
tor Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.) proposed that a nine-man commis-
sion be established "to assist in making a proper and equitable 
settlement of the submerged lands problems." Senator Clinton 
23HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb~-March, 
1953), 180-81, 211. 
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Anderson's bill sought to leave authority for the oil within 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. Seventeen Demo-
crats and one Republican from the consumer states co-sponsored 
this bill. Finally, an amendment prepared by Senator Lister 
Hill (D-Ala.) stipulated that funds accruing from the oil 
exploration would be earmarked directly for education; the 
oil would, however, remain under the watchful eye of the 
Federal Governmento 24 
While the Administration did not officially back any 
particular bill there was no doubt it looked favorably upon 
the Holland measure. The Attorney General stirred up some 
dust when he told the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs 
Committee that the constitutional question involved in the 
issue could be avoided if "the Federal Government would grant 
to the Sta~es only such authority as required for the States 
to administer and develop the natural resources" but not grant 
them "a blanket quitclaim to the submerged lands within their 
territorial boundaries." This suggestion appeared to be a 
dramatic shi.ft from the Administration's outspoken campaign 
pronouncements. Nevertheless, Brownell quickly insisted that 
McKay and he were in perfect agreement on state ownership. 
As usual there was no mistaking McKay's position: "I do be-
lieve that the national interest would be best served by re-
storing to the various States the coastal offshore lands to 
the limits of the line marked by the historical boundaries of 
24The bills are reprinted in Senate Interior Committee, 
SJ 13, (Feb.-l1arch, 1953), 9-11, 12-25; New York Times, March 
~4, 1953, 33. 
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the respective States."25 
The s.tate ownership advocates flatly rejected the Brow-
nell formula and made it plain they would brook no compromise. 
Representative Hale Boggs (D-La.) called the Brownell propo-
sal "reprehensible." Representative Sam Yorty (D-Calif.) 
dismissed it by saying it would solve nothing; it "would 
merely bring it [the oil issue] up in different form." None-
theless, after a meeting with the President, Senator Daniel 
and Governor Kennon reiterated their confidence that Eisen-
hower would honor his campaign pledge. Senator Russell Long 
(D-La.) also expressed confidence: "I have never had any 
doubt that the President would sign bills of the kind Mr. 
Truman vetoed. That was Brownell's formula and not Eisen-
hewer's." The following day Eisenhower again emphatically 
came out for stateownership. He said that while the Attorney 
General's job demanded that he investigate all legal questions, 
he, as President, thought the states should receive their 
land. 26 
The quitclaim legislation received considerable attention 
from outside lobbying groups. These agents saw stateownership 
as a beginning toward restoring control to the local communi-
ties, and therefore, away from the Federal Government and its 
many-tentacled bureaucracy. About a month after Eisenhower's 
25senate Interior Committee, SJ 13 (Feb.-March, 1953), 
926, 954-55t HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.-
March, 1953;, 180-81, 218-20, 236ff. 
26HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.-March, 
1953), 241-42; 144-1~5; New York Times, March 5, 15; March 6, 
1953, 15. 
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election the National Conference of Mayors went on record 
favoring stateownership. Predictably this was followed by a 
similar resolution of the National Association of Attorneys 
General. Likewise, the United States Chamber of Commerce 
"strongly" urged passage of stateownership legislation because: 
"We firmly believe that the doctrine of paramount rights and 
dominion, set forth in the Supreme Court's tidelands decision, 
is a dangerous one that should be repudiated at once." The 
American Farm Bureau Federation supported the Holland bill 
claiming "the general welfare will in the long run be most 
effectively furthered by local control of resource development." 
Invoking the same reasons, the American Bar Association, Paci-
fie Coast Association of Port Authorities, the Great Lakes 
Harbor Association, the National Reclamation Association, and 
Interstate Oil Compact also supported this legislation. Of 
course, the American Petroleum Institute lobbied vigorously 
for the Holland bill. 27 
The quitclaim legislation was opposed by former members 
of the Truman Administration as well as groups that had tradi-
tionally supported the New and Fair Deals. Former Secretary 
of Interior, Oscar Chapman, in testifying against both the 
Holland and Daniel bills, declared that "for years powerful 
pressure groups have been attempting to raid various parts of 
the public domain. They are now redoubling their efforts be-
cause they see in the inexperience of the new administration 
27New York Times, Dec. 4, 1953, 45· HR Judiciary Subcom-
mittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.-March, 1953), 284; Senate Interior 
Committee, SJ 13 (Feb.-March, 1953), 38, 315-19, 1049. 
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an opportunity to put over some of their giveaway legislation." 
Chapman added: "I am deeply concerned that if these [offshore 
oil] measures are enacted they will establish the pattern for 
the greatest giveaway program in the history of the world." 
The former Solicitor General of the United States, Philip B. 
Perlman, who had successfully argued the government's thesis 
in the Texas and Louisiana cases, wrote Eisenhower that the 
legal rights of the coastal states do not include the sub-
merged lands of the sea. "There is no valid. reason, legal or 
moral," Perlman thought, "why the United States should make 
a donation of all its valuable oil and other mineral rights 
in the marginal sea to these States at the expense of the 
other forty-five States." Labor continued to back the advo-
cates of federal ownership. The American Federation of Labor 
and the Congress of Industrial OrganizationsSl.pported the An-
derson bill and Hill amendment. O. A. Knight, Vice President 
of the C.I.O. and President of the Oil Workers International 
Union, favored letting the Federal Government operate the off-
shore oil deposits while earmarking 62~ percent of the Govern-
ment•s share from the oil for education. The Americans for 
Democratic Action supported the Hill amendment and opposed 
the Holland and Daniel bills. A couple of farm organizations 
also saw dangers in stateownership. The National Grange is-
sued this condemnation: 
We are strongly convinced that if the Congress passes 
Senate Joint Resolution 13 [the Holland billl it will 
be a giveaway for selfish use of unpredictab!e and 
valuable future resources that in reality belong to 
all the people of the Nation, it will make a regret-
table error that will greatly impair the future secur-
ity of our nation. 
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Angus McDonald of the National Farmers Union likewise opposed 
the Holland and Daniel bills and supported the Hill amendment. 
Finally, the Fisherman's Cooperative Association of San Diego, 
California, saw a new objection to stateownership. "If one 
nation," it contended, "can unilaterally extend its sovereign 
territory out to sea by as much as a quarter of a mile, then 
there is no reason why it or any other nation cannot extend 
its boundaries seaward by 200 miles, by 400 miles, or by such 
distance it may desire." Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachu-
setts, representing Ea.st Coast fishing interests, agreed with 
this opinion. 28 
Congress wasted no time taking up the issue. Both houses 
of Congress began hearings on the offshore bills within a few 
weeks after the inauguration. The House Judiciary subcommit-
tee took less than a month of testimony and the bill reported 
out by the full Judiciary Committee provided that the off-
shore oil within historic boundaries would go to the states 
and that the states should be allowed to continue severance 
or production taxes, over and above royalties, on the area 
beyond the historic boundaries. This measure subsequently 
passed the House by an overwhelming margin. 29 While the House 
28
senate Interior CoID.Iilittee, SJ 13 (Feb.-March, 1953), 
299-301, 466-80, 502-03, 484-85, 9'71+-...,-r:J, 1178; New York Times, 
Feb. 24, 1, and Aug. 22, 1953, 7; March 6, 1953, Perlman to 
Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-134-F, Box 681, Eisenhower Library. 
29cf. HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.-March, 
1953); New York Times, March 25, 1953, 36; Con5ressional Rec-
ord, 83rd Cong., lst sess., v. 99, part 2 (April 1, 1953), 
~8. The vote on the House bill was 285-108, with 38 not 
voting; 188 Republicans and 97 Democrats voted for the mea-
sure; 89 Democrats, 1 Independent, and 18 Republicans voted 
against it. 
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dispensed with the issue in quick fashion, the supporters of 
stateownership ran into a couple of stumbling blocks in the 
Senate. 
Senator Guy Cordon (R-Ore.), one of the co-sponsors of 
the Holland bill, was designated to chair the proceedings of 
the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Co:cmittee which would 
handle the issue. The Committee quickly rejected the Ander-
son bill and reported out the Holland bill. While the state 
ownership bill was pushed out of committee with dispatch, a 
final vote by the Senate was stymied when opponents to the 
Holland measure filibustered. Senator Wayne Morse, for exam-
ple, distinguished himself by speaking against the bill for a 
breathtaking twenty-two hours and twenty-six minutes. Sena-
tors J. William Fulbright and Lister Hill were the only sou-
therners to participate in this filibuster. During the debate 
a significant exchange of letters took place between the Pres-
ident and the opponents of the Holland bill. In a letter to 
the President, twenty-four senators stated their opposition 
to Senator Holland's measure, "the proposed legislation," as 
they put it, "to give the three states at the expense of the 
other forty-five the natural resources in oil and other miner-
als in the submerged lands of the marginal seas." They re-
quested that the Administration officially state its position 
on the issue of what the coastal states' boundaries were. The 
letter was viewed by the White House as an obvious political 
maneuver. Although Eisenhower signed the letter, it was sub-
stantially the work of Senator Taft and Attorney General Brownell. 
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The President's reply broke a long standing policy of not 
commenting on congressional controversies. It re-stated the 
President's views expressed during the campaign, noting that 
his "position is the same today," and urging "prompt passage" 
of the Holland bill. To help the filibuster Eisenhower con-
tinued, "I hesitate to express an opinion on legislative pro-
cedure, but I am deeply concerned with the delay of the entire 
Administration program in the Senate of the United States. 113° 
A few days later a test vote was taken on the Hill amend-
ment. Senator Hill had long fought for increased Federal aid 
to education, particularly for the South. As early as 1943, 
Hill, along with other southern senators, had advocated in-
creased Federal aid to education. At this time he said it 
!'must be an accepted principle of American Government that 
wealth, income, and privileges should be taxed wherever found, 
and the revenue spent for public service wherever needed." 
Yet successive bills for Federal aid to education either nev&r 
emerged_from the congressional committees or were never brought 
to a floor vote. Hill now saw another chance to secure pas-
sage of a federal aid to education bill. This time he thought 
the primary question "that should concern the Congress and the 
American people is not how, to give the oil and gas away, but 
·30New York Times, March 26, 1953, 28; Senate, 83rd Cong., 
1st Sess., Senate Report 133 (March 27, 1953); April 17, 1953, 
letter to Eisenhower from twenty-three senators, and Memo, 
April 23, 1953, Bernard Shanley to Brownell, in Central Files, 
OF-134-F, Box 681, Eisenhower Library; April 24, 1953, Eisen-
hower to Anderson, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of · 
the Presidents of the United States, 1954 (Government Print-
ing Office, 1960), 217-18. 
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how to keep it and use it in the national interest. This 
national patrimony belongs to the people of the entire nation 
and must be used for their benefit and the benefit of succeed-
ing generations." His proposal would have directed that the 
money derived from the offshore oil be given to education. 
Hill argued: 
Witness the dilapidated condition of our schools, 
all too many of which are dangerously overcrowded; 
the alarming exodus of inadequately salaried tea-
chers from the teaching profession into better-paying 
pursuits; and, furthermore, the absolute necessity 
of expanding our schools to meet the needs of the next 
few years. 
The advocates of stateownership dismissed this argument as a 
"diversion measure growing out of the desperate effort" to 
prevent the states from gaining what was rightfully theirs. 
When a vote was taken the Hill amendment went down to defeat. 
Thirty-eight Republicans and eighteen Democrats, mostly from 
the South and Southwest, voted aga~nst the amendment while 
one Independent, twenty-five Democrats and seven Republicans 
'\Oted for it. When the advocates of federal control could 
muster only thrity-three votes the result was inevitable. 
The opponents to federal control were obviously in solid 
control of the situation.31 
A few days after the !Iill amendment met defeat Majority 
Leader Robert Taft threatened to keep the Senate in continuous 
31For the test of the Hill amendment Cf. Senate Interior 
Committee, SJ 13 (Feb.-.March, 1953), 24-25; Tindall, Emergence 
of The South, 495-97; Bartley, Tidelands Oil Controvers~, 224-
25; Lister Hill, "A Bonanza for Education," Harper's, 2 4, No. 
1222 (March 1952), 28-31; Congressional RecordG 83rd Cong., 
1st Sess., v. 99, part 3 (April 27, 1953), 395 ; New York 
Times, April 28, 1953. · 
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session until a vote was taken on the Holland bill. The oppo-
nents to stateownership finally agreed to a vote. On May 5, 
the Senate voted 56 to 35 to approve the bill. A conference 
between the House and Senate settled on the less extreme Sen-
ate version. Shortly thereafter Eisenhower signed the bill 
into law.32 
Not long afterward the Outer Continental Shelf Act was 
passed by Congress, and signed by the President. The law 
placed the area beyond the state limit under exclusive federal 
jurisdiction. The Secretary of Interior was authorized to 
lease by competitive bidding these areas in lots not to exceed 
5,?60 acres. By 1958, 1,586,709 acres had been leased. The 
revenue from these leases produced almost three billion dol-
lars in cash bonuses and the royalty on the leases are now 
over one hundred million dollars annually.33 
The.anxiety o:f the coastal states was not over yet, how-
ever. The two laws passed by Congress were too ambiguous 
concerning the exact boundaries separating the submerged lands 
and the outer continental shelf. Hence, in 1957, the United 
States Solicitor General filed suit in the Supreme Court 
against Texas and Louisiana to help clear up the matter. 
This awkward procedure caused much anxiety particularly in 
32New York Times, April 29, l· May 6, l; May 14, 1953, l; 
Congressional Record, 83rd Cong. ist Sess., v. 99, part 4 (May 5, 1953), 4488; Bartley, Tidelands Oil Controversi, 216-17, 
223-24, 226-27; Public PaSers of the Presidents, 1953, 326-27; 
Wright, "Jurisdiction, 11 I o. -
33Nash, United States Oil Policy, 194; House of Represen-
tatives, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Report 413 (May 12, 1953); Sen-
ate, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Report 411 (June 15, 1953); New 
York Times, July 31, 1953, 7; Marion Clawson, The Bureau of 
Land Mana[ement (New York, 1971), 135-36; Wright, "Jurisdic-
~ion .. " 18 • * 
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Texas. Jack Porter, the Republican National Chairman in, Texas, 
complained that the Justice Department need not have included 
Texas in the suit, although he did think the suit against Lou-
isiana was justified "on account o.f the absurd claims they 
were making." Eisenhower attempted to allay these fears. In 
a letter to both Governor Shivers and Porter the President 
reiterated his earlier pledges to the coastal states. The 
culp;r-it in this matter, he noted, was Congress: "I must say 
it is regrettable that Congress did not .follow the Administra-
tion's recommendations .for making this [boundary question] 
clear, but instead le.ft the law ambiguous so that the matter 
had to be litigated." The Presidential letter to Porter was 
reprinted on the .front pages o.f various Texas newspapers. 
Porter told Ike the "reaction [to his letter] throughout the 
State [o.f Texas] has been most .favorable and I am certain the 
people of Texas appreciate your attitude in this matter." In 
1960, the Supreme Court delivered a settlement amicable to 
the coastal states.34 
When Eisenhower signed the offshore oil bill he took the 
occasion to point out: "As I have said many times, I deplore 
and I will always resist .federal encroachment upon the rights 
of the States." The'President indeed hit upon the most en-
lightening point brought out by the offshore oil controversy. 
34 Nov. 18, 1957, Porter to Eisenhower; Dec. 4, 1957, 
Eisenhower to Porter; May 21, 1958, Eisenhower to Shiv~rs; 
Forth Worth Telegram, Dec. 6, 1957; Houston Chronicle, Dec. 
6, 195?; Houston ?ost, Dec. ?, 1957, in Central Files, OF-
134-F, Box 681, Eisenhower Library; Engler, Politics of Oil, 
94. 
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Essentially the controversy was tied to the sensitive con-
flict between states' rights and the legitimate power of the 
federal government. 
As early as 1945, the Attorney General recognized how 
perplexing this issue would be. "It may be added," he ob-
served, 
that there is strong feeling against the claim of the 
United States within many important coastal states, 
notably California, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Florida. There has likewise been strong feeling 
in some interior states, though this may perhaps be 
alleviated by the fact that the proposed suit will 
make claim only to the lands below the marginal seas 
and not to tidelands or land beneath inland waters. 
In its brief against the State of California, the United 
States made its position clear on the issue of inland waters. 
"This suit," it said, 
does not involve any bays, harbors, rivers or other 
inland waters of California, nor does it involve the 
so-called tidelands, namely those which are covered 
and uncovered by the daily flux of the tides. It is 
limited solely to that portion of the open sea embraced 
within the three-mile belt, sometimes referred to as 
the marginal sea. 
These declarations to the contrary, the inland water states 
still felt threatened. This accounted for what Harold Ickes 
called, "a unanimity of opinion" among the Attorneys General 
ot the United States. It was also a crucial ingredient in 
the campaign of 1952. In his New Orleans address Eisenhower 
carefully noted: "I favor the recognition of clear legal title 
to these lands in each of the forty-eight states." In the 
midst of the campaign Senator O'Mahoney, an opponent of state 
ownership, warned Stevenson about this specific problem. "The 
passage of a quitclaim bill by Congress will lead inevitably 
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to the demand for the cession to the Interior states of public 
lands within their boundaries. 11 35 
Since this general problem of states' rights touched on 
inland water and mineral rights there was no neglecting these 
important matters. In November 1952, the National Reclamation 
Association thought the oil issue was only symptomatic of a 
much wider malady; it contended. the Federal Government's 
position on the oil controversy constituted "a dangerous step 
toward Federal control over all of the navigable waters of 
the Nation and the resources lying under.the same." The Great 
Lakes states also expressed concern. The legislature of the 
State of Illinois passed a resolution similar to the National 
Reclamation Association's. Frank G. Millard, Attorney General 
of riichigan, testified in favor of the Holland Bill in order 
to secure "a reaffirmation of the proprietary rights in the 
use and development and control of the lands and resources in 
the Great Lakes area in which we are interested. 11 36 
Likewise the issue of the relationship between the states 
35Memo, April 19, 1945, Attorney General to the President, 
in Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central 
Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3278, National Archives; U.S. 
Supreme Court, No. 12, Original, United States v. California, 
Motion for Leave to File Complaint (Oct., 1945); Aug. ?, 1952, 
O'Mahoney to Stevenson, Department of Interior, Office of the 
Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3284, Nation-
al Archives. It should be pointed out that O'Mahoney, in 1952, 
submitted an amendment which would have specifically exempted 
the inland waters from such offshore legislation. Bartley, 
Tidelands Oil Controversy, 225. 
36im Judiciary Subcommittee No~ l, HR 2948 (Feb.-March, 
1953), 234-44, 338; Senate Interior Committee, SJ 13 (Feb.,~ 
March, 1953), 81, and for other comments along the same line, 
245-46, 255-56, 1047-49. 
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and mineral leases acquired new importance. After all, oil 
is mineral; what, then, of the minerals in the interior? 
Secretary of Interior McKay did not feel there was any con-
nection. "I do not think," he told a congressional commit-
tee, 
the States have any right to that Cfederal inland 
mineral resources] because ordinarily when you acquire 
land, unless it is stated in the title, you are en-
titled to the land and subsoil and air above. Most 
of the States now, when they are selling land, reserve 
the mineral rights. If it is Federal land, I do not 
know why the States should come along and demand the 
minerals underneath." 
Senator George.Malone of Nevada disagreed with his fellow 
Republican's estimate. In questioning Brownell on the off-
shore oil question, Malone explained his position: "My ques-
tion is: If the Congress of the United States is now going 
to take a hand and transfer mineral rights to a few states, 
there seems to be no reason why the mineral rights should 
not just be transferred to all the States." Senators Malone 
and Arthur v. Watkins of Utah sought, in committee, to attach 
an amendment to the offshore oil bill which would have given 
each state all revenues from the subsoil mineral resources 
of the public lands within their boundaries. The Senate In-
terior Committee narrowly turned down this amendment to the 
Rolland bill.3? It was not surprising, then, for the Western 
and Great Lakes states to vote in great numbers for the Holland 
. 3?HR Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, HR 2948 (Feb.-March, 
1953), 191; Senate Interior Committee, SJ 13, (Feb.-March, 
1953), 928ff;· Senator Hunt of Syoming introduced a bill simi-
lar to the Watkins-Malone measure. Cf. Senate Interior Com-
mittee, SJ 13 (Feb.-March, 1953), 875-83. 
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bill. This controversy poignantly demonstrated that the 
issue of states' rights, upon which the Administration based 
its partnership policy, was politically and economically sen-
sitive not only in the South but in other areas of the coun-
try as well. 
It was precisely because of these implications for other 
natural resources that many independent conservation-minded 
people, New Deal liberals, and professional conservation or-
ganizations strongly protested the stateownership legislation. 
As William Blair of the New York Times remarked: 
There has been increasing speculation that once the 
states gained control of the seaward oil resources 
they would turn their attention to the mountains and 
the forests, major targets of some industrial inter-
ests because of the tremendous reserves of timber, 
minerals, water and water power~ and grazing rights. 
The Americans for Democratic Action charged that politicians 
were "already planning legislation to give away the western 
grazing lands, and the off-shore oil 'give-away' can set off 
a chain reaction which will strip the .American people of all 
their natural resources." Similarly, Commonweal warned: "The 
offshore oil battle therefore is of the widest public concern. 
It must be followed up by stands against similar legislation 
and administrative raids on vital national resources--there 
would be reason enough to resist them solely in the interests 
of national defense." After all, if McKay could reverse the 
Department of Interior's posture on offshore oil, he could do 
likewise in other critical areas as well. Thus, for conser-
vationists and New Deal liberals alike, the gnawing question 
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was whether the offshore oil legislation was merely an aber-
ration or the opening wedge to a menacing pattern.38 
38New York Times, May 3, 1953, IV, ?; American for Demo-
cratic Action, "The Offshore Oil Controvesy--What It Means to 
the American People" (March 25, 1953), in Paul Douglas Papers, 
Box 411, Chicago Historical Society; "Raid on the Public Do-
main," Commonweal, 58 (May 1, 1953), ·aa. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURAL GAS IMBROGLIO 
Natural gas is a by-product of oil and, like that resource, 
it has had an equally volcanic history, particularly in the 
nineteen forties and fifties. As in the offshore oil contro-
versy, the dispute over regulation of the producers of natur-
al gas involved two presidential vetos, a significant congre&-
sional battle, a major scandal, and a greatly debated Supreme 
Court decision. But, wilike the offshore oil controversy, 
this issue revolved around what limits,·· if any, should be 
placed on the Federal Power Commission's authority to regulate 
the natural gas industry. This added an ingredient to an al-
ready complicated political and constitutional recipe. 
The dispute over regulation of the natural gas industry 
evolved from a confluence of interconnected circumstances. 
During the nineteen thirties the natural gas industry had 
begun to expand, and as a result, Congress passed the Natural 
Gas Act of 1938. Though designed to supplement state regula-
tion it granted regulatory authority to the Federal Power Com-
mission. The FPC seemingly possessed the power to regulate 
the transportation and sale of natural gas for resale. Also, 
the Commission was empowered to determine prices for gas in-
volved in interstate commerce. The FPC thus became the prime 
enforcer of ~he Act. While the Act seemed explicit enough in 
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theory, there soon developed great difficulty in enforcing it. 
In short, the language of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 was too 
ambiguous. Specifically, ·section l(b) of the Act· provided 
that the FPC's jurisdiction should apply "to the transporta-
tion of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in 
interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate 
public consumption ••• and to natural gas companies engaged in 
such transportation or sale." This sentence appeared suffi-
ciently precise, but the very next words so qualified its 
meaning that the entire section was rendered open to practical-
ly any interpretation. It continued: " ••• but the FPC's jur-
isdiction shall not apply to any other transportation or sale 
of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or 
to the facilities used for such distribution or to the produc-
ing or gathering of natural gas. 11 As a result of this vague 
wording, the focal point of the dispute was whether the Fed-
eral Power Commission's authority extended exclusively to 
the distributors and not to the independent producers. To 
complicate matters more, the Commission itself was hopelessly 
divided over the matter. Eventually the Supreme Court had to 
deliver a highly controversial interpretation.1 
With a rapidly increasing demand for natural gas at the 
end of the Second World War, the problem became more acute. 
Natural gas was particularly essential because it was one of 
1Nash, United States Oil Policfi, 214-15; Edith T. Carper, 
Lobbyin~ and.the Natural Gas Bill ( niversity of Alabama 
Press, he Inter-University Case Program, 1962), 170. 
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the most accessible and least exploited forms of energy, and 
thus could be used easily to meet the requirements of the 
country's rapidly growing population. Between 1945 and 1950, 
the search for energy substitutes was also encouraged by fuel 
oil shortages. Furthermore, improved technology, especially 
in pipelines, meant that natural gas was no cheaper and could 
be distributed at the national level. All of this was reflec-
ted in the statistical increase in natural gas consumption. 
The total production of natural gas in the United States was 
increased from 2,660.2 billion cubic feet in 1940 to 9,405.4 
billion cubic feet in 1955. Between 1930 and 1960 residential 
and industrial consumption rose more.than tenfold. As the de-
mand for natural gas increased consumers clamored for more 
vigorous regulation of the field prices of the producers. Of 
course, the producers fought such regulation just as strenuous-
ly. Thus the increased demand for natural gas forced the poli-
tical and judicial process to clarify the ambiguity of the 
Natural Gas Act of 1938. 2 
Like the offshore oil controversy, the natural gas battle 
exerted an important influence on the economy of the Southern 
and Southwestern, as well as the Far Western and Mountain 
states. Eighty-four percent of the gas reserves of the United 
States were located in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Kansas, Mis-
sissippi, New Mexico, and Arkansas. Texas served as a typical 
example. While the importance of agriculture to the state's 
2Nash, United States Oil Policy, 209-10; Carper, Lobby-
in5, ?. 
r 
l 
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economy dwindled, Texas' natural gas industry expanded rapid-
ly. Situated in the Houston-Beaumont-Port Arthur area, it 
developed a petrochemical industry. In fact, Texas became 
the nation's leading producer of natural gas •. By the end of 
the fifties the natural gas industry in Texas increased over 
one-half billion dollars. Expansion of the natural gas and 
oil industry insured lucrative defense contracts for Califor-
nia and Texas. By 1960, only California and New York exceeded 
Texas in defense contract allocations. Natural gas was indeed 
a vital resource to these states.3 
The Federal Power Commission unsuccessfully sought to 
settle the issue. In August, 1947, the Commission unanimously 
issued Order No. 139, the intention of which was to end any 
uncertainty that existed in the minds of natural gas producers. 
~ Order told the independent producers and gatherers of 
natural gas that they could "sell at arm's length and deliver 
such [natural] gas to interstate pipelines ••• without appre-
hension that in so doing they may become subject to assertions 
of jurisdiction by the Federal Power Commission under the 
Natural Gas Act." Since this ruling was not binding on future 
commissions, the leaders of the gas industry continued to push 
for legislation.4 
Because of new consumer and industrial demands for natur-
al gas and the FPC's exhaustive study of the natural gas 
3Harold Vatter, The United States Economy in the 1950's 
(Norton & Co •. , 1963, New York), 186-8?; Carper, Lobbying, 1. 
4Nash, United States Oil Po!icy, 217-18. 
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industry, the Commission split evenly in 1948 over the issue. 
Commissioners Harrington Wimberley and Nelson Lee Smith opted 
for a strict interpretation of Section l(b) of the Natural 
Gas Act. They urged Congress to enact a bill which would 
specifically exempt intrastate gas producers from FPC juris-
diction and lay down policy guidelines for rate-making and 
control of wholesale sales. Commissioners Leland Olds and 
Thomas Buchanan had joined in the unanimous decision on Order 
1~9 but now reversed their opinion. They did not think any 
amend.merits to the Natural Gas Act were needed; indeed, they 
wanted the FPC • s authority over the industry increased·. It 
was their conviction that if federal. controls were not 
tightened the supply of natural gas would soon be depleted. 
Olds, in particular, had incurred the wrath of the gas indus-
try because he was an uncompromising champion of strengthen-
ing authority for the Federal Power Commission. With the FPC 
evenly split no resolution could be made through the Commis-
sion.5 
In 1949, Leland Olds did not stand well with the oil and 
natural gas industry and its congressional representatives. 
When Truman nominated him to a third term on the Federal Power 
Commission, the entire issue came to a head. Olds was a native 
of Rochester, New York, a graduate of Amherst College, and a · 
veteran of World War I. His economic orientation was left of 
5Nash, United States Oil Poli~, 218-19; Carper, Lobbting, 
6. There wa~ one vacancy on the F which accounted for t e 
even split. The FPC is a five-man commission. 
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center, and after the First World War, he had written for 
Labor Leader, a leftist paper. Olds later became head of the 
New York State Power Authority and, in 1939, Roosevelt ap-
pointed him to the Federal Power Commission, where he soon 
became known as one of the more militant advocates of strict 
government regulation of private utility rate-making. Leland 
Olds was unquestionably a faithful New Dealer. 6 
Besides running afoul of the natural gas industry, Olds 
had incurred the wrath of Harold Ickes, who thought the com-
missioner had advised Roosevelt against appointing him chair-
man of the new Federal Water-Power Commission. Ickes took 
revenge by permitting Abe Fortas, the Undersecretary of Tnter-
ior, to supply a friend, Senator Lyndon Johnson, with damaging 
information about Olds. For- Johnson the Olds affair held a 
particular appeal. In 1948, he had barely won a seat in the 
Senate and Texas was quickly becoming a conservative state. 
To ensure re-election and to gain admittance into the Senate 
hierarchy, Johnson realized it would be necessary to ingrati-
ate himself with the Senate's conservative elders and the oil 
and natural gas industry back home. This he proceeded to do. 
The fact that Olds had attempted to mobilize media opposition 
to a bill_.which. would have struck down t.he FPC' s authority.. . .. 
over the independent producers of natural gas did not enhance 
his popularity either.? 
6Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The 
Exercise of Power (New York, 1966), 45. 
?Evans a~d Novak, Lyndon Johnson, 46-49. 
. . 
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The Olds nomination was sent to a Senate Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce subcommittee chaired by Johnson. The members 
of the subcommittee were bitterly hostile to him. During the 
nomination hearings, Olds' chief questioners, Senators Kerr 
and Johnson and Representative Lyle of Texas, did not examine 
the nominee's qualifications for serving on the Com.mission so 
much as his leftist activities in the decade after the First 
World War. Lyle, in fact, was determined to demonstrate his 
"firm desire for ridding the Federal Power Commission of any-
one he deemed a Communist sympathizer. In September the sub-
committee voted unanimously against Olds. Despite political 
pressure from the White House, the full Senate Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce voted overwhelmingly against 
Olds' nomination. Truman, however, refused to withdraw the 
nomination, and in October, the Senate voted 53 to 15 against 
Olds. The Commission was now stymied with two for and two 
against strict regulation of the indivi4ual producers. A suc-
cessful Olds nomination would have tilted the FPC in favor of 
regulation.8 
In 1949J Oklahoma Senators Kerr and Elbert Thomas intro-
duced a bill which would have exempted individual producers 
of natural gas from Section l(b). Senators Johnson and Rus-
sell Long of Louisiana vigorously supported the bill. The 
Kerr bill was similar to one passed by the House the previous 
''.
8 Nash, United States Oil Polic~, 6. In 1949 Truma'n had 
appointed a commissioner who had si ed with Olds and Buchanan. 
The Olds nomination was thus crucial to the FPC's regulatory 
powers over the independent ~roducers of natural gas. 
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session but not acted upon by the Senate. The bill received 
staunch opposition from the representatives of the large 
consumer states. Senators Paul Douglas of Illinois and Wayne 
Morse of Oregon led the fight against the bill. Once again, 
however, the Federal Power Commission reversed itself. Though 
in 194? all of the commissioners had favored legislation exemp-
ting local gas producers from Commission jurisdiction, three 
ot the commissioners, including Olds, now openly opposed the 
bill. Congress passed the Kerr measure and Truman, following 
the advice of a majority of the FPO, vetoed the bill. Tru-
man' a veto reflected consumer opposition to the measure. He 
pointed out that unlike coal and oil, the "consumer of natural 
gas cannot move easily from one producer to another in search 
of lower prices.n In other words, if the independent produc-
ers of natural gas went unregulated it would result in higher 
prices for the consumer. As in the offshore oil controversy, 
a Truman veto caused a political stalemate and the issue was 
laid before the Supreme Court.9 
The Supreme Court made a ruling in 1954, which, for the 
time being, settled the question in favor of FPC regulation 
of the independent producers. In 1951, a case involving the 
Phillips Petroleum Company, the nation's largest independent 
producer of natural gas, came before the Federal Power Commis-
sion. In a four to one opinion, the Commission ruled that 
Phillips was exempt from Section l(b) of the Natural Gas Act. 
9Nash, United states Oil Policy, 218-23. 
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Since the Phillips Company was a giant in the industry consum-
er interests could not let the Commission's ruling go unchal-
lenged. Several consumer representatives filed petitions 
for review in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia. The consumer participants urging 
the Circuit Court to reverse the RPC ruling were the State ot 
Wisconsin, Wayne County, Michigan, and the cities of Kansas 
City (Missouri), Detroit, and Milwaukee. All of them were 
consumers of Phillips gas. The Circuit Court ruled in favor 
ot the consumers. This decision was appealed to the Supreme 
Court which, on June ?, 1954, upheld the lower court's deci-
sion. Ironically, the Supreme Court had interpreted the law 
more.broadly than the Com.mission itself had desired. At any 
rate, the Phillip~ decision temporarily solved the problem. 
Beyond question, the Federal Power Commission now possessed 
the authority to regulate the field prices of independent pro-
ducers of natural gas.10 
The decision fell heavily on the Federal Power Commis-
sion and the oil and natural gas industry. Since it is prac-
tically impossible to separate oil and gas production, the 
oil companies were particularly hit hard by the Phillips de-
cision. They contended that oil would likely be next. Also, 
the gas producers feared that credit for gas production would 
be more difficult to secure due to the financial insecurity 
that would undoubtedly sweep the industry. Moreover, the 
lOEngler, Politics of Oil, ll?-31;. Nash, United States 
Oil Policy, 233-34; Carper, Lobbying, 6-7. 
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Phillips decision greatly increased the work load of the Fed-
eral Power Commission. The Commission now assumed, in addi-
tion to its other burdens, the regulation of about 40,000 gas 
producers. To remedy this situation the natural gas industry 
and the Eisenhower-appointed Federal Power Commission went to 
Congress .for legislation that would reverse the Phillips deci-
sion.11 
Until this point Eisenhower had remained remarkably si-
lent. But the Phillips decision changed that. A week after 
the Supreme Court announced its decision, Senator Johnson o.f 
. . -
Texas recommended that a commission be set up to "study care-
fully" the problems of the natural gas industry and to make 
recommendations "for appropriate legislation." While Bureau 
of the Budget Director Rowland Hughes suggested that the prob-
lems be forwarded to a commission already in existence, the 
Administration decided instead to create a new commission to 
investigate this and other energy resource issues. On July 
30, 1954, the White House announced the establishment o.f a 
Cabinet Committee on Energy Supplies and Resources Policy. 
The Secretaries of the Departments o.f State, Treasury, Defense, 
Justice, Interior, Commerce, and Labor composed the Committea. 
Arthur Fleming, Director of the Office o.f Defense Mobilization, 
was designated its chairman. The Committee was charged with 
the responsibility o.f undertaking "a study to evaluate all 
11Nash, United States Oil Policy, 233-34; "Natural Gas," 
Business Week, 1367 (Nov. 12, 1955), 106; "Gas Headaches, .. 
'.Susiness tJeelC, 1267 (Dec. 12, 1953), 132·-34. 
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factors pertaining to the continual development of energy sup-
plies and resources and fuels in the United States, with the 
aim of strengthening the national defense, providing orderly 
industrial growth, and assuring supplies for our expanding 
national economy and for any future emergency." The report 
of the Committee, issued in early 1955, recommended the exemp-
tion of independent producers from FPC regulation. The report 
was correctly interpreted by Business Week as "Eisenhower's 
invitation to Congress" to repeal the Phillips decision. 
Consumer interests greeted the report with stinging criticism. 
Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin rejected the report out-
of-hand. Unless the natural gas industry were subjected to 
Federal regulation, he declared, "the respective consuming 
states like my own would be virtually helpless in trying to 
establish reasonable prices by the time the over-priced gas 
were to come into the respective state boundaries." In a 
letter to Arthur Fleming, Senator Paul Douglas objected to 
the composition of the Committee. He argued that it had been 
weighted in favor of the oil and gas industry and thus was 
antipathetic to consumer interests. Fleming replied by argu-
ing that the "positions of these [oil and gas] industries 
are widely divergent in character." There was not, he con-
cluded, a single bloc of oil and gas representatives. Doug-
las remained unconvinced. "And while you refer to the diver-
gent views of the coal industry and the oil and gas industry 
on many issues," he said, "they have long seen eye to eye on 
the precise legislative issue I mentioned--the question of 
104 
exempting from reasonable regulation the sales in interstate 
commerce of nontransporting as producers. 012 
In 1955, a bill conforming to the recommendations of the 
Presidential Advisory Committee on Energy Supplies was intro-
duced into Congress by Senator J. William :Fulbright and Repre-
sentative Oren Harris, both Democrats from Arkansas. Under 
the proposed bill, the Federal Power Commission's jurisdic-
tion over field process would have been severely curtailed. 
The Commission would regulate the producers in such a way as 
to allow for a "reasonable market price" and a "fair gather-
ing charge in those cases where such price is determined be-
fore but not after gathering is completed." In this sense, 
the Fulbright-Harris proposal differed from the Kerr bill 
which would have simply exempted the producers from all regu-
lation. While the President would most likely sign such a 
bill, many pundits speculated he would not "lift a finger to 
help get it passed." This assessment was partially true, for 
the Administration let Congressional leaders handle the matter 
almost exclusively.13 
12June 14, 1954, Johnson to Eisenhower; March ?, 1955, 
Central Files, OF-134-G, Box ?25, Eisenhower Library; "Report 
of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Energy Supplies and 
Resources Policy," Central Files, OF-134-G, Box 684, Eisen-
hower Library; "Two Lines Drawn," Business Week (I1arch 5, 1955), 
32; Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2nd-Sess. (Feb. 3, 1956), 
19?1-?2. 
l3House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 partsi Natural Gas 
Act (Exemption of Producers) (1955)i 2-3, 16-1? hereafter 
re£erred to as House Hearings, 1955 ; "Federal Control of 
Natural Gas: The Battle Warms Up," Business Week, 1324 (Jan. 
15, 1955), 80; Nash, United States Oil Policy, 235. 
105 
Opposition to the bill arose from organized labor, gas 
utility companies, municipal organizations, and the coal in-
terests. The labor and mayor groups concentrated their lob-
bying efforts on behalf of their consumer constituency. Repre-
sentative Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin summarized their 
arguments: 
If the cost of the gas brought into our State through 
that rnatural gas] pipeline increases, the consumers 
have Tittle alternative but to pay the higher price. 
They cannot go to another supplier, and they cannot 
change to another fuel--such as coal, oil, or elec-
tricity--without losing their investment in gas-burn-
ing equipment. 
The United Auto Workers had waged a strong fight against the 
Kerr Bill and now it protested the Fulbright-Harris measure. 
The UAW charged that the "reasonable market price" provision 
was just a gimmick. If passed, the Fulbright-Harris bill 
would thus be "a 30 billion windfall to big oil and na·tural 
gas producers ••• " Joseph W. Childs of the CIO contended that 
competition within the industry sent prices up, not down as 
the producers sought to prove. He concluded: "If this is the 
kind of protection we get from competition in the sale of 
natural gas to pipelines, we've had enough." The National 
Farmers Union also believed that the nature of the industry 
required regulation, not total free enterprise. The Union 
foresaw a dangerous precedent being set by the Fulbright-
Harris bill: " ••• and finally if the authority of the Federal 
Power Commission is wea..~ened and destroyed in regard to regu-
lation of natl,lral gas prices, it is probable that authority 
to regulate electric power wholesale rates for resale will be 
14 
weakened and destroyed." 
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These consumer interests took their case directly to the 
\Jhite House. Led by Senator Wiley a delegation of municipal 
and state associations met with Eisenhower on March 18, 1955, 
to urge him to oppose the Fulbright-Harris bill, but when the 
President proved unsympathetic, consumer opposition to the 
bill was mobilized by mayors of cities from around. the coun-
try. On April 6, 1955, Mayors Joseph S. Clark, Jr. of Phila-
delphia, Robert Wagner of New York, and David Lawrence of 
Pittsburgh sent telegrams to a hundred mayors of cities with 
populations over 100,000 people. In early February the three 
mayors met with a half dozen senators, including Douglas of 
Illinois and Lehman and Ives of New York, to arrange strategy 
for the difficult fight ahead. In protesting the bill, Mayor 
Clark set forth what the mayors conceived as the central issue: 
And the real issue raised by this legislation which 
we oppose is whether a group of producers, the ful-
crum of whose power rests in the hands of the large 
oil companies in this country would be permitted to 
determine the price of a commodity passing in inter-
state commerce and affected by the public interest, 
unilaterally and without policing in the consumer 
interest by a regulatory body: the Federal Power Com-
mission. 
Nevertheless, the efforts of organized labor and mayors attrac-
ted little public attention. 15 
14tJAW, "Facts About the Big Gas Gouge of 1956," (Mimeo-
graphed, Washington, D.C.); UAW, "1956 Legislative Program--
adopted by--UAW International .Ex:ecutive Board" (mimeographed, 
Jan. 11, 1956); Angus McDonald, "National Farmers Union Power 
and Resources Memorandum No. 2" (mimeographed, Jan. 6, 1956); 
National Famers Union, "Washington Newsletter," v. 3, no. 3 
(.Jan. 20, 1956), 4, in Paul Douglas Papers, Box 38?, Chicago 
Historical Society; House Hearings, 1955, 295, 1178-?9. 
l5New York Times, March 19, 8; April ?, 1955, 3?; Feb. 2, 
10? 
The gas industry was not unified on the bill. The gas 
utilities opposed the escalator clause and since the Ful-
bright-Harris bill did not eliminate it, they too fought the 
bill's passage. At a meeting in October 1955, the gas utili-
ties organized the Council of Local Gas Companies, a group 
designed to work closely with the opposition congressmen. 
The Council's leader was John Heyke, the President of Brook-
lyn Union Gas Company. Approximately sixty companies from 
twenty states made up the Council. The Council protested the 
Fulbright-Harris claiming it would exempt producers from regu-
lation while the local gas companies would still be tied to 
escalator clauses. "Many of these escalator clauses," the 
Council remonstrated, "are unfair and vicious in their opera-
tion, since the uncontrolled action of third parties can bring 
about the increase in price without any regard to the necessi-
ties of the producer who is selling the gas." Heyke reiterated 
to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that 
"The operation of these [escalator] clauses has in recent years 
resulted in unjustified price increases for producers which 
bear no reasonable relationship at all to producer costs, risks, 
required incentives, or general economic conditions." Randall 
LeBoeuf' of Consolidated Edison Co. of New York agreed: "No 
regulatory process can function if these [escalator] 
clauses change rates without the exercise of any judgment on 
1956, 14; House Hearings, 1955, 1380-84; March 9, 1955, Alex-
ander to Bernard M. Shanley, Central Files, OF-140-A, Box 725, 
Eisephower Library; Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 
v. 101, part 9 (July 28, 1955), 1181-82. 
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the part of the regulatory body." The independent Natural Gas 
Association of America echoed the same sentiments. The gas 
utilities agreed that rate increases did not derive from any 
necessary hike in producers' expenses or even in the value of 
natural gas; rather, they felt "artificial extraneous circum-
stances" accounted for the rate increases. If the escalator 
clause remained operative while the producers went unregulated, 
gas prices would jump, making it exceedingly more difficult 
for gas utilities to compete with coal as an economical energy 
resource. 16 
The coal states of West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, 
and Ohio were equally opposed to the .Fulbright-Harris bill. 
The United Mine Workers championed gas conservation, something 
the union hoped would stem the competitive impact of natural 
gas on coal. The National Coal Association put the real rea-
son succinctly: "It is important to make it clear to the Con-
gress that coal has lost substantial markets to such unregu-
lated natural gas competition, and most such losses can be 
attributed to the price flexibility of natural gas which is 
possible because of the exemption [of natural gas from FPC 
regulation]." Accordingly, Representative Harley Staggers of 
West Virginia introduced a bill to help protect the coal in-
dustry from the "unfair'' competition of natural gas. Repre-
sentative James Van Zandt of Pennsylvania advocated federal 
16council of Local Gas Companies, "Th~ Natural Gas Issue 
Before Congre.~rn 11 (Pamphlet), in PauLDouglas Papers, Box 387; 
House Hearings, 1955, 395-97, 675-82, 803-04; Carper, Lobby-
ing, 32-34. 
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regulation of the natural gas industry in order to preserve 
jobs. "As a representative of a congressional district whose 
economy depends upon coal and railroads," he said, "this un-
fair competition from natural gas has thrown thousands of 
coal miners, railroad workers, and other employees in related 
industries out of jobs. 017 
The Fulbright-Harris bill gathered support from several 
important sources. It received the overwhelming endorsement 
of the Eisenhower-appointed Federal Power Com.mission. This 
time the Commission was not as badly divided as on previous 
occasions. Commissioner Buchanan met a fate similar to Olds'. 
Truman renominated him to the FPC but the Senate subcommittee 
which investigated his nomination voted nine to four against 
him. Nevertheless, Truman kept Buchanan on the Commission 
through a recess appointment. The appointment of a new Chair-
man of the FPC concerned the advocates of federal regulation 
of natural gas. For example, Senator Wiley urged that in 
selecting a new Chairman "every consideration be given to 
selecting an individual who will hold views" sympathetic to 
the construction of the Saint Lawrence Seaway and "to pro-
tecting the rights of consumers especially in so crucial an 
area of utility regulation ,as natural gas rates." But Eisen-
hower promptly withdrew Buchanan's name for Senate considera-
tion and replaced him with Jerome Kuykendall, a member of the 
Washington State Public Utility Commission. While a lawyer in 
l?Nash, United States Oil Policy, 228; House Hearings, 
1955, 299, 1099, 1891-94. 
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private practice, Kuykendall had numbered Trans-Northwest 
Gas, Inc., and the Western Gas Co. among his clients. Despite 
some opposition to his appointment, Kuykendall was confirmed 
and made Chairman of the Commission. Likewise, when the term 
of Harrington Wimberley expired in 1953, Seaborn Digby, an 
Eisenhower Democrat from Louisiana, was appointed to the Com-
mission. From 1948 to 1952, Digby had sat on the industry-
dominated Conservation Commission of Louisiana and had been 
a member of the Legal Committee of the Interstate Oil Compact 
since 1948. Seemingly, Digby was a good political appointment. 
After investigating him, Kuykendall reported to Charles Willis, 
Jr., a special assistant to the President, that "All the in-
formants indicated that Mr. Digby was not an outstanding poli-
tical figure although quite well known in Louisiana politics. 
Apparently all political factions in Louisiana like and re-
spect Mr. Digby. 11 Similarly, James F. McKillips, Jr., an 
assistant to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, 
recommended him: "It is my understanding this would be a popu-
lar appointment in Louisiana." The·Digby appointment did not 
meet with unqualified enthusiasm from all quarters, however. 
Senator Charles Tobey of New Hampshire, the new Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, felt 
the Federal Power Commission was biased in favor of the gas 
producing states. "Let us look at the picture realistically," 
he wrote Sherman Adams. "If Mr. Digby, a gas producer-state 
Democrat, is ~ppointed to the Commission, who is the counter-
vailing representative of the northern gas consumer on the 
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other side?" For various reasons Tobey did not believe Com-
missioner Draper. was "an adequate countervailing influence in 
favor or the consumer." But Tobey singled out Commissioner 
Nelson Lee Smith for his most severe criticism. He thought 
Smith~ also from New Hampshire, should have been the consumer 
countervailing force on the FPC but, instead, he "has consis-
tently depended for his political support on Texas gas inter-
ests." Consequently, he suggested that Smith be replaced when 
.. 
his term expired on the Commission. Tobey wanted him trans-
ferred to the Interstate Commerce Commission and his successor 
to represent the consumer states. Specifically, Tobey wanted 
the new commissioner to come from New England. In a separate 
communication to Adaw,s, Tobey also outlined the political value 
or appointing a consumer representative to the FPO. "If we 
are going to put champions of higher gas prices in the field 
on the [Federal Power] Commission," he pointedly concluded, 
"we have got to take care of this consumer problem on the Power 
Commission." When his appointment expired in June, 1955, 
Commissioner Smith was succeeded by William R. Connole of Con-
necticut, a consumer-oriented commissioner. Unfortunately 
this appointment did not come until after the Commission, with 
only one dissenting vote, had endorsed the Fulbright-Harris 
bill.18 
18Engler, Politics of Oil, 325-26; Nash, United States 
Oil Polic~, 232; Feb. 24, 1953, Wiley to Eisenhower; Memo, 
June 4, 1 53, Kuykendall to Willis; May 19, 1953, McKillips 
to willis; July 6, 1953, Tobey to Adams; (Tobey also sent 
another letter to Adams on the same day); Feb. 2, 1955, Nel-
son Lee Smith· to Eisenhower; April 3, 1953, in Central Files, 
OF-18, Box 193, Eisenhower Library. 
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The chief advocates of the Fulbright-Harris bill were 
.Arthur- Fleming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization 
and Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Energy 
Resources, the Federal Power Commission, and the American 
Petroleum Institute, which represented the independent pro-
ducers. After Wiley's consumer group visited with Eisenhower 
in Ma~ch 1955, Fleming adamantly defended his Committee's 
recommendation. "All of these [consumer] arguments bear upon 
the likelihood of unreasonable price increases," he observed. 
They ignore the availability of the antitrust laws to 
deter and break up combinations of companies for the 
purpose of increasing prices in interstate commerce. 
They ignore or belittle the basic advantage of unregu-
lated commodity prices in a free market and the na-
tional policy against Government interference with 
private enterprise. 
Jerome Kuykendall, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, 
also endorsed the Fulbright-Harris bill. He marshalled six 
reasons why independent producers should not be regulated by 
the FPC. First, natural gas is a resource, like coal and oil, 
and they are not regulated. Therefore: "If one of these fuels 
is to be subjected to regulation, they all should be." Sec-
ond, since natural gas is not a public utility, the laws of 
competition--not regulation--ought to be allowed full play. 
"We [the FPC]," Kuykendall said, "are of the opinion that the 
gas producing industry does not have the characteristics of 
public utilities which must and should be monopolies, and is 
the type of industry in which competition or any unfair compe-
- ...:, t_i ti on., _if any, should and can be dealt with by proper appli-
cation of our antitrust laws." Third, such a law would eliminate 
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the cloud of financial uncertainty presently hanging over the 
industry. Fourth, since the supply of domestic natural gas 
might diminish because regulation would destroy incentive 
for gas exploration, some industries in the North and Mid-
west might find themselves compelled to move to the natural 
gas producing states unless this bill is enacted. Otherwise 
this trend could have a devastating effect on the economy of 
the Northern and Midwestern states. Fifth, "the fixing of 
rates of producers for gas sold in interstate commerce for 
resale will inevitably conflict with the recognized power of 
the States to regulate producers for purposes of conservation." 
Finally: "Ye [the FPC] believe that a sound fuel policy is 
essential to a robust and expanding internal economy and to 
the successi'ul development of the national defense. 11 Commis-
sioner Draper, who accepted the arguments of the consumer 
advocates, was the lone dissenter from the Commission's offi-
cial views. "This seller's market situation," Draper main-
tained, "is aggravated by the fact that, generally speaking, 
neither the distributing companies nor the consumers are in a 
position to bargain directly with the producers who are the 
ultimate suppliers of natural gas."19 
The American Petroleum Institute (API) was delegated the 
job of bringing the producers' case before the Federal Govern-
ment and the general public. After the Circuit Court handed 
19Memo, March 31, 1955, Arthur S. Fleming to Hauge, Cen-
tral Files, OF-140-A, Box 725, Eisenhower Library; House Hear-
ings, 1955, 12-15; Congressional Record, .84th Cong., 2d Sess., 
v. ' part , (Jan. 17, 1956), 64s-;-?64-66. 
down its decision in the Phillips case, the API established 
two ad hoc committees designed to encourage remedial legis-
lation. The General Gas Committee became the API lobbying 
agent and the Natural Gas and Oil Resources Committee was 
organized to educate the public about the problems plaguing 
the industry due to the Phillips decision. Dr. John Boat-
wright, chief economist for Standard Oil of Indiana, directed 
the research activities of the General Gas Committee. Testi-
fying before the House and Senate Commerce Committees, Boat-
wright contended that while the natural gas market was widen-
ing, the supply of natural gas might be greatly diminished in 
the future because there will be no incentive to explore for 
the resource. He cited one case in particular and concluded: 
"Regulation, as practiced, did stifle exploratory efforts to 
discover new [natural gas] resources." This was just one of 
the many arguments employed to persuade congressmen to the 
merits of the Fulbright-Harris bill. Business Week displayed 
the same reasoning: "Government control [of the natural gas 
industry] would only impose unnecessary restraints and would 
run counter to the sound principle that government should not 
attempt to do what private industry can do better. 1120 
The opponents of federal regulation also obtained support 
from influential organizations outside the industry. The 
20 . Carper, Lobbying, 8, 12; Senate, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., lst Sess., Natural 
Gas Act (1955) 4 120-227 [hereafter referred to as Senate Hear-
ings, 19551; "Industry Can Do It Better," Business Week, 132? 
(Feb. 5, 1~55), 144. 
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American Cattlemen's Association viewed federal regulation of 
the natural gas industry as a dangerous precedent. If the 
Federal Government could regulate this resource, it reasoned, 
then someday it might decide to regulate all American indus-
tires, including livestock. Better to stop the government 
now before it gets out of hand. The American Farm Bureau 
agreed wholeheartedly. The National Wool Growers Association 
loudly protested the implications of the Phillips decision. 
The Association felt that a statenent redefining the powers 
of the Federal Power Commission would also "clearly and firmly 
state that neither that agency nor any other of the Federal 
Government shall have the power to encroach upon the preroga-
tives and long-established practices of the respective States 
nor upon the intrinsic and inalienable rights of individual 
citizens, nor to fix prices in any competitive busin-ess. 1121 
Despite its well-chartered course, the Fulbright-Harris 
bill did not find an altogether clear road ahead. The House 
Commerce Committee reported out the bill without any changes. 
After a motion for recommittal was narrowly defeated, the bill 
passed by only six votes. The proponents of the bill now re-
doubled their efforts for the expected fight in the Senate. 
Not everyone, however, interpreted the narrow victory in the 
House as a danger sign for the gas producers. Noting little 
public response to the bill, Commonweal thought the "chances 
of defeating the measure would be greatly enhanced if somehow 
21The opinions of these organizations.can be found in 
House Hearings; ·1955,.523-25; Senate Hearings, 1955, 1453. 
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the consuming public would be induced to take part .. " And the 
Case scandal did· ~exactly that. 22 
Unexpectedly, in the midst of the debate on the Fulbright-
Harris bill, Senator Case, a conservative Republican from 
South Dakota, informed his colleagues of his intention to vote 
""1against the pending measure. He revealed that a 1 yer had 
contributed twenty-five hundred dollar bills to his re-elec-
tion campaign. He did not charge, however, that the money was 
a bribe; after all, he was already going to vote for the bill 
anyway. But because of the size of the contribution and the 
relative anonymity of the donor, Case simply could not vote 
for the measure. "The point at which I object, ••• ," the Sena-
tor explained, "is that of doing something so valuable to 
those interested in natural gas that they advance huge sums 
of money as a down payment so to speak, on the profits they 
expect to harvest." Obviously piqued by Case's disclosure, 
Senator Fulbright, the sponsor of the bill, badgered Case to 
divulge the name of the individual who had given the money to 
his campaign. Fulbright sharply drew his point: 
••• To come in here and use this example of malfeasance 
of alleged supporters of the bill without any knowledge 
of who they are and whom they represent leaves us in 
a very peculiar position. There is necessarily suspi-
cion around with references to any Senator who supports 
the bill, because the Senator from South Dakota himself 
has changed his position because of the offer of a bribe--
22House of Representatives, 84th Cong., lst Sess., Report 
N. 992 (June 28, 1955); Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st 
Sess., v. 101, part 9 (July 28, 1955), 11921-30; "Threat to the 
Consumers," Commonweal, 62 (Aug. 12, 1955), 461. The House 
vote was nonpartisan as in the offshore oil case. 86 Democrats 
and 123 Republicans voted for the bill and 136 Democrats and 67 
Republicans opposed it. Generally speaking, the votes could be 
broken down according to consumer/producer state interest. 
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A couple of days later Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and 
Minority Leader William Knowland introduced a joint resolu-
tion to establish a committee to investigate Case's disclos-
ure. 
The investigative committee, headed by Walter F. George 
of Georgia, was composed of senior members of the Senate. 
The Committee found there had been no attempted bribery but 
did determine "galloping irresponsibility" on the part of 
the donor. George's committee suggested that a thorough study 
of the Federal Lobbying Act, Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 
and the election laws should be undertaken. A Federal Grand 
Jury was not as lenient with the donor, however. The defen-
dants pleaded guilty to violating the Federal Lobbying Act 
and received fines. Ironically, there had been no need for 
the entire incident. Fulbright's bill would have passed the 
Senate easily. The scandal now cast a long shadow over the 
political atmosphere. 23 
When the Senate Commerce Committee reported out the pro-
ducers' bill, the Council of Local Gas Companies, quickly sur-
mising that the Fulbright forces had the necessary votes, 
wisely decided to attempt to modify the bill through amend-
ment. The floor managers of the bill adopted a strategy of 
23For a fuller explanation of the intricacies and ramifi-
cations of the Case scandal see Engler, Politics of Oil, 408-
14; Carper, LobbyinF, 36-39. Congressional Record, 84th Con~, 
2d Sess., v. 102, part 2 (Feb. 3, 1956), 1963-64, 1996; ~tng. 
Rec., Ibid., Feb. 6, 1956, 2009-10; Senate, Select Cammi. ee 
for Contribution Investigation, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Report 
1?24 (April ?, 1956); "Gas Bill Lobby's Tangled Trails: An 
Inept Neff's Path Can Now Be Mapped," Life, 40 (I-larch 26, 
1956), 32-33; New York Times, Dec. 15,--r9)6, 1. 
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opposing all such amendments. Senator John Pastore of Rhode 
Island proposed that a provision be inserted in the bill 
stipulating that the FPC ought to take into consideration the 
interests of the consumer as well as a reasonable market price. 
Fulbright answered that the Federal Power Commission was al-
ready commanded by law to consider the consumers' interests 
by testing "the reasonableness of the provisions of the con-
tract as they relate to existing and future prices." Senator 
Douglas• amendment would have freed "the small producers of 
natural gas from all regulation," and would have retained 
"regulation :for the approximately 200 large producers." Had 
Douglas• amendment been accepted the .bill would have been re·-
turned to the House, where it no longer enjoyed majority sup-
port. Both the Pastore and Douglas amendments were d,efeated. 
The pressure put on the senators was great. For example, Sena-
tors Pat McNamara (D-Mich.) and George Aiken (R-Vt.) declared 
they had never experienced such pressure. On the same day 
Johnson and Knowland introduced their resolution to investi-
gate the Case episode, the Senate voted 53 to 38 for the bill. 
The no-am~nd.ment strategy had worked. All eyes now focussed 
on the White House. 24 
Although the President had not publicly committed him-
self to the bill, it was generally agreed he would sign it. 
24 .. 
. Carper, Lobbying, 34; Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 
2d Sess., v. 102, part 2 (Feb. 6, 1956), 2064-6?, 2074-75, 2096; 
New York Times, Jan. 18, 24; Feb. l, 12; Feb. 7, 1956, l; "The 
President's V~to," Commonweal, 63 (March 2, 1956), 560. The 
vote was: 30 Republic~ns and 23 Democrats for; 14 Republicans 
and 24 Democrats opposed. 
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Oren Harris urged Eisenhower to sign it. "I sincerely hope, 
Mr. President," he· wrote, "that you will not be persuaded by 
the propaganda, the distortion of the facts and the unfortun-
ate event of the Senator Case matter." Representative Char-
les Halleck (R-Ill.) agreed that the Case affair "should cer-
tainly not be permitted to cloud the issue." But 1956 was a 
political year, and Eisenhower vetoed the measure. In the 
veto message Eisenhower said: "I believe I would not be dis-
charging my own duty were I to approve this legislation before 
the activities in question have been fully investigated by the 
Congress and the Department of Justice." Nevertheless, Eisen-
hower noted that he agreed with the principle of the bill. 
Commonweal complimented the President on his action. "Defeat 
of the measure," .it said, "is; therefore, a sort of political 
muscle resulting from the President's determination to defend 
'the integrity of governmental processes.'" Henry Hazlitt 
of Newsweek was not so admiring. "President Eisenhower's 
veto of the natural-gas bill was confused, irrelevant, and 
political blunder," he inveighed. "It cannot be defended 
logically'· constitutionally, or economically. u 25 
Shortly after the veto the White House quietly sent out 
word to Southwestern oilmen that the Administration would 
2~eb. 13, 1956, Harris to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-
140-C, Box 726, Eisenhower Library; Personal and Confidential, 
Feb. 13, 1956, Hallack to Adams, Persons, Morgan, Gerald Mor-
gan Papers, Box 20, Eisenhower Library; House Document 342, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 20, 1956); "The President's Veto," 
Commentary, 63 (March 2, 1956), 560; Henry Hazlitt, "That Gas 
~ill Veto," Newsweek., 47 (March 12, 1956), 88; "For Gas, Free-
dom--With Strings, 11 Business Week, 1380 (Feb. 11, 1956), 34. 
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support a gas bill protecting the consumer and reconciling 
the difference between producers and distributors. In his 
Budget Message of January 195?, Eisenhower told Congress that 
"legislation freeing gas producers from public utility-type 
regulation is essential." To facilitate matters, Gerald Mor-
gan, a White House aide, asked the Chairman of the FPC to 
draft a bill conforming to the requirements of the President's 
veto message, and harmonizing the interests of the producers, 
distributors, and pipelines. When Kuykendall discovered he 
could not do it unaided, the FPC chairman conferred with Ran-
dall LeBoeuf, who had been-a leading spokesman for the utility 
distributors opposing the Fulbright-Harris bill, William Tarver, 
a former member of the FPC staff and presently employed with 
a pipeline company, and David T~ Sea~ls, who had supported the 
producers. When critics later charged that consumers were 
not represented at these secret meetings, Kuykendall defended 
himself: "I got 3 extremely able men from those 3 segments of 
the industry (producer, pipeline, distributor), and I believe 
that among those the consumer interests were adequately repre-
sented." When the head of the Brooklyn Union Gas Company 
asked him to step out of the picture because a separate indus-
try group aiming at the same objectives had been previously 
formed, Kuykendall complied with his wishes. In the next ses-
sion of Congress, Representative Oren Harris introduced a new 
bill, outlawing the escalator clause and stipulating that pro-
ducers had to. prove their rates were reasonable if the F.PC or 
a third party challenged them. The Federal Power Commission 
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and all three segments of the industry supported this revised 
bill. This time LeBoeuf testified in favor of the legislation. 
\lb.ile the bill was reported out of committee it never reached 
a vote. Once again the Administration decided the time had 
not come for such a law. A bill of this type never did pass 
under Eisenhower's presidency. 26 
The natural gas controversy involved all aspects of the 
American political and judicial system. But for the sake of 
a scandal, the Natural Gas Act would have been amended in 
1956. The offshore oil and natural gas controversies followed 
much the same routes. In one case the Supreme Court was over-
turned by Congress; in the other the.high court's decision 
stood only because a scandal made it politically impropitious 
for the President to sign the Fulbright-Harris bill. But the 
natural gas controversy highlighted some new questions. Kuy-
kendall had worked with representatives of the industry to 
write a bill which would have diminished the regulatory pow-
ers of his own commission. Many observers seriously questioned 
whether his activities had been in keeping with the statutory 
independence of such commissions from outside entanglement and 
interference. When he came up for renomination, Kuykendall 
2611 No Gas Relief," Business Week, 1401 (July 7, 1956), 
31; "Gas Frets over FPC, 11 Business Week, 1438 (March 23, 1957), 
48; House of Representatives, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Report 
No. 83?; House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., (1957), 2 parts, 
Natural Ga:s Act Regulation of Producers' Prices), 101, 126-30, 
; ongress e s New Na ura as 1 , usiness Week, 1442 
(April 20, 1957), 46. Seals had testified in favor of the 
Fulbright-Harris bill; cf. Senate Hearings, 1955, 69-71. 
Engler, Politics of Oil, 326-29, 415-16. 
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had to answer this among other questions. Meanwhile, a new 
competitive energy resource, atomic energy, also demanded 
legislative and executive attention. 
" -
CHAPrER V 
LEWIS STRAUSS, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE JCAE 
When America emerged from the Second World War the newest 
form of energy, atomic power, occupied a unique position 
among the country's resources. Because of its military impor-
tance atomic energy became the exclusive monopoly of the Fed-
eral Government. This monopoly meant the application of 
nuclear energy to peaceful domestic purposes was regulated 
to secondary importance. By 1953, however, industry was de-
manding access to this new power resource. The development 
of a new industry awaited. While its impact upon the Ameri-
can. economy during the fifties was negligible, the potential 
economic importance of atomic energy for industrial use was 
obvious. But as the Federal Government loosened its grip, 
several policymaking problems developed. During the fifties, 
the political mechanism by which domestic nuclear energy 
would be regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the 
Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), and 
the Yhite House took definite shape. 1 
The Atomic Energy Commission stood out among other agen-
cies in the maze of federal bureaucracy. Most of the AEC's 
1Philip Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear Power: Economic Uses 
and Policy Formation (The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 
1963), 4; Harold Vatter, The U.S. Economy in the 1950's (Nor-
ton & Co., New York, 1963), lO-ll. 
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business was shrouded in secrecy and devoted almost entirely 
to military phases of atomic energy. As long as the atom re-
mained a monopoly of the Federal Government the AEC did not 
have or need a political constituency; in a sense, the Com-
mission was above politics. But once the Federal Government 
consented to release the atom for peaceful domestic purposes 
the AEC found itself cut adrift in the midst of a political 
thunderstorm. 2 
The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy was 
also in the eye of that storm. Among congressional commit-
tees, the JCAE, established in 1946, enjoyed special bene-
fits. The JCAE, for example, was the only joint committee 
granted legislative authority; the other nine joint commit-
tees served only investigative, study, or housekeeping 
chores. Besides its legislative functions, the JCAE also 
exercised the customary investigative and study duties. Fur-
thermore, the joint committee, by its nature, had singular 
legislative powers. Ordinarily, if unacceptable legislation 
were reported out by a committee in one branch of Congress, 
the parallel committee in the other house could amend it. 
Such was not the case with the JCAE. Once the Joint Committee 
reported out a bill, all avenues, short of amending it on the 
floor of Congress or actually defeating the bill, we~e closed. 
2Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the 
Atom: The Inte~ration of Powers (New York,-r9b3), 75-76; H. L. 
Nieburg, "The 'isenhower AEC and Congress: A Study in Execu-
tive-Legislative Relations," Midwest Journal of Political Sci-
~ (May, 1962), vol. VI, No. 2, 115~48. 
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Nevertheless, one important limitation was placed on the Joint 
Committee's legislative authority. Until 1954, the Committee 
was not empowered to authorize the construction or acquisition 
of new atomic facilities. The JCAE thus worked closely with 
the House and Senate appropriations committees. It is easy 
to understand why the JCAE jealously guarded its legislative 
prerogatives and independence.3 
Since the committee was prestigious, congressmen natur-
ally sought membership on it. An examination of the member-
ship of the Joint Committee reveals, however, that electoral 
constituency interest often played a large role. The loca-
tions of the original atomic installations were determined 
solely by technical requirements, not constituency interests. 
But a.s these installations became integrated with the economies 
of the states and regions where they were located, congress-
men from these areas naturally gravitated to the JCAE. An 
AEC laboratory or plant could mean large government contracts 
and jobs, a political as well as an economic inducement. This 
is not to say that all states possessing AEC facilities ob-
tained representation on the committee. Among those in the 
fifties best reflecting this constituency concern, however, 
were Senators Clinton Anderson (Los Alamos and Sandia), Henry 
Jackson (Hanford), Albert Gore (Oak Ridge), and Representatives-
3Rosenthal and ·Green, Government of the Atom, 26, 12?; 
Morgan Thomas, in collaboration with Robert M. Northrup, 
Atomic En.er~ and Congress (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
l?ress, 1956 , 17-20. Since the JCAE worked with important 
secret in.formation it was highly unlikely any JCAE-sponsored 
bill would be defeated. The chances for amending legislation 
were poor. 
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Chet Holifield and Craig Hosmer (Lawrence Radiation Laboratory 
and Stanford linear acceleration), and Melvin Price (Argonne). 
Throughout the fifties these congressmen fought tenaciously 
to preserve and occasionally to expand the JCAE's jurisdic-
tion over the AEC. 4 
Since the AEC had no political constituency and the JCAE 
closely identified with Commission activities, the Joint Com-
mittee became the AEC's public apologist. Whenever the AEC 
underwent public criticism, members of the JCAE defended it. 
Realizing the significance of this marriage Gordon Dean, the 
first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, nurtured a 
close relationship between the Commission and the Joint Com-
mittee. According to Section 15(b) of the McMahon Act, the 
basic atomic energy law, the Commission. was ordered to "keep 
the joint committee [JCAE] fully and currently informed with 
respect to the Commission's activities." For the most part 
the AEC complied with this provision as, indeed, the JCAE 
took its responsibility seriously. In fact, the Committee 
came to regard itself as a full policymaking partner, and 
not just as a "watchdog" over the AEC. "Fundamental policy, 
though normally originating within the [Atomic Energy] Com-
mission tends to be made with the advice and consent of the 
congressional committee [JCAE]," Senator Henry M. Jackson, a 
4Harold Orlans, Contractin5 for Atoms. A Stud~ of Public 
Policy Issues Posed by the Atomic Energy Commission s Contract-
in for Research Develo ment and Mana erial Services (The 
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1 , l , 164; 
Rosenthal and Green, Government of the Atom, 35. 
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member of the JCAE explained. "And in the case of certain 
vital policy decisions, the urging from the Committee has 
played so powerful a role that it can be said the Committee 
made the decisions, with the advise and consent of the execu-
tive branch." From 1946 until 1953, the JCAE and AEC lived 
in a harmonious relationship. But between 1953 and 1958, the 
years when Lewis Strauss reigned over the Commission, the JCAE 
vigorously resisted the tendency toward executive domination 
of the AEC. The Joint Committee simply opposed any divorce. 
'While the turf over which the battle took place appeared to 
be the public versus private power issue, the real struggle 
concerned which branch of the government, the JCAE or the 
'White House, would predominate over AEC activities.5 
The executive-legislative struggle arose largely out of 
the ambiguous nature of the McMahon Act (1946). The Joint 
Congressional Committee, as.we have seen, enjoyed unique 
status and independence in Congress, thus jealously guarding 
its responsibilities and prerogatives. But the relationship 
of the Executive to the Atomic Energy Commission was less ex-
plicit. The Act made the AEC relatively independent of the 
'White House. The Commissioners and the General Manager of 
the AEC were appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Once appointed, however, a commissioner 
5Morgan Thomas, Atomic Ener~, ch. V ("Defense of Agency 
and Program"), 118-40; Orlans, l; Henry Jackson, "Congress 
and the Atom," The Annals of the American Academy of Politi-
cal and Social Sciences (November, 1953), v. 290, 76-81; Nie-
burg, "The Eisenhower AEC a:11d Congress," 115. 
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could be dismissed by the President only for reasons specified 
by the McMahon Act. Thus, the Commission was intended to 
exercise a degree of autonomy. The nub of the problem was 
that while the McMahon Act directed the President to oversee 
the Commission's work relating to fissionable materials and 
atomic weapons, the mechanism by which this should be done 
was not made plain. Rather it was left to the executive 
branch to devise. 6 
When Lewis Strauss became Chairman of the AEC in 1953, 
he stepped into a crossfire between the White House and the 
JCAE. As a member of the Taft-Hoover wing of the Republican 
Party, Strauss was unpopular with many Democrats from the 
start. He and Taft had begun their public careers together 
when Herbert Hoover, the £uture president, headed the Food 
Administration during World War·r. As each pursued his own 
career, the three men remained close friends over the years. 
When Taft sought the presidential nomination in 1952, both 
Strauss and Hoover supported him. Born and educated in Char-
leston, West Virginia, Strauss rose to prominence in business 
circles as a partner in the finance firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. 
In 1946, Truman offered him a position on the newly created 
AEC, a position he accepted after consulting with Taft. After 
the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949, the 
loss of the American atomic monopoly was a cause of concern 
6Morgan Thomas, Atomic Energy, 12-13. Also, it ought to 
be pointed out that the Presi4ent appointed all the members 
of the General Ad~isory Committee of the AEC. 
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for many. Consequently, Strauss, along with Gordon Dean, 
recommended the United States undertake construction of the 
hydrogen bomb. Truman accepted their controversial advice. 
Strauss later resigned from the Commission and returned to 
business. 'When Eisenhower took over, he named Strauss his 
executive assistant for consultation on atomic energy matters, 
and not long afterwards, nominated him chairman of the AEC. 
As Chairman of the AEC Strauss occupied a politically sensi-
tive position. He was head of a relatively independent Oem-
mission with firm ties to an influential congressional com-
mittee; on the other hand, Eisenhower made him a member of 
the National Security Council and a Special Advisor to the 
President. Inexorably, a political tug-of-war between the 
JCAE and the w"hite House resulted. The fact that the Demo-
crats controlled the JCAE after 1955 only exacerbated these 
tensions.? 
By Eisenhower's inauguration, industry had already 
mounted pressure for relaxation of the federal monopoly on 
atomic patents and source material. Until 1950 the AEC had 
been involved in only one nonmilitary project and that had 
been discontinued. Later the Monsanto Chemical and Dow 
Chemical-Detroit Edison industrial groups introduced proposals 
?Nieburg,"The Eisenhower AEC and Congress," 122, 129; 
Harold Wolfe, Herbert Hoover: Public Servant and Leadershi 
of the Loyal Opposition "New Yor , , ; Lewis 
Strauss, Men and Decisions (New York, 1962), 213, 332,-ch. II; 
New York Times, June 24, I; June 25, 26; June 28, 36; March 8, 
1953, l; Duncan Norton-Taylor, "The Controversial Mr. Strauss," 
Fortune, 51 (January, 1955), 164-66; Anne w. Manks, "Washing-
ton Notes," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, IX (April, 1953), 
84. 
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for industrial participation in domestic development of the 
atom for electire power. Finally, in 1951, the Atomic Energy 
Commission initiated the Industrial Participation Program, 
by permitting the AEC's reactor program to be studied by 
businesses concerned with the atom. Two rounds of such stu-
dies resulted. The National Security Resources Board recom-
mended, in December 1952, that the McMahon Act be revised to 
allow for participation of private interests in the develop-
ment of atomic energy. "Direct the Atomic Energy Commission, 
in consultation with the Department of the Interior and the 
Federal Power Commission, as well as other interested agen-
cies," it advised, "to draft for submission to the Congress 
an amendment to the [McMahon] act specifying the conditions--
including patent rights, availability of fissionable mater-
ials and allocation of costs as between industrial power and 
weapons--under which private interests could operate commer-
cially to benefit from their atomic power research, develop-
ment and production." The President's Advisory Committee on 
Government Organization made a similar suggestion. 8 
Eisenhower heeded this advice and, in February 1954, 
forwarded a special message to Congress recommending amend- · 
ments to the McMahon Act. Aside from certain foreign policy 
changes, the President felt the time had now come for "broad-
ened participation in the development of peacetime uses of 
8ttorgan Thomas, Atomic En.er51, 142; New York Time~, De-
cember 23, 1952; President's Advisory Committee on Government 
Organization, April 11, 1953, draft of Memorandum No. 17, 
Eisenhower Library, Central Files, OF-103. 
131 
l\ .,•\'"' energy in the United States." "But," he added, "in 
, 1 '•a undertaking, the enterprise, ini tia ti ve and competitive 
,, , .. ~ \"t. t, of individuals and groups within our free economy are 
.,..t<iit,lttd to assure the greatest efficiency and progress at the 
~.._,~t cost to the public." The. Atomic Energy Commission, 
.~l•wise, sent two draft bills to Congress. The Chairman of 
~!~ Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Represen-
:.t.~ive w. Sterling Cole (R-NY) refused to even consider thes.e 
~i!ls because they arrogated too much authority to the Presi-
!.~=.t. Even though a Republican, Cole was not about to let 
-::.:.e !Jhite House usurp any of the JCAE's power. Consequently, 
:~le and Senator Bourke Hickenlooper. of Iowa, the Vice Chair-
:a.!l of the Committee, drafted their own bill. The intention 
1: the Cole-Hickenlooper bill was to preserve the authority 
:! the JCAE while achieving the Administration's basic objec-
"!!. Tes. 9 
The Cole-Hickenlooper bill had three main provisions. 
,.. ... !'at, the AEC would be authorized to release information to 
-:·~ allies of the United States for the design and develop-
~~;.t ot defense plans and training of personnel, although 
.~:~rmation regarding the design or manufacture of weapons 
., .. ,. ... 1d not be made available. Secondly, the AEC also would 
•4' '1llowed to give data to its Allies regarding "industrial 
"tt" other applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes." 
9Public Papers of the Presidents, 1954, 260-69; Strauss, 
:~·i. nnd Decisions, 313; Rosenthal and Green, Government of the 
' <:.::it 13-14, 124-25; New York Times, .April 16, 1954, 1. 
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Fissionable materials for industrial use could be released. 
Finally, the bill aimed at creating "a great new industry in 
atomic energy" by permitting and encouraging private industry 
to own and operate atomic reactors and power plants under 
regulation by the Atomic Energy Commission. 10 
Generally, the bill met with the approval of industry 
but not with the constituent groups of the New Deal coali-
tion. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
complained that the bill would legalize a return to the days 
of Samuel Insull and the "power trusts." In effect, the Cole-
, 
Hickenlooper bill, the NRECA asserted, would create new util-
ity holding companies, an evil the Public Utilities Holding 
Company Act of 1935 had attempted to destroy. Agreeing with 
the NRECA, the·c.I.O envisioned the bill making "inevitable 
the creation of a giant monopoly in the production of atomic 
power •••• " In other words, the opponents of the bill feared 
that if industry owned its source material and had exclusive 
patents they would monopolize the domestic use of atomic ener-
gy. Trumpeting the virtues of free enterprise, industry, of 
course, was especially eager for passage of the Cole-Hicken-
looper bill. E. H. Dixon, President of Middle South Utilities, 
Inc.~ and an influential member of the Edison Electric Insti-
tute, contended that if "the superior position of the United 
States" in atomic energy were to be maintained, it would have 
to be done "in terms of industrial capacity and industrial 
10ttorgan Thomas, Atomic Energz, 149-153· 
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development." "In this respect," he went on, "the present 
[McMahon] act operates in reverse; complete Government mono-
poly tends to inhibit industrial participation, the very 
level upon which our superiority has been demonstrated in 
other fields and can be maintained with respect to the atom." 
The United States Chamber of Commerce felt that relaxation 4 of the government's monopoly would encourage development of 
"the science of atomic power." Furthermore, Walker Gisler, 
President of the Detroit Edison Co., thought the bill should 
permit private enterprise to build and operate atomic energy 
plants, to acquire, own and dispose of fissionable and source 
materials, to sell and distribute end products and by-prod-
ucts produced in an atomic energy facility, to obtain licen-
ses from the AEC for such work, and to have the normal patent 
and trade-secret protection subject, of course, to full dis-
closure to the Commission for its own use and military pur-
poses. The industrialists had one added advantage; they re-
ceived the support of the Atomic Energy Commission. 11 
The Commission unanimously endorsed the Cole-F..ickenlooper 
bill, noting it "would carry out the basic objectives of the 
President's message in this area." The AEC, in fact, encour-
aged development of atomic energy by industry. Reflecting the 
arguments of industry, the Commission told the JCAE: "Putting 
this resource to work, through continued Government development 
11u.s. Congress, Joint Congressional Committee 
Energy, S. 2 and H.R. 8862 To Amend the Atomic Ener 
of 1946, rd Congress, d Sess. , Parts, -
313, 360, 495-96, [hereafter cited as JCAE (1954).] ' 
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where necessary, and through private industry, to strengthen 
the economy--to create power for industry and homes, open up 
jobs, create new sources of revenue--will most quickly and 
securely achieve and spread its benefits. 1112 
Before atomic energy could be opened to industry it was 
first necessary to iron out certain technical and political 
problems. Specifically, questions involving ownership of 
patents and source material, preference to public power groups, 
and the "principal officer" clause had to be answered. The 
Cole-Hickenlooper bill would have provided for normal patent 
practices. Those who agreed with this provision envisaged 
such patent rights encour~ging industry to develop atomic 
technology and science. In order'~o permit a reasonably wide 
d:i.ssemination of' the knowledge now accumulated in the field,n 
the American Bar Association and the Atomic Energy Commission 
sounded a compromising note by suggesting that a transitional 
period of five years would be preferable to instituting the 
traditional patent laws right away. Alfred Iddles, President 
of the Babcock & Wilcox Co., which manufactured steam-gener-
ating units, said that a transition period would be amenable 
to him. Nevertheless, there was no doubt he preferred the 
traditional patent provisions. " ••• It happens," he said, 
"that all of my competitors are already in the business, and 
if I can beat them out in doing the next job in competition 
better, and get a patent on it, I ought to be able to do so." 
12 . ~-' 563, 575, 615. 
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E. H. Dixon noted that patents had played almost no direct 
part in the electric power industry for many decades and that 
"it is believed that patents will play a small part, if any, 
within the electric power industry itself in the atomic age, 
since the industry is one in which profits are limited, and 
the patent incentives would necessarily be relatively unimpor-
tant." The American Public Power Association took exception 
to this reasoning. The Association felt the patent provision 
in the Cole-Hickenlooper bill was "so obviously designed to 
serve individual private interests at the expense of the gen-
eral welfare as to require their total rejection ••• " The 
National Farmers Union suggested that all atomic patents 
should be "nonexclusive" (i.e., available to the entire in-
dustry), and the AEC should be empowered to set reasonable 
royalty fees. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Asso-
ciation predicted that electricity rates would increase if 
exclusive patents were granted. "I predict," Clyde T. Ellis 
of the NRECA inveighed, "that if Congress yields to the de-
mands of the monopolistic power companies and permits the 
granting of exclusive patents ••• the adverse reaction will be 
voiced at every farm breakfast table and in every rural ballot 
box in the United States."13 
The question of ownership of fissionable materials went 
straight to the heart of the problem. The industrialists be-
lieved industry should be allowed to own its own source 
l3Ibid., 61, 179, 356, 318-19, 597-99, 648-49; Clyde T. 
Ellis, ACIT'ant Step (New York, 1966), 135. 
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materials, while opponents fought to have the materials leased 
to industry by the Federal Government. E. H. Dixon cited four 
cogent reasons why industry ought to possess the source mater-
ial. First, if it leases the material the government woulci 
then be in private business "in a very important manner." 
Second, the expense for the government would be great. "Re-
gardless of the needs of the [Federal] Government for special 
material and regardless of the status of its finances, it 
would have a continuing obligation to spend enormous sums of 
money in fulfillment of such a program," Dixon pointed out. 
Third, the present system "might tend to discourage the invest-
ment of private capital in the industry." Finally, industry 
could conceivably find itself in a dangerous political posi-
tion. To wit: a situation could arise in which "a hostile 
administration might use the lease device adversely against a 
business or businesses for reasons having nothing to do with 
the special problems surrounding special material and its 
use." Walker Cisler _pointed out that "with private ownership 
the rights of private investors would be more adequately pro-
tected." The National Association of Manufactures and the 
.American Bar Association fully concurred with Cisler and Dix-
on. The American Public Power Association disagreed, urging 
"that controls of fissionable materials contained in the 1946 
[McMaho~J act be not released until adequate knowledge is 
available with respect to the production of electric e:b.ergy.li14 
14Ibid., 370, 78, 461, 59, 176-7?. 
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The line was most clearly drawn on the issue of prefer-
ence. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
and the National Farmers Union demanded that a clause insur-
ing preference for public bodies be inserted in the bill. 
The NREGA wanted the government to build atomic reactors for 
the generation of electric power and to market that power 
under the preference laws. "Safeguarding the interest of the 
public in the public domain and in the development of public-
power sites," the National Farmers Union added, "goes back 
almost to the beginning of our history as· a nation." Leland 
Olds, a former public power advocate on the RPG, also testi-
fied in favor of a preference clause. Walker Gisler, however, 
was adamantly opposed to any preferential treatment for pub-
lic or private bodies. "I believe that there should be no 
preference," he said pointedly. "I believe it should take 
its rightful place in the economic order and that there 
[should] be no special preference for the distribution of 
atomic generated power as compared to the conventional." 
When Representative Holifield asked him if he advocated "a 
different system than is now contained in the Federal Power 
Act," Cisler responded: "Yes, I believe that is not a fair 
situation that now exists.·" Hence the Gole-Hickenlooper bill 
was generally viewed on all sides as an attack on the prin-
ciple of preference. 15 
While the issues of ownership of source materials; and 
l5Ibid., 82-83, 354-55; Ellis, Giant Step, 135; New York 
Times, May 20, 1954, l?. 
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patent and preference rights were, by and large, topics that 
had filled the air hanging over the public versus private 
power dilemma since the Reclamation Act of 1902, the debate 
about the "principal officer" clause of the C.ole-Hickenlooper 
bill brought a new dimension to the atomic energy controversy. 
For the first time the Commission was in open disagreement 
over an internal organizational matter. According to the bili 
the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission would henceforth 
be designated the principal officer of the Commission. While 
the AEC, in its policy statement to the JCAE, took no offi-
cial stand on this issue, individual members did. With re-
gard to regulatory commissions, the First Hoover Commission, 
in 194?, had recommended "that all administrative responsi-
bilities be vested in the chairman of the commission." While 
this recommendation had not applied directly to the AEC, Chair-
man Strauss told the JCAE that the Hoover Commission sugges-
tion, nonetheless, was applicable to his Commission's manager-
ial problems. By streamlining its lines of authority, Strauss 
believed, the AEC's work would be performed more efficiently. 
In responding to a question from Representative Holifield, 
Strauss said he approved of the clause because it would be 
"an improvement on the existing lack of any delineation of 
the duties and responsibilities of the Chairman." Commissioner 
Joseph Campbell, also an Eisenhower appointee, sided with 
Strauss. Commissioners Eugene Zuckert, Thomas E. Murray, and 
Henry Dewolf .Smyth, all Truman appointees., however, took ex-
ception to this clause. Because Strauss was both a Presidential 
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advisor and chairman of the AEC, they believed such a provi-
sion would, in fact, reduce the Commission to presidential 
subservience. "To me, the fact that the Chairman does have a 
dual capacity," Zuckert emphasized, "makes it all the more 
imperative that every step possible be taken to preserve and 
promote for the long run the substance of the Commission con-
cept for the direction of the responsibilities entrusted to 
it." ~he Democratic members of the JCAE obviously agreed 
with these three commissioners. Representative Holifield was 
?determined to have this clause deleted from the bill while in 
committee and, if it was not, he would fight it on the floor 
of the House. Eventually, the Committee compromised and 
changed the designation from "principal officer" to "official 
spokesman." Nonetheless, this dispute was only the first 
leak in the dike. 16 
Once the hearings ended, Representatives Holifield and 
Price submitted a resolution in the House. Describing the 
proposed changes in the Atomic Energy law as "premature and 
ill-advised, .. they cautioned against any action that would 
"entail huge Government subsidies to private firms or restrict 
the participation, through patent devices or otherwise, to a 
small segment of industry." The Joint Committee, neverthe-
less, unanimously reported the bill out. 
16The Commission on the Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, Re ulatory Commissions: A Re ort to 
the Con"-'.ress (Narch, 1949), 5- ; J.CAE 1 54 , 8 - , 3 , 5, 
So6, 79~; New York Times, June 5, 1954, l; Rosenthal and Green, 
Government of the Atom, 14?; Thomas, Atomic Ener~, 16?-?4; 
Warren Unna, "Dissension in the AEC," Atlantic,9 (May, 195?), 
39. 
_~,~..,·-
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Public power advocates mobilized support in an effort to 
defeat the bill in the House and Senate. In July 1954, a 
group of consumer, labor and farm organization leaders acci-
dently met while individually attempting to secure Senate 
opposition to the Cole-Hickenlooper bill. The group, com-
posed of Alex Radin of the American Public Power Association, 
Dr. Clay Cochran, a research economist for the National Rural 
Electric Cooperative Association, George Taylor, director 
of the National Hells Canyon Association, Angus McDonald of 
the National Farmers Union, and Donald Montgomery of the UAW, 
decided to find a senator willing to lead the fight against 
the bill. After approaching Senator· Warren Magnuson, who was 
"willing to go along" if they could "round up a few more," 
they finally landed on Senator Lister Hill of Alabama. Hill 
bluntly told them that the public power senators would do all 
they could but there were not enough of them. "You've got to 
get the word out to the people," he counseled. "Tell then'. if 
we don't get their support, this bill is going through. 11 The 
group did its best; the Dixon-Yates scandal, however, directed 
more public attention to the issues than any concerted effort 
could possibly ever have. 1? 
l?con~ressional Record, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., v. 99 
(July 29,954), 10427-28; New York Times, July l, 1954, 13; 
Ellis, A Giant Step, 13?-38; Thomas, Atomic Ener~, 148; Bar-
row Lyons, Tomorrow's Birthri ht: A Political an Economic . 
Intertretation o Our a ura esources New or , , 33o-3. For the Cole-Hickenlooper hill cf. "Proposed Atomic 
Energy Act Amendments," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 10 
(June, 1954), 227, 240. The original five public power groups 
organized the Electric Consumers Information Committee to 
bring new farm and labor organizations into the fight. The 
Public Affairs Institute did the research for the Committee. 
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The Tennessee Valley Authority had stood out in the minds 
o:t opponents of public power as a glaring example of "creep-
ing socialism." While few seriously entertained the thought 
of destroying the TVA, many were nevertheless determined that 
Authority expansion must be halted. The Eisenhower partner-
ship policy was particularly suited to that end. 
The new Administration's hostility to the TVA was clearly 
demonstrated publicly and privately. In a speech at Mem-
phis, Tennessee, in October 1952, Eisenhower credited the 
Tennessee Valley Authority with making a substantial contribu-
tion to the life of the Valley. Nevertheless, he did not 
think it should be looked upon "as a. single pattern for such 
development in other regions." Rather, he envisioned a 
Federal Government "devoted to the principle of decentralized 
government and to the principle of states' rights, as well as 
to full development of our resources." This was, as it turned 
out, a subtle hint to the Valley; no further expansion of the 
TVA would be permitted. At a cabinet meeting in July 1953, 
Eisenhower exclaimed, "By God, if ever we could do it, before 
we leave here, I'd like to see us sell the whole thing [the 
TVA], but I suppose we can't go that far." The President 
again reiterated his opinion of such valley authorities when 
he dedicated the McNary Dam in September 1954. Lewis Strauss 
and Joseph Dodge, Director of the Btireau of the Budget, shared 
Eisenhower's convictions on this subject. For cosmetic pur-
poses Gabrie~ Hauge,. a White House aide, advised the Presi-
dent to use some term other than "creeping socialism" to 
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describe the TVA. But Hauge st:-essed that he took "no excep-
tion to the ideas expressed" by the phrase. 18 
By the end of the Second World War the power requirements 
of the Tennessee Valley had increased considerably •. Besides 
business and municipal needs, the Valley now had huge atomic 
energy and military installations requiring large amounts of 
power. After an initial defeat by a Republican congress, the 
Democratic congress in 1949 voted a new plant for the area and 
an attempt in 1952 to cut TVA appropriations was repelled. 
These difficult days, however, were only barb ingers of what was 
to come .when a Republican president and congress assumed power 
in 1953.19 
By 1952 the Authority was aware that it would shortly be 
unable to supply the needs of its domestic customers due to 
overriding defense obligations. The West Memphis, Arkansas, 
area had the most severe problem. Consequently, the TVA pro-
posed building a plant in Fulton, Tennessee, an area close 
enough to supply West Memphis. The funds for the plant were 
requested in the Truman budget of 1952. Naturally, the request 
was opposed by private utilities located in the Fulton area, 
particularly the Middle Southern Utilities Company, a holding 
18Aaron Wildavsky, Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics 
(New Haven, 1962), 17; Eisenhower, speeches in Memphis and 
Knoxville, Tennessee, October 15, 1952, Central Files, OF-108-
E, Box 503, Eisenhower Library; New York Times, October 16, 
1952, l; September 23, 1954; Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of 
Power (New York, 1963), 152; JCAE (1954), 1035; Sherman Adams, 
Pirsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration 
tNew York, 1961), 312; Memo, Hauge to Eisenhower, June 22, 
1953, Hauge Papers, Box 1, Eisenhower Library. 
l9Wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 3-5, 10-15. 
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company with su~sidiaries on the Western border of the TVA 
system. Edgar H. Dixon, president of Middle Southern, ex-
pressed fear that the TVA would now expand into his company's 
domain. This fear was compounded by the fact that while net 
income and common stock dividends rose significantly over a 
period of three decades the percentage of power supplied by 
private power had decreased from 93.5 to 75.5 percent. When 
he assumed office, Eisenhower decided to postpone action on 
the Truman request for TVA funds until the Bureau of the Bud-
get could study the problem. Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-
Ky) and seven Democratic senators from TVA states, urged the 
President not to cut the TVA budget. Nevertheless, in March 
1953, the budget conscious Administration deleted the :FUlton 
plant and made other significant cuts in the Authority's bud-
·;get. Both Joseph Dodge and Lewis Strauss felt the Atomic 
Energy Commission ought to find a private utility to supply 
its Paducah, Kentucky, installation. In this way, the TVA 
could have the additional power it had been supplying that 
installation freed for other purposes. After all, should 
this plan fail, the Administration could always request a 
supplemental appropriation for the Fulton steam plant. As 
finally worked out, the plan called for the AEC to purchase 
·power from a private utility and then to release an equivalent 
amount of power to the TVA for the West Memphis area. Since 
the idea initially had been his anyway, Gordon Clapp, Chair-
man of the TVA Board, agreed to go along with this plan. On 
December 24,-1953, Rowland Hughes of the Bureau of the Budget 
1{~4-
told Strauss to begin negotiations with the private utilities. 20 
Economically Clapp's plan was particularly alluring to 
an Ad.ministration opposed to any increase in the TVA budget. 
In addition, TVA's defense and domestic power needs would 
also be met. Politically the plan was equally appealing. 
Since Clapp had suggested it originally, the TVA could hardly 
protest the scheme. But the plan contained certain pitfalls 
into which the Administration could easily fall if it did not 
carefully watch its step. First, the Administration was now 
committed to a specific course of action and could not wait 
until new appointments to the TVA Board fell due. Second, the 
White House was in a tricky position: either it contracted 
with a private utility or it would have to request a supple-
mental appropriation for the Fulton plant. Finally, the bar-
gain warned the private utilities that failure to reach a con-
tract with the Atomic Energy Commission would result in forc-
ing the Administration to support new steam plant funds for 
the TVA. 21 
In the meantime, the Bureau of the Budget decided to 
make "a commercial financial appraisal of [the] TVA." The 
Bureau secured the services of Adolphe H. Wenzell, a vice 
2~Wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 4-5, 16-1?, 20-21, 33-3?; David 
A. Frier, Conflict of Interest in the Eisenhower Administration (Iowa State University Press, 1969), 56; Telephone Memo, Sen-
ator Cooper, RB to Stephens, April 30, 1953; letter, Lister 
Hill to Eisenhower, April 2, 1953; Hill, Kefauver, Clements, 
Eastland, Sparkman, Gore, and Stennis to Eisenhower, May 12, 
1953, Central Files, OF-50, Box 234, Eisenhower Library. 
21
vildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 4?-48. 
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president and director of First Boston Corporation, one of 
the nation's largest underwriters of private utility securi-
ties. Wenzell's admitted predisposition against the TVA was 
clear in his report. He recommended four alternatives, three 
of which he rejected because they would have caused the break-
up of the TVA system and thus the loss of economies important 
to the region. Instead he favored selling the TVA to a new 
private corporation. This way the Authority's power system 
would be part of a tax-producing corporation, while the navi-
gation and flood control activities would remain with the 
Authority. 22 
In 1954, after some initial difficulties, the Middle 
Southern Utilities Co. and the Southern Company, a utility 
holding company with subsidiaries on the southwestern border 
of TVA, made a combined proposal to the AEC. The two heads 
of the companies, Edgar Dixon of Middle Southern and Eugene 
A. Yates of Southern, proposed to supply 600,000 kilowatts of 
power to the AEC at $200 per kilowatt of capacity •. It was 
understood this energy would replace a same amount supplied 
by the TVA. The AEC, however, would be required to reimburse 
the two companies "for all taxes of every kind or character." 
This contract for replacement power was not unusua1. 23 
But one of the pitfalls now became apparent. In March 
1954, the TVA and AEC agreed to undertake a joint study of 
22wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 22-28; Memo, Dodge to Adams, 
May 11, 1953, Central Files, OF-50, Box 234, Eisenhower Libray. 
23wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 32, 37-38, 52-55, 59; Frier, 
56. 
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the Dixon-Yates proposal for the Bureau of the Budget. The 
TVA discovered in this analysis that a private utility would 
supply the power to the Authority by way of a contract with 
the Atomic Energy Commission. The TVA could see no reason 
why the Commission should act as its agent when the Authority 
itself could just as easily negotiate the contract. In 
other words, the TVA now viewed the AEC as simply a front ~or 
private power interests. And the Authority was not wrong. 
At the insistence of the Administration, in April DL~on-
Yates withdrew their first proposal and submitted a new one. 
The revised estimates were lower than the previous proposal. 
The private power companies and the Administration definitely 
wanted to be sure the Authority could not make political capi-
tal out of faulty figures in the private utility proposal. 
'While the contract received the approval of the Federal Power 
Commission and the Army Corps of Engineers, an impasse resul-
ted between the TVA and the Administration. 24 
The Tennessee Valley Authority was run by a three-man 
Board of Directors. If the Administration wished to secure a 
favorable majority on the Board it either would have to re-
move two of the commissioners for cause or wait until their 
terms expired. When the Administration came to power it 
24wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 72, 77-78, 161-68. The FPC 
voted 4-1 for the contract. The majority were Eisenhower 
appointees; the dissenting vote came from Calude Draper. Cf. 
U.S. Congress, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Ener-
gy, 83rd Congress, 2d Sess., Exercise of Statutorb Require-
ments of Section 164 Atomic Ener Act of 1954 tilit Con-
tract Between Atomic Ener Comoission and Hississi l. Va 
Genera ing Co~pany 1 , , er cite 
JCAE, Sec. 164 hearings (1954)•] 
l 
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considered dismissing two of the TVA commissioners. Gordon 
Clapp, the vigorous Director of the TVA, was especially a 
thorn in the Administration's side because he was an opponent 
of the new partnership policy and an astute def ender of the 
TVA. One White House aide asked the Justice Department if 
members of the TVA "could be removed from office other than 
for cause?" In the midst of the controversy over the reduced 
TVA budget, Sherman Adams sent two significant memos to Dodge. 
In one he laconically noted: "If we could ef'f'ect-·some changes 
[in the status of the TVA commissioners];.it might be a most 
appropriate solution to their TVA expansion program." On 
another occasion, Adams put it bluntly: "Is there any way 
within the law for us to dispense with their [the TVA commis-
sioners'] services?" This was not a frivolous question since 
there was a precedent for dismissing a commissioner for cause. 
In 1938, Franklin Roosevelt had f'ired Arthur Morgan f'rom the 
TVA Board for "contumacy.'' Ironically, Morgan now came to the 
defense of Clapp's stewardship. Yb.en Clapp's term expired 
Dodge suggested the Administration look for a man who, among 
other things, was "in complete sympathy with the objectives 
of the administration ••• " The White House first thought of 
Harry Carbuagh, a successful Chattanooga businessman, who had 
the support of the Secretary of the Treasury. Senator Cooper 
opposed Carbaugh on the grounds it "would give the Democrats 
in the Congress the chance to dramatize the issue of public 
power versus private power when there is no necessity for 
such a debate." Preferring·to complete his present work, 
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s. D. Sturgis, Jr., Major General, Chief of the Corps of En-
gineers, asked that his name be withdrawn from consideration. 
The Administration finally settled on General Herbert Vogel, 
a member of the Corps of Engineers. From June 1952 to Aug-
ust 1954, Vogel had been chairman of the Arkansas-White-Red-
Basin Interagency Committee_~nd the Division Engineer of the 
Southwestern Division of the Corps in Dallas, Texas. During 
his confirmation hearing, Vogel testified, under vigorous 
examination by Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, that he could 
"obviously, positively" support the TVA act. At the sugges-
tion of Senator Cooper, Vogel's confirmation was delayed un-
til after action had been taken on the controversial Cole-
Hickenlooper bill. In August 1954, the Senate finally con-
firmed Vogel by voice vote. But the w'hi·te House still faced 
an intransigent TVA Board. The terms of the remaining dissi-
dent commissioners, Harry Curtis and Raymond Paty, would not 
expire until 195? and 1960, respectively. Although the Ad-
ministration need only have removed one member to obtain a 
favorable majority, Eisenhower decided against taking a chance 
of inflaming an already explosive situation. But the TVA-
Administration impasse was only part of' the problem. The 
White House was also experiencing serious difficulties with 
the AEC. 25 
25wildavsky, Dixon-Yates; Gordon Clapp's ideas on part-
nership and the TVA can be found in his The TVA: An Approach 
to the Development of a Region (University of Chicago Press, 
1955), 71-73, 124-25; Memo, undated, Willis to J. Rankin Lee, 
Department of Justice; Memo, Adams to Do·dge, May 13, 1953; 
Personal Memo, Adams to Dodge, May 20, 1953; Morgan to Eisen-
hower, March 1, 1954; Memo, Dodge to Adams, January 26, 1954; 
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The Administration had chosen the AEC as the agent to 
supply the power to the Authority. The Commission had seemed 
pliable enough. Lewis Strauss was divided between his loyalty 
to the White House and his fellow commissioners, but could 
be counted on to do the Administration's bidding. Joseph 
Campbell, an Eisenhower appointee, would go along with Strauss. 
Commissioners Henry Smyth and Eugene Zuckert probably would 
oppose the project. The balance on the Commission hung with 
Thomas Murray, ostensibly an advocate of free enterprise. 
In many ways Murray and Strauss bore remarkable resemblances. 
Both were wealthy and came from business backgrounds; they 
believed in free enterprise. Nevertheless Murray opposed the 
Dixon-Yates contract. He simply did not believe the AEC 
should become needlessly involved in a political controversy 
that would "seriously" impair "the nonpolitical character" of 
the Commission. The dissident commissioners reserved their 
most stinging criticism for Strauss personally. Until Janu-
ary 1954, Strauss had been the only member of the AEC aware 
ot the potential contract. The other members discovered the 
negotiations accidently. After a reporter for the Memphis 
Willis to Adams, March 18, 1954; Cooper to Adams, April 3, 
1954; Cooper to Adams, March 22, 1954; Cooper to Eisenhower, 
March 22, 1954; Sturgis to Adams, May 25, 1954; memo, Willis 
to Adams, July 16, 1954; in Central Files, OF-50, Box 234, 
Eisenhower Library. Irving K. Fox and Isabel Picken, The 
U stream-Downstream Controvers in the Arkansas-White-Itea 
Basins Survey Inter-Universi~y Case Program, , 11; 
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Public Works, 83rd Cong., 
2d Session, Nomination of Herbert D. Vogel (Aug. 9-10, 1954), 
14; Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2d Session, v. 100, Part 
11 (August 11, 1954), 13987-988; New York Times, August 11, 
1954. 
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Press Scimitar inquired about the existence of such a con-
tract, it was discovered that indeed negotiations were going 
on. Until this point the conflict within the Atomic Energy 
Commission over the principal officer clause had only been 
brewing; now it reached the boiling point. Before the JCAE 
Murray openly accused Strauss of purposely hiding information 
about the contract from his fellow commissioners. "I call 
your attention to the fact I am a member of the Atomic Energy 
Commission with full authority, full access to all informa-
tion," he pointedly reminded Strauss, "and I call your atten-
tion to the fact that you, as Chairman of this Commission, 
took it upon yourself to start considering changing the power 
contracts that were in existence by the TVA without consult-
ing with your associates." In- a letter to the new Director 
of the Bureau of the Budget, Rowland Hughes, Commissioners 
Smyth and Zuckert expressed dissatisfaction that the contract 
"involves the AEC in a matter remote from its responsibili-
ties." Smyth later resigned from the Commission but not be-
fore helping create a majority opposed to the Dixon-Yates con-
tract. Consequently, the Administration found itself in th·e 
embarrassing position of confronting two Agencies, the TVA 
and AEC, with majorities opposed to the contract. Moreover, 
the Administration could not gracefully back out of the con-
tract, for if it did the business community would question 
the sincerity of its new partnership program. Left with lit-
tle other re~ourse, in June 1954, Eisenhower ordered the 
Atomic Energy Commission to negotiate a contract with Middle 
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South Utilities, Inc., and the Southern Company for a steam 
plant to be built at West Memphis, Arkansas. The contract 
dispute now became an integrated part of the general debate 
over the Cole-Hickenlooper bili. 26 
The Cole-Hickenlooper bill and the Dixon-Yates contract 
were fully debated by Congress. Those opposing the contract 
charged it was a governmental "give-away" to big business. 
Senator Kefauver reflected the thinking of this group. He 
• contended the people of the Tennessee Valley had every right 
to be suspicious of Y~tes' intentions, since Yates had been 
one of the original opponents of creation of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. Harking back to the experience of the 
1920s, Kefauver also foresaw that if the contract were approved 
the privo.ta utilities would again ba in a position to dictate 
"their own terms to municipalities and rural electric cooper-
atives, who have been showing the country how the electric 
business can be and should be conducted." If the TVA were 
destroyed--as Kefauver thought the Dixon-Yates contract would, 
in effect, do--an increase in electricity bills would ensue. 
Finally, the senator saw wider implications than just for the 
26Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear Power, 149; Wildavsky, 
Dixon-Yates, 41-42, 81-82, 89; JCAE, Sec. 164, hearings (1954), 283, 280, 292; JCAE hearings (1954), 958. Smyth resigned in 
November, 1954. He.had been the lone member of the AEC to 
side with Dr. Robert J. Oppenheimer. The Dixon-Yates and 
principal officer controversies were also involved. Cf. 
"Smyth Resigns from AEC, Libby New Commissioner," Science 
News Letter, 66 (September 25, 1954), 200; Duncan Horton-
Taylor~ 111; "AEC Security Decision," 66 (July 10, 1954), 
Science News Letter, 19-21. Smyth continued to criticize 
the Eisenhow.er atomic energy program; cf. Smyth, "Nuclear 
Power and Foreign Policy, 11 Foreign Affairs, vol. 35, No. 1 
(October, 1956), 1-16. 
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TVA states. Should the White House succeed in its drive 
against the TVA, the fight for public power in the Pacific 
Northwest would also be severely damaged. 27 For this latter 
reason the National Hells Canyon Association, and the Demo-
cratic and Independent (Senator Wayne Morse) congressional 
delegations from the Pacific Northwest chimed in with the 
chorus opposing the Cole-Hickenlooper bill and the Dixon-Yates 
contract. 
The Cole-Hickenlooper bill faced some opposition in the 
House, but, by and large, the bill emerged intact. An amend-
ment reversing the President's order putting private power 
facilities in the Tennessee Valley lost. The bill and the 
contract were approved by a 231 to 154 vote. The most serious 
threat to defeating the bill and the contract was ln the 
Senate. 28 
In the Senate two amendments dealing with the Dixon-Yates 
contract were presented. Senator Clinton Anderson's amend-
ment attempted to prevent the Atomic Energy Commission from 
contracting for private power to supply the TVA. The amend-
ment prohibited replacement-power contracts and also would 
have required the AEC to submit any proposed contract to the 
Joint Congressional Committee on Atooic Energy for thirty 
days. If the JCAE did not approve the contract, the commit-
tee could ask Congress to invalidate it. Republican Senator 
27Estes Kefauver, "\..Jhat's Wrong with Dixon-Yates," Atlan-
tic, 195 (January, 1955), 66-69. 
28New York Times, July 24, 1954, l; Congressional Record, 
83rd Cong., -2d Sess., v. 100, Part 9 (July 2 , 1954), 12025. 
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John Sherman Cooper defended the Anderson amendment. "Con-
gress," he pointed out, "created the agency [TVA] and if any 
basic alterations in its nature are to be made, they should 
be made directly by the legislative action and by the direc-
tion of executive agencies of the Government." An Administra-
tion amendment sponsored by Senator Homer Ferguson of Michi-
gan sought to approve the Dixon-Yates contract outright. 
In essence, Ferguson's amendment approved of replacement con-
tracts and of the AEC negotiating power contracts with public 
utilities. Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina suggested the 
Ferguson amendment be modified to provide that the Dixon-
Yates contract be submitted to the JCAE for thirty days for 
its inspection. The JCAE, however, would not have the author-
ity to reject the contract. This modification was accepted 
by Ferguson. The Ferguson-Ervin amendment thus received the 
crucial southern support of the senators from Arkansas, Lou-
isiana, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia. Representa-
tive of their thinking, John L. McClellan of Arkansas asked, 
"Are we to continue to pour out millions and millions of 
collars in this [TVA] area to build it beyond its natural 
potentials while the rest of the country suffers and waits? 
Are we to show that favoritism?" Evidently the Senate agreed, 
for the Anderson amendment was defeated and the Ferguson-
Ervin amendment won a decisive victory. The Dixon-Yates con-
tract had now leaped another difficult hurdle. 29 
29con~ressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (July 14, 
1954), 165 -92, 10590; Cong. Rec., Ibid., July 20, 1954, 
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The public power advocates mustered enough strength to 
filibuster the Cole-Hickenlooper bill and, together with 
southerners opposed to "gag rules," to override an a·!;tempt 
at cloture. The Senate approved an amendment by Senator Al-
bert Gore prohibiting the AEC from paying truces on the pri-
vate power contracts it negotiated. But the crucial amend-
ment, presented by Senator :Edwin Johnson of Colorado, author-
ized the AEC to produce electric power either in its own 
facilities or through other Federal agencies with a prefer-
ence to non-profit distributors. The amendment narrowly 
passed and a fight to retain it was e~ected in the House-
Senate conference. After a thirteen-day filibuster the Sen-
ate, by a 57 to 28 vote, finally passed the Cole-Hickenlooper 
- ·-1 30 01.l • 
The public power advocates· were still unsatisfied. 
After a House-Senate conference approved a final bill, the 
public power representatives on the conference, Anderson, 
Johnson (Colorado), and Holifield, refused to sign the final 
report, objecting strenuously to Representative Cole's provi-
sion concerning patents. The conference deleted the Senate 
version which would have increased the compulsory licensing 
1101?-19; Con~. Rec., ibid., July 19, 1954, 10834; Cong· Rec., 
ibid., July 2 , 1954, Ir22'1; JCAE hearings (1954), Iol -11. 
30con~essional Record, 83rd Congress, 2d Sess., v. 100, 
part 9 (Ju~ 26, 1954), 11942, 11981, 1198?; Cong. Rec., ibid., 
July 22, 1954, 11388; Co~. Rec., ibid., July 27, 1954, l~; 
Ellis, A Giant Step, 139 l; New Y~Times, July 27, 1954, 
14; July 28, 1954, 13. 
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period to ten years, and inserted Cole's provision which re-
moved all Government control over patents. Thus, the private 
utilities would be subject to the normal exclusive patent 
rights for seventeen years. Albert Gore and Lister Hill 
promised a determined fight against this amendment on the 
floor of the Senate. Gore declared, "It would open the doors 
of the patent office to a small group of companies that have 
a monopoly on the know-how and also have a monopoly on the 
employment of the people with the know-how." The Johnson 
amendment had been watered down as well. The public power 
advocates were not about to sit idly by and let all this pass 
unnoticed. By a voice vote ·the House approved the conference 
report. The Senate did not, however. Senator Johnson (Color-
ado) criticized the report for including the words "insofar as 
possible" concerning the AEC's duty toward preference custom-
ers. Senators Gore, Anderson, Hubert Humphrey, and Guy Gil-
lette also objected to this language and suggested the bill 
be returned to conference. By a six-vote margin, the Senate 
sent the bill back to conference with instructions for its 
conferees to work for compulsory licensing of peacetime 
atomic patents and preference for public bodies and rural 
electric cooperatives. When the new conference report con-
formed to these wishes, the Senate passed the bill. Despite 
grave misgivings Representative Cole ruefully urged pas.sage 
of the revised conference report. Concerning the patent pro-
vision Cole said he hoped Congress would "repeal this highly 
distasteful,- highly un-American provision" in the next session 
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of Congress. By voice vote the House once again passed the 
bill. While the public power advocates had not gotten all 
they wanted, they nevertheless had won a victory of sorts. 
On August 30, 1954, Eisenhower signed the bill into law.31 
The political implications of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 were potentially great. In foreign policy the authority 
of the President was substantially increased. In domestic 
nuclear policy the President's victory on the Ferguson-Ervin 
amendment upheld his legal authority over the Atomic Energy 
Commission. A majority of AEC had opposed the Dixon-Yates con-
tract; yet, at Strauss' request, the President had success-
fully ordered the Commission to negotiate the contract anywa~ 
The McMahon Act had left undefined the extent of Executive 
control over the AEC but the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and 
the Dixon-Yates controversy seemingly clarified some of the 
confusion. 'While Presidential authority increased, the power 
of the Joint Congressional Committee did not diminish. In 
Section 202 o! the Act, the JCAE reasserted its authority 
over the AEC. "The [Atomic Energy] Commission," the Section 
read, "shall keep the Joint Committee fully and currently 
informed with respect to all of the Commission's activities." 
Consequently, the Committee retained and even increased its 
31New York Times, August 7, 1954; August 14, 1954, l; 
August 17, 1954, l; Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2d 
Sess. (August 9, 1954), v. lOO, part Io, 1387; Con~. Rec., 
ibid., August 13, 1954, part 11, 14350, 14351, 143 ?, 14364; 
~· Rec., ibid., August 16, 1954, 14606; Cong. Rec., ibid., 
August 17, l~ 14873, 14867-14873; Commission on Organiza-
tion of the Executive Branch (June, 1955), 1120-1121; Public 
Papers of the· Pr·esidents, 1954, 776-77. 
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supervisory authority over all the activities of the AEC. 
Later, when Strauss was nominated in 1959 to be Secretary of 
Commerce, Senator Anderson claimed this section of the Act 
"was directly aimed at Mr. Strauss who had already in 1954 
violated the law in carrying out his obligations." Moreover, 
with public power conscious Democrats in the majority on the 
Joint Committee after the elections of 1954, this provision 
became the cudgel with which they beat the Administration and 
Strauss. Now that industry would be entering the field of 
atomic energy, the JCAE was commanded to hold hearings the 
first sixty days of each session of Congress to obtain informa-
tion on the "development, growth, and state of the atomic 
energy industry. 11 32 
The Atomic Energy Commission, however, had been changed 
by the Act. The AEC no longer enjoyed a monopolistic posi-
tion in the field of atomic energy. Also, the AEC now became 
a regulatory commission. But the Act, at best, 
32Thomas, Atomic Energy, 153-58; James L. Morrisson, 
"Federal Support of Domestic Atomic Power Development--The 
Policy Issue," Vanderbilt Law Review, 12 (December, 1958), 
197-99; 68 Stat. at L. 955 (PUblic Law 703, 83rd Cong., 2d 
Sess., Atomic Energy Act, 1954), in Madeline W. Lasee (com-
piler), Le islative Rister of the Atomic En.er Act of 19 4 
Public Law rd Con ress , I U. • A omic Energy Com-
mission, Was ing on, D.C., ); U.S. Congress, Senate, Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings on the 
Nomination of Lewis L. Strauss to be Secretary of Commerce, 
86th Congress, 1st sess. (1959), 5d9; Rosenthal and Green, 
Government of the Atom, 94; Nieburg, "The Eisenhower AEC and 
Congress, 0 130, The 1946 Act did not include the word "all"; 
the 1954 Act added it. (My emphasis.) It might be pointed out 
that the Act settled the question of the chiarmanship of the 
JCAE. Sectiqn 203 provided that the Chairmanship should 
alternate between the House and Senate and that the Chairman 
should be chosen by the members of the house from which he 
comes. The vice chairman should be chosen from the other 
house and chosen by its members. 
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gave the Commission only a nebulous guideline of its new 
responsibilities. Its added duties included licensing of 
private production and utilization facilities, source and by-
product materials, and the use of special nuclear materials. 
The Commission had to establish standards and regulations for 
the industrial development of atomic energy. One things was 
was unambiguous, however; as one former AEC commissioner has 
written, the Atomic Energy Commission could no longer claim 
to be above politics. For the Commission was now, for better 
or worse, knee-deep in the politics of partnership.33 
With passage of the Cole-Hickenlooper bill, the public-
power drama was far from played out. In October 1954, the 
Attorney General ruled that the Dixon-Yates contract was valid 
under the recently passed Atomic Energy Act. The following 
month the Dixon-Yates controversy exerted a major influence 
on the elections of 1954. The controversy may well have con-
tributed to the defeat of Senator John Sherman Cooper in Ken-
tucky and to the senatorial victory of Richard L. Neuberger 
in Oregon. The Democrats regained control of both houses of 
Congress. And that meant Senator Clinton Anderson, the arch-
foe of Strauss, would become chairman of the Joint Committee.34 
The Administration now moved quickly. Shortly after 
the elections, the JCAE, still Republican dominated, voted 
along straight party lines to waive the stipulation in the 
33Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear Power, 147; Thomas, Atomic 
Energy, 151-52. 
34wilda~sky, Dixon-Yates, 132-33; Frier, Eisenhower Ad-
ministration, 65-66. 
159 
new law requiring that all atomic energy contracts must lay 
before the JCAE for thirty days unless a majority of the 
committee rules otherwise. In voting to waive the contract, 
the Republican majority unequivocally characterized expansion 
of the TVA as "rank, unrestrained, unadulterated socialism." 
The Democratic minority, of course, saw it differently. "The 
proper business of the Atomic Energy Commission," they said, 
"is and must continue to be, atomic energy--not negotiating 
con"Gracts for electric power for municipalities." In Febru-
ary 1955, the Securities Exchange Commission voted four to one 
to approve the Dixon-Yates contract. Paul Rowen, the lone dis-
senter, was a Democratic commissioner. By the beginning of 
1955, the Administration could count a solid majority on the 
Atomic Energy Commission. Dr. John von Neuman, a noted mathe-
matician, had taken the place of Zuckert and Dr. Willard Libby, 
a chemist from the University of Chicago, succeeded Smyth. 
Murray was the only Truman appointee left. While serving an 
interim appointment on the AEC Libby had endorsed the Dixon-
Yates contract. At his confirmation hearing Libby admitted 
that his endorsement had been based on "cursory and inadequate 
study and the great faith I have in the competence and good 
intentions of my colleagues." This prompted Senator Kefauver 
to vow not to support Libby's confirmation until the Dixon-
Yates business was settled. Besides, there did not appear to 
be majority sentiment in the Senate favoring repeal of-the 
contract. All the obstacles to completing the contract seemed 
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finally removed.35 
The contract appeared to be well on its way toward final 
completion when it was disclosed that a possible conflict of 
interest was involved in the government's dealings •. The fin-
ancial agents for the Dixon-Yates contract were the First 
Boston Corporation and Lehman Brothers. Thinking the publi-
city accruing from the venture would be good for the firm's 
image, First Boston had not accepted a fee for its services. 
Earlier in the TVA-AEC controversy, the Bureau of the Budget 
had employed Adolphe Wenzell of First Boston to conduct an 
independent evaluation of the TVA, which, it turned out, was 
a condemnation of the Authority. Since the Administration 
had told no one, least of all Congress, of Wenzell's involve-
ment a great impropriety, at best, appeared obvious. On Feb-
ruary 18, 1955, Senator Lister Hill, one of the prime oppo-
nents of the contract, openly and directly attacked the Ad-
ministration. He charged that the Administration had "delib-
erately" hidden the facts of the Dixon-Yates contract from 
the Congress. Specifically: "There exists persuasive evi-
dence that this man [Wenzell] participated in conferences and 
meetings on the Dixon-Yates matter, which were held in the 
35Frier, Eisenhower Administration, 65-66; Joint Congres-
sional Committee on Atomic Energy, Reuort on the November 13, 
1 Waiver Action b~ the Joint Commlttee on Atomic Eiler , 
Cong., st Sess. 1 , -1 ; wildavsky, Dixon-Ya es, 
137-38, 156-57, 223; Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (October, 
1954), 334 (September 1954), (November 1954), 367; U.S. Con-
gress, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (Senate 
Section), 84th Congress, 1st Sess., Confirmation of AEC Com-
missioners, june 1953 to March 1955 (1955),. 22. 
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Budget Bureau at the very time when the First Boston company 
was making arrangements for financing the Dixon-Yates plant." 
In the meantime a New York financial and economic consultant, 
Walter Von Trescow, proposed an alternate plan. In January 
1955, by a straight party vote, the Democratic-controlled JCAE, 
recommended that the Administration cancel the Dixon-Yates 
contract. After a few months of charges and countercharges, 
on July 11, the Ad.ministration terminated the contract.36 
While termination of the Dixon-Yates contract ended the more 
spectacular phase of the atomic energy controversy, a new, 
more quiet yet subtle struggle took place afterwards. The 
Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, controlled 
by the Democrats, asserted itself. 
The Democrats on the Joint Committee decided to face the 
Administration head-on concerning the public power issue. In 
1956, Senator Gore and Representative Holifield introduced a 
bill directing the Atomic Energy Commission to expend $400 
million for the construction of demonstration power plants. 
In essence, the Gore-Holifield bill represented a revolt on 
the part of the JCAE; the committee was now initiating legis-
lation which, if passed, would blunt the pro-business bias 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The Democrats on the com-
mittee believed the Administration was proceeding too slowly 
in developing a domestic atomic energy program. While the 
36 wildavsky, Dixon-Yates, 188-96, 206, 218-19, 223-4?, 
264; Con~res$ional Record, 84th ·cong., 1st Sess. (1955), 
part 2, 714; New York Times, January 29, 1955, 1. · 
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Joint Committee was unanimous in its opinions on defense, 
·.international affairs, and congressional authority over the 
AEC, it was divided, along party lines, on the public versus 
private power issue. In short, the Republicans opposed the 
bill while the Democrats favored it.3? 
The utility industry, the Atomic Energy Commission, 
and the coal interests rallied in opposition to the Gore-
Holifield measure. The representative of the Edison Electric 
Institute saw the bill as a danger to American free enterprise. 
"We must not· defeat the very objectives we are trying to 
achieve in that cold war by abandoning our principles of free 
enterprise along the way," the Insti_tute warned the Joint Com-
mittee. Four of the five members of the AEC also opposed the 
bill. Strauss emphasized the bill would negate the free 
enterprise provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. But 
the Commission found most distasteful a stipulation directing, 
rather than simply authorizing, the AEC to fulfill the 
3?At least one Democratic member of the JCAE has made it 
plain that the majority members of the JCAE saw the Gore-Hol~ 
field bill as a means of reasserting the committee's power 
over the AEC. Cf. Melvin Price,"Atomic Energy in Congress," 
Bulletin . of Atomic Scientists, XII (December, 1956). Rosen-
thal and Green, Government of the Atom, 12, 120, 60-61; Mor-
risson, "Federal--Support, 11 212; Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear 
Power, 10-11; Nieburg, "Eisenhower AEC and Congress," 134-35. 
The proponents of the bill did not always picture the contro-
versy as a public versus private power issue. Senators Gore 
and Kefauver, for example, saw it as a matter of government 
responsibility toward industry. Kefauver noted this: "I 
gained the impression from reading the debate in the House of 
Representatives that the issue was presented as one of public 
versus private development. But, is it not a fact that, look-
ing forward, private development will be along the line of ex-
perimentation before private industry will be willing to ac-
cept responsibility of such a large program? Gore answered 
in the affirmative. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 
v. 102, part 11 (July 26, 1956), 14724. 
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objectives of the bill. An altercation between Senators Pa.s-
tore and Anderson and Chairman Strauss illustrated how diver-
gent their attitudes were: 
Mr. Strauss. Senator Pastore, do you feel that you 
cannot rely on the Atomic Energy Commission's good 
f'aith to carry out this policy which you have so elo-
quently described, but that we have to be directed to 
do it? 
Senator Pastore. I will tell you very frankly, I 
would leave the 'direct' out, if you gentlemen would 
say that you believe this ought to be done, but you 
keep saying that we are doing enough, and we don't 
think we are doing enough, and we don.• t think that 
we ought to do any more. 
Mr. Strauss. Do you think for a moment if you passed 
this bill and the Congress passed the bill, that we 
would go at it half-heartedly? 
Chairman Anderson. You have testified that you don't 
think anything needs to be done. 
Senator Pastore. I don't think that you would build 
the reactors. 
Chairman Anderson. We have a record full of it. 
Commissioner Murray agreed with Pastore and Anderson. "More-
over, in my judgment," he warned Senator Anderson, "it would 
be a tragic mistake to fail to give the Commission a definite 
directive to carry out the domestic program." Finally, as 
in the natural gas controversy, the coal interests feared 
that government-sponsored atomic energy would become a sub-
stitute energy resource. Representative John Saylor (R-Penn.) 
emphasized "that the Federal Government does not belong in 
private business and that we cannot afford to become involved 
in any more spurious blueprints produced on socialistic draw-
ingboards." The coal interests maintained, based upon figures 
supplied by the Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Sur-
vey, that the nation's coal reserves were sufficient to sup-
ply the country's energy requirements for at least the next 
couple centuries. Significantly, the United Mine Workers 
persuaded seven Democrats to vote against the bill.38 
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With Senate Republicans abstaining, the Joint Committee 
unanimously reported out a compromise bill. _The compromise 
version provided that $400 million would be authorized for 
an unspecified number of demonstration atomic plants to be 
built by the Atomic Energy Commission. The plants, however, 
were to be built only at AEC sites and the electric energy 
produced would be employed by the Commission. As in the. 
original bill, the "authorized and directed" provision re-
mained. Senator Anderson explained the compromise strategy 
intended to avoid a floor fight over the bill. If this were 
the real intention, it failed. The Gore-Holifield bill 
passed the Senate, with only three Republicans supporting it. 
But the onslaught of opposition came in the House. Even though 
Representative Cole won several amendments severely watering 
it down, the House voted to recommit the bill. The narrow 
margin between victory and defeat had been supplied by the 
seven Democrats from coal producing states.39 
38strauss, Men and Decisions, 319; David F. Cavers, "Atom-
ic Power: The Quest for a Program," The George Washim1:ton Law 
Review, 27 (April, 1959), 464-65; U.S. Congress, Join"E Congres-
sional Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Civil-
ian Atomic Power Acceleration Pro am (June 28, 1956), 4-6, 
, ; rice, ; osen a and Green, Government 
of the Atom, 16-17; Con~ressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 
v. 102, Part 10 (July 2 , 1956), 945-4?, 14262, 14251; New 
York Times, July 30, 1956, 8 
39u.s. Congress, Senate, 84th Congress, 2d Sess., Senate 
Report 2390 (June 29, 1956), (House Report No. 2622, July 5, 
1956, was identical to Senate Report 2390.); Congressional 
Quarterlt Almanac (1956), 542-46; Rosenthal and ~reen, Govern-
ment of he Atom, 152-53; 134-35; Price, "Atomic Energy in 
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In 195?, to avoid another fight, the AEC announced a new 
round of the power-demonstration-reactor program. This ploy 
did not wash, however. What the Joint Committee had failed 
to gain when Gore-Holifield was defeated, it now won via the 
congressional appropriations process. According to Section 
261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, appropriations for con-
struction of new "facilities" had to be first authorized by 
Congress. The powerful chairman of the House Appropriations 
Committee attacked this budgetary system in 195? and threat-
ened to freeze all AEC appropriations until the JCAE examined 
the Commission's program. The JCAE immediately did this; it 
recommended increased budget powers.for itself. Congress 
granted the Joint Committee complete "project-by-project" 
authorization powers over the Commission's budget requests. 
Further, the Authorization Act of 1958 required the Atomic 
Energy Commission to lay any tentative contractual agreement 
before the JCAE for forty-five days while Congress was in 
session. While this Act did not empower the co:m!Ilittee to 
stop completion of any contract, the JCAE now possessed full 
investigative powers over such contracts. The chances for 
another Dixon-Yates contract were thus considerably lessened. 
Strauss, in the end, was forced by circumstances beyond his 
control to agree to this new appropriations procedure. Secre-
tary of State John Foster Dulles ·worked with the Democratic 
members of the Joint Committee to obtain their approval -of 
Congress," 3?4-?5; Con~ressional Record, 84th Cong.? ~d Sess., 
v. 102, part 9 (July 1 , 1956), 12469; Cong. Rec., ibid., 
part 10 (July 24, 1956), 14288. 
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the Participation Act of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. In return for their cooperation, Strauss lost the 
crucial support of the Administration in 1957-58 for the 
fight against the JCAE. In the end the Joint Committee es-
tablished firm control over the. AEC. 40 
The JCAE was determined to maintain its influence after 
Strauss left. Whenever a nominee for the AEC appeared before 
the Joint CoIIlI:littee, it extracted a promise from the candi-
date that he would keep the Committee fully informed of all 
the Commission's activities. Senator Anderson and Represen-
tative Holifield, for example, pointedly gave John McCone, 
Strauss' successor, some advice about the thin line between 
his future role as a presidential advisor and his responsi-
bilitias to Congress. " ••• So I am not going to advise you 
not to wear both hats," Anderson warned, "but I suggest to 
you that you will be happier if you do not." Apparently 
McCone accepted their advice because peace prevailed between 
the AEC and JCAE under his stewardship. 41 
Between 1955 and 1958 the Joint Congressional Committee 
wrested from the White House a great deal of power over the 
40Morrisson, "Federal Support," 218-19, 221; Orlans, 
Contracting for Atoms, 165-69; Nieburg, "The Eisenhower AEC 
and Congress," 134-36; Rosenthal and Green, Government of 
the Atom, 16-17. 
41clinton Anderson and James T. Ramey, "Congress and Re-
search: Experience in Atomic Research and Development," An-
nals of the American Academ of Political and Social Sci:e!ices, 
January, , ; Nie urg, ; Or ans, ; • S. 
Congress, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 
(Senate Section), 85th Cong.; 2d Sess., Nomination of John A. 
McCone to Be a Member of the Atomic Energy Commission (July 
2, 1958), 25-2?. 
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Atomic Energy Commission. The JCAE has been equally resource-
ful in defending its actions during these years. In 1959, 
David F. Cavers criticized the JCAE for taking over the func-
tions of the White House. "Apparently convinced that the 
AEC was failing the nation because of its dependence on team-
work with industry, the Democratic leadership in the Commit-
tee has been encroaching persistently on the domain that nor-
mally is reserved to the executive," he observed. Both Rep-
resentative Melvin Price and Senator Anderson defended the 
Committee. Congress intended, they insisted, that the JCAE 
should exercise an active policymaking function and not play 
a passive role. The Gore-Holifield bill was, in their judg-
ment, one instance .~f the Committee rightfully undertaking 
its policymaking prerogative. Results, they further pointed 
out, demonstrate the JCAE's role to have been beneficial. 
"Suffice it to say," Anderson wrote in 1961, "that there has 
been no criticism of the fact that the United States now has 
additional and better nuclear weapons, more raw materials 
and fissionable materials, a growing nuclear Navy, and an 
expanding research and development program for the peacetime 
atom, all of which have been urged by the Joint Committee and 
supported by the Congress. 1142 The victory of the Democratic-
controled Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy sim-
ply served notice that the Administration's partnership policy 
would find rough treading in the turbulent waters of atomic 
ene!gy policymaking. 
42navers, "Atomic Power," 470; Anderson and Ramey, "Con-
gress and Research,"; Price, "Atomic Energy in Congress." 
CHAPTER VI 
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING OR PARTN.ERSHIP?--
THE HELLS CANYON DECISION 
If the Tennessee Valley Authority represented "creeping 
socialism" to the adherents of partnership, the creation of 
any further valley authorities was certainly anathema. In 
the Pacific Northwest, however, a battle between private 
utility development and federal comprehensive planning of 
water resources had also been raging over the future of Hells 
Canyon, the deepest gorge in the North American continent. 
This site, located on the Snake River, was part of the boun-
dary separating Oregon and Idaho. It was the last great 
underdeveloped power site in .the West; in fact, its power 
potential exceeded all other sites in the United States. 
Moreover, there existed no doubt that development of Hells 
Canyon must begin soon to prevent a drastic power shortage 
in the Pacific Northwest. 
Hells Canyon had been an object of attraction for some 
time. Since forty percent of the nation's potential hydro-
electric power was located in the Pacific Northwest, Hells 
Canyon, in particular, drew attention. At Gifford Pinchot's 
suggestion, Theodore Roosevelt had set aside the Canyon as a 
potential water power site. Also, the Department of Interior 
ha~. by no means overlooked the possibility of constructing a 
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high dam in the Canyon. 1 The site acquired special appeal 
when the New Deal built such large multi-purpose dams as 
Bonneville and Grand Coulee, both on the Columbia River. 
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Thus, in 1946, the Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, 
Region I, recommended that a storage and power project be 
erected at Hells Canyon. Subsequently this report was ap-
proved by the Secretary of Interior. 2 The Corps of Engin-
eers, not to be outdone, cast an eye on the Canyon. In a 
194? Interim Report, the Corps concluded that the Canyon could 
function well as part "of the integrated system of multiple-
purpose projects for development of the water resources of 
[the] Columbia River Basin." The foDowing year the Corps 
issued its "308 Review Report," an eight-volume comprehensive 
plan for the Columbia River Basin. The Report proposed that 
Congress authorize reservoirs and dams at Albeni Falls on the 
Pend Oreille, Libby (Montana) on the Kostenai Rivers, Priest 
Rapids on the Columbia, John Day and The Dalles dams on the 
Columbia River, Glacier View in Glacier National Park, and 
Hells Canyon on the Snake River. The Corps pointed out that 
comprehensive development of the Columbia Basin was necessary 
to prevent floods, improve navigation, store water for irri-
gation, and increase the region's power supply. In arguing 
for multiple purpose development the Report maintained there 
was no other way to be "assured that the optimum development 
1coyle, Conservation, 196-9?. 
2senate, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Report No. 2275.(June 19, 
1956)' 10. 
l?O 
of each water use will be accomplished in the best interests 
of each sub-basin, the region and of the Nation as a whole; 
or that improvements made to meet the present needs will not 
block or interfere with the more extensive improvements that 
will be required in the future." Governor Douglas McKay of 
Oregon "heartily" endorsed the Report.3 The conflict between 
the Corps and Bureau of Reclamation became heated. The Corps, 
for example, severely criticized the flood and irrigation 
provisions of the Bureau's report. When, in 1948, a flood 
overcame much of the Pacific Northwest, President Truman 
directed the Corps and the Bureau to coordinate their efforts. 
The Corps continued to criticize the Bureau's proposal but, 
on April 11, 1949, the Secretaries of Army and Interior, the 
Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Chief of 
the Engineers finally signed an accord to coordinate their 
plans in the Columbia Valley. Governor McKay approved the 
coordinated plan and, despite some serious reservations, 
Governor Langlie of Washington also gave his consent. As 
part of the coordinated plan, the Bureau of Reclamation was 
assigned Hells Canyon. In February 1950, the Secretary of 
4 Interior, Oscar Chapman, forwarded this agreement to Congress. 
3corps of Engineers, Interim Report No. 3 (194?), Feder-
al Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, no box number; House 
of Representatives, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., Document 531, 
Columbia River and Tributaries, Northwestern United States (8 vols., June 28, 1949), I, xvii, 335, 33?. 
4June 15, 1948, O. E. Walsh, Colonel, Corps of Engin-
eers, District Engineer, to R. J. Newell, Bureau of Reclama-
tion, Regional Director; memo, August 13, 1948, Walsh to 
Chief of Engineers; August 27, 1948, w. S. Moore, Colonel, 
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In the meantime, the Administration had been developing 
an alternate plan. On several occasions the Administration 
proposed the creation of a Columbia Valley Authority (CVA), 
modelled after the Tennessee Valley Authority. But the Corps 
of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation, along with private 
utility groups and the Forest Service, opposed the CVA, just 
as they had previously fought the Missouri and Tennessee Val-
ley Authority. The Administration felt the CVA would elimi-
nate the conflict between the Corps and the Bureau of Reclama-
tion. President Truman informed an audience in Boise, Idaho, 
that a Columbia Valley Authority would "stop all the fuss" 
between the two agencies "and all the rest of the bureaus in 
Government." In his Annual Budget Message for fiscal 1951, 
the President again pressed Congress to authorize the CVA. 
Senators Warren Magnuson and Henry "Scoop" Jackson, both Demo-
crats from Washington, fought hard for the Columbia Valley 
Authority but to no avail. In 1949 the CVA scheme received 
a painful blow when the First Hoover Commission recommended 
that the TVA be continued but that the Federal Government 
should not initiate any further authorities. Consequently, 
Corps of Engineers, the Board of Engineers for Rivers and 
Harbors to Chief of the Engineers; November 15, 1948, Michael 
Strauss to Lt. General Raymond A. Wheeler, Chief of Engin-
eers; December 7, 1948, Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of Army, 
to Secretary of Interior, in Corps of Engineers, Federal 
Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, no box number; H. R. 
Document 531, v. 1, xvi; U.S. Congress, House of Representa-
tives, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., House Document 473, The Columbia 
River: Final Letters of Transmittal and Comments of Affected 
States and of ?ederal Agencies (2 vols., February, 1950), I, 
69-?o, 65-66,_23, 3-4; McKinley, Uncle Sam, 641-42. 
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in 1950, the Bureau of the Budget instead approved the Bur-
eau of Reclamation-Corps of Engineers plan for comprehensive 
development of the area. The Truman Administration did not 
find success here either. Twice bills for the. Hells Canyon 
dam failed to secure congressional approval.5 
Until now it had been a governmental matter but the issue 
took on crucial significance when a private utility, the Ida-
ho Power Company, became involved. In 1916, the Idaho Power 
Company acquired an interest in the area by purchasing a 
small plant at Oxbow, a location on the Snake River not far 
from Hells Canyon. While the Corps and Bureau were investi-
gating the area, the Idaho Power Company, in June 1947, 
applied to the Federal Power Commission for a preliminary 
permit for a new hydroelectric project at Oxbow. Senator 
Glen Taylor of Idaho and the Department of Interior filed a 
protest and the Company temporarily suspended its request 
for an application. When the Corps-Bureau plan was voted 
down by Congress, Idaho Power, in December 1950, again applied 
to the FPC for a license to build the Oxbow project. Once 
more the Department of Interior issued a protest with the 
Commission. On May ?, 1952, the FPC decided to hold hearings 
on the matter. The Department of Interior and six regional 
public power organizations were granted petitio~~ to intervene 
. 5Lesl.ie Miller, "The Battle that Squanders Billions," 
Saturday Evening Post, V. 221, No. 46 (May 14, 1949), 161; 
McKinley, Uncle Sam, Ch. XVI, and 643-53; Harry Truman, Pub-
lic Papers (1950), 8, 90, 345-51; Congressional Record, 'SISt 
Cong., 1st Sess., v. 96, part IV (April 14, 1950), 5187-88, 
5190; H. R. Document 473, V. l, 4-5; Barrow Lyons, Tomorrow's 
Birthright, 274-75. 
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in the proceedings against the Company. The Idaho Power 
Company later amended its original five dam plan, now propos-
ing a three dam project for Hells Canyon, Oxbow, and Brown-
lee. Thus, there were two alternative plans for tapping the 
resources of Hells Canyon. The Bureau of Reclamation planned 
to construct a high multi-purpose dam, while Idaho Power 
wanted to construct three small dams with a total power capa-
city of ?83,000 kilowatts. The Bureau's dam called for a 
capacity of 1,022,000 kilowatts. Since Congress had not 
authorized the Corps-Bureau plan, the center of attention now 
moved to the Federal Power Commission as Eisenhower assumed 
the Presidency. 6 
On taking office the Eisenhower Administration faced a 
difficult decision. As the Denver ~ accurately depicted 
the situation, no matter what it did, the Administration 
would be open to a torrent of criticism. Should the Admini-
stration attempt to deny the Idaho Power Company a license 
it would be held accountable for the inaction of the Republi-
can-ruled Congress in approving a federal dam. If, on the 
other hand, the Administration allowed the Idaho Power Company 
to obtain the license it would be charged with having "sold 
out" Hells Canyon to Wall Street. Eisenhower made two appoint-
ments particularly vital toward a resolution of that dilemma.? 
6senate Report 2275, 10; Lyons, Tomorrow's Birthright, 
2?8; Coyle, Conservation, 197; The Interveners included the 
National Hells Canyon Association, the Lewis County Public 
Utility District of Washington, seven other Public Utility 
Districts in Washington, and the NRECA. 
?The Denver ~' May 13, 1953. 
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When Douglas McKay, a two-term governor of Oregon, be-
came Secretary of Interior it was not altogether certain 
where he stood on the issue. As a firm believer in states' 
rights he had vigorously opposed the Columbia Valley Author-
ity. "We definitely need the United States Government to 
develop the Columbia River," he affirmed at his nomination 
hearing in 1953. "Private power can't do it, but I have 
opposed the part of the Federal Government in imposing them-
selves in Authority affairs, because I think the people at 
the State level want to retain control of their natural re-
sources." Yet he had approved both the "308 Review Report" 
and the Corps-Bureau agreement. When he was confirmed by the 
Senate, Wayne Morse of Oregon, who had dramatically broken 
with the Republican Party during the recent presiden-tial cam-
paign and was a strong advocate of the federal dam, took to 
the floor of the Senate to urge his fellow Oregonian's con-
firmation. A fellow supporter of the federal project, Sena-
tor Magnuson, however, opposed McKay's nomination because he 
disagreed with the nominee's views on development of public 
power in the Pacific Northwest. 8 
The appointment of Jerome Kuykendall as the new Chair-
man of the Federal Power Commission raised serious suspicions 
in the minds of those who favored construction of a Hells 
Canyon dam by the Bureau of Reclamation. Kuykendall had been 
8senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Cong., 1st Sess., The Nomination of Governor 
be Secretary of the n erior anuary 
Times, January 22, 1953, 1, 10. 
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appointed to the Washington State Public Service Commission 
by Governor Langlie, a staunch opponent of both the Columbia 
Valley Authority and the federal dam. Consequently, organized 
labor in the State of Washington, the National Rural .Electric 
Cooperative Association, and the Idaho-Oregon Hells Canyon 
Association pronounced Kuykendall guilty-by-association. 
"His first objective," Albert Ullman of the Hells Canyon 
Association predicted, "will be to accomplish what La.nglie 
has be~n attempting for a long time--to put the hatchet to 
the federal Hells Canyon project." The United Steel Workers 
ot Spokane declared that Kuykendall was "opposed to the de-
velopment of the Northwest's industrial growth." While he 
would not commit himself on the issue, Kuykendall made it 
clear to the Senate Interior and Foreign Commerce Committee, 
which heard testimony on his nomination, that it was better 
for private capital to do the job when it could, rather than 
the federal government. In other words, the government, he 
said, should become involved only when private enterprise 
cannot perform the task. He was thus an exponent of partner-
ship. 9 
9senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Nomination of Jerome K. Kuykendall, of 
Washington, to be a Member of the Federal Power Commission 
for the remainder of the term exnirin§ ,June 22, 1957 (April 
22, 1953), 8, 14, ff; Ellis, A Glant ten, 125-27; Telegram, 
'W. C. Weyer, President, United Steel Workers Local 338, USA, 
CIO, to Eisenhower, April 23, 1953, and telegram, April 23, 
1953, D. E. Bandwaun, President, Spokane County CIO Council, 
to Eisenhower, in Eisenhower Library, Central Files, GF-43-A, 
Box 388; Engl.er, 325-30; New York Times, !1ay 16, 26; April 
24, 25; April 23, 24; April 14, 1953, 53. · 
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Furthermore, Bureau of the Budget Circular A-47 and the 
Department of Interior's new power policy signaled a reversal 
of the New Deal-Fair Deal emphasis on federal projects. 
"The New Deal's great public crusade is dead," Business Week 
correctly announced. "But one thing is certain: McKay has 
rung down the curtain on the kind of 'damn-private industry, 
government-should-build-everything' policy on federal power 
followed by his Democratic predecessors at Interior." The 
Department decided to get the Hells Canyon matter 11cleaned 
upn rather than, as one member of the FPC.advised Under Sec-
retary Tudor, to "drag its feet." Consequently, on May 5, 
1953, McKay officially withdrew the Department's intervention 
in the case. In explaining his decision, McKay noted that 
legislation favoring the high dam was presently before Con-
gress, but "in view of efforts to balance the budget it ap-
pears doubtful that appropriations for the work can be justi-
fied now even if the project is authorized." \./hen McKay's 
decision came under fire, Eisenhower defended it, saying that 
ttmany, many people" from the concerned area "insisted that 
they do not believe in this big .federal dam." In keeping with 
the Administration's partnership policy, McKay explained that 
"private enterprise should be allowed to develop power as 
long as it does not interfere with the orderly development 
of natural resources." Significantly, he added: "There has 
been a tendency in the past to give breaks to all the public 
deals." \./hen the Denver~ questioned whether this deci-
sion meant the engineers of the Bureau of Reclamation would 
1?7 
be permitted to testify before the FPC "without political re-
straints," the Department replied they would be. "No witness," 
Ralph Tudor assured Kuykendall, "is being controlled in any 
way in this matter and no employee who may be called as a 
witness need be concerned that his testimony in this case 
will have any effect on his future with the Department. 1110 
The action of the Department of Interior left adherents 
of a federal dam without an organization representing their 
interests before the Federal Power Commission. The National 
Hells Canyon Association, composed of various labor, farm, 
cooperative, and public utility groups, was quickly formed 
to fill this void. "The interests of these interveners," the 
Association told the FPC, "lie in a continuing increased sup-
ply of low-cost power and in full development of the resources 
of the Columbia River basin." The National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association also joined as an intervener. In 
July 1953, the FPC officially accepted the Hells Canyon Asso-
ciation as an intervener against the Idaho Power Company. 
Clearly neither side would now compromise. 11 
lO"McKay: Changing a Power Trend," Business Week (Sept. 
~2, 1953), 63; McKay's statement explaining the new power pol-
icy can be found in Elmer Bennett Papers, Box 6, Eisenhower 
Library; the official letter of withdrawal, May 5, 1953, 
Clarence Davis, Solicitor, to Kuykendall, in Federal Power 
Com.mission, Washington, D.C., Project No. 19?1, Part~; Public 
Pa5ers of the Presidentsfl 1953, 287; Newsweek, 41 (May 18, 
19 3), 87; Denver Post, ay 20, 1953; Tudor to Kuykendall, 
July 16, 1953, Cen~ Files, OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower 
Library. 
11Federal Power Commission, Petition for Leave to Inter-
vene, June 26, 1953, Project No.· 1971, Part 4; The Denver Post, 
~18, 1953, noted that a compromise solution existed. AC::--
cording to this solution the.Idaho Power Co. would have 
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About a week after McKay's announcement, the Idaho Power 
Company once again filed applications with the Commission for 
licenses to construct and operate the three-dam project. This 
time, however, the State of Washington intervened on.behalf 
of the Company. Among other points, Governor Langlie's brief 
claimed the project would be "a flagrant dissipation" of fed-
eral money that "could more wisely be invested in projects 
known to have far greater flood control and hydroelectric po-
tential .1112 
But one final problem remained. While it was officially 
neutral in the conflict over which should build the project, 
the National Park Service argued that "a master plan" protect-
ing the site's recreational potential ought to be drawn up 
before construction began. Conrad Wirth, Director of the Park 
Service, estimated such a study would cost only $60,000 and 
could be completed within two years. He also maintained the 
Idaho Power Company should pay for the study in the event the 
FPC grants it a license. Reluctantly NcKay complied with 
built multiple purpose dams below Hells Canyon near the riv-
er's confluence with the Columbia. Neither side was amenable 
to accepting this compromise, however. 
12Quoted in Federal Power Commission, Intervener, State 
of Washington, Reply Brief to Idaho Power Company, Project 
Nos. 1971, 2132, 2133 (February 4, 1955), 1-2; Ralph Tudor, 
"Notes Recorded While Under Secretary, Department of Interior, 
March, 1953-Sept., 1954," in Eisenhower Library, Tudor Papers, 
Box 1, entry for Nay 3, 1953. In his diary Tudor noted that 
"about two weeks" before Interior announced its decision to 
withdraw from the case, a member of the FPC visited him and 
suggested that his department do nothing on the Hells Canyon 
matter, and ".perhaps some of the controversy and excitement 
will die down." Interior did not agree and went ahead with 
withdrawing its intervention. 
179 
Yirth's wishes and so informed the Commission. In testimony, 
the National Park Service told the FPC that a desirable recre-
ational plan could be developed whichever side won the case. 13 
Outwardly the issue was a re-enactment of the traditional 
public versus private power dilemma. The Administration held 
the position that free enterprise must be given an opportunity 
to develop the nation's resources. Obviously McKay and Eisen-
hower saw a danger of government monopoly in the federal dam. 
"I don't like monopoly of any kind," McKay once said, "but 
the worst type is monopoly by the Federal Government, because 
it's so hard to change." In answering the charge that the 
Idaho Power Company also would constitute a monopoly should 
the FPC grant it the license, McKay contended that private 
enterprise "can be controlled by regulatory bodies." More 
specifically, the Administration felt the Idaho Power Company 
should have the right to bring its case to the Commission and, 
if the Company satisfied the FPC, it ought to get the license. 
The main problems, the Administration argued, were political, 
economic and judicial. 
13Jviemo, Conrad Wirth to Orme Lewis, Assistant Secretary, 
October 8, 1953; memo, Wirth to Aandahl, December 13, 1953; 
memo, Tudor to McKay, February 5, 1954; McKay to Kuykendall, 
February 8, 1954, in Department of Interior, Office of the 
Secretary, Central Files Section, no box number, Federal Rec-
ords Center, Suitland, Maryland. It deserves mentioning that 
the NPS testified that if the high dam "were not constructed, 
e
ressures would increase for the construction of Glacier View 
DamJ, which encroaches upon Glacier National Park.~' Counsel 
or ~he Idaho Power Company objected to this segment of the 
Park Service's statement and was sustained. Cf. Memo, John G. 
M. Marr, Technical Review Staff, to Tudor, February 9, 1954, 
"A Summary of FPC Hearings, Vols. 76-82," p. 5, and "Statement 
of the National Park Service," p. 8, in Department of Interior, 
Office of the Secretary, Central Office Files, no box number, 
Federal Records Center, Suitaland, Maryland. 
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It was true, as Administration spokesmen repeatedly 
pointed out, that twice a Democratic Congress had not seen fit 
"to appropriate the tremendous sums needed for Hells Canyon 
or even to authorize the project." Of course, this argument 
overlooked the fact that it had been a Dixicrat-Republican 
coalition that had defeated the federal dam. In this connec-
tion, both Kuykendall and McKay emphasized that "the power 
supply in 1957 will be adequate in all regions of the country 
except the Pacific Northwest." Since the federal dam was 
unable to get congressional approval, it was thus imperative 
that free enterprise perform the task, lest the Pacific North-
west suffer a severe power shortage. Political partnership 
also meant a check on the growth of the federal bureaucracy's 
power. In a series of important articles, Raymond Moley, the 
Administration's most articulate apologist, agreed there was 
little real choice but to opt for free enterprise. To do 
otherwise, he thought, would allow the Bureau of Reclama-
tion's power to continue unfettered. "To build it," he remind-
ed his readers, "would be the summit of the bureau's ambit:icn." 14 
14rnterview with McKay, U.S. News and World Report, v. 
35 (October 9, 1953), 62; Eisenhower to Rep. Jack Westland, 
December 14, 1953; McKay, Speech to Commonwealth Club, San 
Francisco, August 21, 1953; McKay, Speech to American Power 
Association, May 14, 1953; Kuykendall and McKay to Arthur 
Burns, June 18, 1954, in Central Files, OF-155-C, Box 833, 
Eisenhower Library; Tudor, Speech to Idaho State Reclamation 
Association, Boise, Idaho, November 4, 1953, Department of 
Interior, Special Office Files, no box number, National Ar-
chives; Raymond Moley, "Low Blows at High Dams," Newsweek, 
47 (May 21, 1956), 124; "The Fair Deal in Hells Canyon, 11 News-
week, 38 (August 6, 1951), 81; "Hells Canyon Issues," NewS::-
\:ieel<, 42 (July 27, 1953), 80; Elmer Bennett, A S~~osiUiil'On 
Federal, State, and Local Co9peration on Conservaion and 
Development of Water Resources, "The Role of the Federal Gov-
ernment,," California Law Review, V. 45, No. 5 (December, 1957); 
Davis O.H., 62-63. 
... .-·· 
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Considered from the Administration's economic vantage 
point the dictates of a balanced budget far outweighed any 
arguments for a government-sponsored project.· "This country," 
McKay once told an interested party, "just cannot go on squan-
dering money and survive as free people." Simply put, the 
high dam would have cost too much in lieu of defense expen-
ses; McKay estimated a federal dam would run around $843,000, 
000. Once again, the Administration.averred that since a 
private utility was willing to do "a very comparable job" 
which would meet the requirements of the Federal Power Act, 
the government ought not to throw roadblocks in its way. 
This reasoning particularly appealed to congr·essmen outside 
the Tennessee Valley and the Pacific Northwest. They ques-
tioned why their regions should be taxed for a dam in the 
Northwest when the burden could just as easily be borne "on 
the willing shoulders of the private investor." Senator Ralph 
Flanders of Vermont, for example, saw no sense in being taxed 
for a dam in Idaho when instead it would be better "to have 
the Idaho· Power Company contribute something to the taxes" 
he had to pay. Contrary to what critics of partnership may 
have led some to believe, however, the Administration was 
not hostile t~ every federal project. The Dalles and John 
Day Dams, both part of the Corps' "308 Review Report," and 
the Upper Colorado River Storage Project received a partner-
ship certification. In 1953, Senator Guy Gordon of Oregon, 
a strong partnership defender, presented the John Day plan 
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to the Senate.15 
Finally, legal precedent was weighted heavily in the Ad-
ministration's favor. In 1951, the Federal Power Commission 
had granted a license to the Virginia Electric and Power Com-
pany to build a power plant on the Roanoke River at Roanoke 
Rapids, Virginia. The Secretary of Interior and the National 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association of Virginia brought 
the case before the Supreme Court, which ruled the FPC was 
empowered to grant a license to any private company £or any 
power site included in a plan for comprehensive river basin 
development, provided, of course, that Congress had not ap-
propriated £unds for construction of that project and if the 
licensing was in the public interest as designated by the 
Federal Power Act of 1920. Having ''no disagreement with this 
conclusion," the Eiserlhower Administration based its decision 
to withdraw Interior's intervention from the Hells Canyon 
thi 1 . 16 case on s ru ing. 
15McKay to C. L. Gilstrap, March 22, 1954, Department 0£ 
Interior, Office of the Secretary, no box number, Federal 
Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; Meley, "The John Day Part-
nership," Newsweek, 44 (July 26, 1954), 88; Ralph Flanders to 
Sherman Adams, Central Files, OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower 
Library .• 
16Lyons, Tomorrow's Birthri~ht, 160-62; Ralph Tudor, 
Speech to Southwestern Electrica Exchange, Boca Rotan, Flor-
ida, March 22, 1954, in Elmer F. Bennett Papers, Box 10, 
Eisenhower Library. In a similar case the Supreme Court ruled 
that the statutes creating the FPO "expressed general policies 
and granted broad administrative and investigative power, 
making the Commission the permanent disinterested expe.rt 
agency of Congress to carry out these policies." Chapman v. 
Federal Power Commission [345 U.S. 153, 168 (1953)]. 
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Politically,the Ad.ministration's position was endorsed 
by the Republican governors of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, 
as well as by both senators from Idaho and one from Oregon. 
Reclamation groups, including the Idaho State Reclamation 
Association, opposed the Bureau of Reclamation's plan because 
it was, in their opinion, "a power dam, pure and simple, and 
therein lies its potential threat to irrigation in Idaho. 17 
The opponents of the Idaho Power Company employed primar-
ily four arguments. They pointed out, first and most impor-
tantly, that the Idaho Power Company's three-dam plan would 
destroy comprehensive planning for the Columbia River basin. 
The Corps of Engineers-Bureau of Reclamation plan called for 
a network of dams which would supply hydroelectric power, 
irrigation, and flood control. By contrast, the Idaho Power 
Company's plan promised only hydroelectric power. Represen-
tative Gracie Pfost (D-Idaho), knoi.m as "Hells Belle" for her 
vociferous advocacy of the federal project, rightly believed 
comprehensive planning was "the basic question." If the Ida-
ho Power Company received a license, she thought, it would 
mean comprehensive planning for the Columbia River Basin would 
be foresaken in favor of "piecemeal, partial development" for 
"the benefit only of a private monopoly." Oddly enough, the 
conservationists and the Bureau of Reclamation, for once, 
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were not at loggerheads. The Bureau defended its plan for a 
multiple purpose dam at Hells Canyon before the Federal Power 
Commission. The Bureau reasoned that since the unit cost of 
power for both plans would be about the same, the additional 
advantages from the multiple purpose development would best 
serve the entire needs of the area. Coincidentally, the Bur-
eau and the conservationists were locked in a heated struggle 
over a proposed dam in :Echo Park, Utah, as part of the Upper 
Colorado River Storage Project. The conservationists opposed 
the Administration and the Bureau of Reclamation here. The 
:Echo Park conflict, however, had a direct bearing upon Hells 
Canyon. The high dam advocates caught the Department of 
Interior in an apparent contradiction. "If the Bureau [of 
Reclamation] people," Robert w. Lucas, editor of the Denver 
~'asked, "can miss the mark.so widely on the Snake [Hells 
Canyon], how do I know that their concepts of :Echo Park and 
the feasibility of that project and others related thereto 
are trustworthy at all?" The Hells Canyon Association pointed 
out this logic to the FPC. Although the position of the Corps 
of Engineers was not as plain, there is evidence to suggest 
that it also lined up with the high dam advocates. Two months 
after the Department of Interior withdrew its intervention 
from the case, the Montana Great Falls Tribune quoted Briga-
dier General Samuel Sturgis saying that 1.3 million acre feet 
of the required 27 million acre feet of flood control storage 
would be lost in the event Idaho Power obtained a license. 
"We," Sturgis concluded, "can find substitute storage--but 
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where I don't know." When Representative Pfost asked if the 
article was correct, the Corps replied it was "substantially 
accurate." Also, in 1956, McKay, campaigning for Wayne Morse's 
senate seat, complained that Brigadier General L. H. Foote, 
North Pacific Division of the Corps, had made statements 
about Hells Canyon to the Oregonian "damaging to the Admini-
stration policy and my personal campaign." Foote, in fact, 
expressed concern that "only half the possible flood storage 
will be available" according to the plans of the private util-
ity companies in the area. McKay subsequently asked Sherman 
Adams "for help in getting the Army Corps of Engineers back 
in step with administration policy c·oncerning Hells Canyon · 
Dam." Adams, according to McKay, accomplished this task. 
While they were not concerned with the power issue, the Wild-
life Management Institute and the Citizens Committee on Natur-
al Resources worried over another aspect of comprehensive 
planning. They feared the Idaho Power Company's plan would 
result in losses of fisheries, wildlife, and recreational 
facilities. The argument for the comprehensive plan of the 
Bureau of Reclamation was perhaps best summed up by the Na-
tional Farmers' Union. "The Idaho Power Company project," it 
told the FPC, "would contribute absolutely nothing to the 
region in the way of benefits to irrigation and substantially 
less than the Federal Hells Canyon project to navigation and 
flood control." The public versus private power issue was 
only a fig leaf; actually, the. real issue was over the relative 
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merits of comprehensive plannine:; and partnership.18 
The second reason the high dam advocates favored the Bur-
eau of Reclamation's plan was economic. The Pacific. Northwest 
possessed an aluminum industry dependent on low-cost power. 
Also, rock phosphate, located in southern Idaho, awaited ex-
ploitation, but this potential industry also required cheap 
power. The National Hells Canyon Association told the FPC 
the high dam "would contribute materially more to alleviate 
the hydroelectric power problem throughout the region, includ-
ing southern Idaho." In other words, cheap power supplied by 
a federal project would entice more industry to the area, 
which, in turn, would create more jobs. Or, conversely, as 
former President Truman put it, if the FPC gives Idaho Power 
a license, there will be "less power and higher rates, fewer 
jobs and lower wages." Organized labor was especially recep-
tive to this view. Andrew J. Biemiller of the AF of L and 
O. A. Knight, Vice President, C.I.O., both testified before 
the House SubcoI:'llD.ittee on Irrigation and Reclamation for the 
18rbid., 6-7, 98; Robert W. Lucas to Tudor, March 16, 
1954; Memo, "Summary of volumes 117-132 of the Hearings Con-
ducted by the Federal ?ower Commission on the subject matter 
Hells Canyon, John B. Bennett to Tudor, June 24, 1954, Depart-
ment of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Files, no 
box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; Mon-
tana Great Falls Tribune, July 2, 1953; Pfost to Brig. General 
C. H. Chorpening, July 8, 1953; C. H. Chorpening to Pfost, 
July 28, 1953, Corps of Engineers Files,- no box number, Fed-
eral Records Center, Suitland, Maryland; two telegrams, McKay 
to Adams, June 7, 1956, Central Files, GP-140-E-2, Eisenhower 
Library; McKay to Adams, June 15, 1956, Gentral Files, GF-109 
-A-2, Eisenhower Library; Senate Report 2275, 49; Con~ression­
al Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 9, 1956), v. Io , part 
Io, 13479; New York Times, October 6, 1953, 34; Seymour Har-
ris, Economics of Political Parties, 308-09. 
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federal dam. Further, after noting that eighty percent of 
its membership was unemployed seven months of the year, Elmer 
F. Mcintire, executive secretary of the Idaho State Federa-
tion of Labor, suggested to the same subcommittee that "low-
cost power from Hells Canyon will provide many thousands of 
new jobs, as well as firming up the economy for more year-
round payrolls which the Northwest needs badly." For this 
reason organized labor in the State of Washington condemned 
Governor Langlie's intervention on the side of the Idaho Power 
Company, and worked to defeat his bid in 1956 for the Senate 
seat of Warren Magnuson, a longtime champion of the federal 
dam. The American Public Power Association also supported 
cheap power through a federal dam. 19 
The public power groups and conservationists painted 
the Idaho Power Company as a big business interloper whose 
true interests actually rested outside the Pacific Northwest. 
Senator Estes Kafauver, for example, charged that the Com-
pany's base was in New England and had "few controlling stock-
holders west of the Hudson River." If partnership meant 
local control, then, he asked, how does Idaho Power fit in? 
l9Federal Power Com.mission, Intervener's Brief, Project 
No. 1971, Part 7, 23; New York Times, September 8, 20, 21; 
October 29, 1953, 32; House Subcommittee on Interior and Re-
clamation hearings (July 1955), 150-57, 123; Resolution, 
International Union of Operating'Engineers to McKay, January 
8, 1954; resolution, Central Labor Council of Spokane and 
Vicinity, December 27, 1956; resolution, Spokane County CIC 
Council, December 27, 1956, J. L. Newlun, President, Y~kima 
County Public Power Leage, to McKay, February 23, 1954, in 
Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central 
Files, no box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland, 
Maryland. 
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Tom E. Roach, President of Idaho Power, said this image was a 
distortion. The Company's largest shareowner, he wrote Ke-
fauver, represented "an ownership of about 2% of the total 
in terms of corporate voting power." The corporate voting 
power of Idaho shareowners alone, Roach continued, was "al-
most double that of shareowners residing in any other state." 
Hence, Idaho Power was not, as Kefauver and others thought, 
an Eastern-based operation, controlled by a few shareholders. 
Nonetheless, the Cooperative League, testifying on behalf of 
the federal dam, accused Idaho Power of having its "principal 
stockholders" in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. 20 
Finally, the advocates of the federal project perceived 
a parallel between Hells Canyon and Dixon-Yates. According 
to them, a victory for Idaho Power and Dixon-Yates would sig-
nify a return to "the power trust" of the twenties. Senator 
Wayne Morse, for example, correctly noted that a majority of 
the members of the Atomic Energy Commission disapproved of 
the Dixon-Yates contract but Eisenhower nevertheless commanded 
the Commission to negotiate the contract. "How long," Morse 
asked, "will it be before the White House tells the Federal 
Power Commission how to decide the Hells Canyon [case] or ano-
ther like it?" Recognizing the same parallel, Senator Mag-
nuson, Chairman of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
20New York Times, February 14, 1953, III, 2; Kefauver to 
T. E. Roach, February 12, 1954; T. E. Roach to Kefauvsr, Feb-
ruary 25, 1954, in Department of Interior, Office of the Sec-
retary, no box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Mary-
land; House Subcommittee on Interior and Reclamation hearings 
(July 1955), 140-41. 
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Committee charged with handling FPC nominations, warned that 
he was "watching carefully" the activities of the Federal 
Power Commission in the Hells Canyon case. The Hells Canyon 
Association, of course, drew the same parallel. Because, 
indeed, the issues were so similar, the advocates of the 
federal dam received support from the Tennessee Valley con-
gressional bloc. Kefauver in 1955 openly questioned Kuyken-
dall' s impartiality in both the Dixon-Yates and Hells Canyon 
d . . 21 ec1s1ons. 
The Federal Power Commission's Examiner, William Costello, 
heard these conflicting arguments from July 1953 to July 1954, 
and the parties engaged in another year of protracted legal 
maneuvering before a final decision was reached. In December 
1954, the FPC's staff "bought most of the Idaho Company's 
arguments." Their brief reported that while the three dams 
would not be any more economica,l .tb.an the single federal dam, 
there were advantages to the private operation that overrode 
considerations for the federal scheme. In fact, the staff 
brief came out so strongly for the Idaho Power Company that 
many Washington observers felt the FPC Examiner, whose duty 
it was to make a recommendation to the Commission itself, 
could not but agree with the brief. They were perfectly 
21co~ressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100, 
part 9 (J y 21, 1954), 11170-?2, 11180, and July 22, 1954, 
11346-47; Kefauver to Morse, reprinted in the New York Herald 
Tribune, August 6, 1955, in Files of Joseph Dodge, Box.?, 
Eisenhower Library; House Subcommittee on Interior and Recla-
mation hearinGS (July 1955), 121-22. It should be pointed 
out that the Democrats (and one Independent, wayne Morse) 
fully supported the Democrat~ from the Tennessee Valley in 
the Dixon-Yates controversy. 
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correct. On May 6, 1955, the Examiner recommended that the 
Commission grant the Idaho Power Company a license. Costel-
lo's reasons were curious, however. In short, he found that 
the high Hells Canyon dam would be superior to the private 
utility plan. "The three dam plan of the Applicant," Costel-
lo wrote, "would not serve the public purposes and promote 
the public interest in the same way as the High Dam Project 
might under governmental auspices, but this is not to say that 
the Applicant's plan would not serve public purposes and pro-
mote the public interest." The deciding factor in the case, 
however, was Congress' unwillingness to pass a bill authoriz-
ing the federal project: " ••• the likelihood of the authoriza-
tion of and appropriation for an undertaking of the site 
involved in the High Dam Project is so remote as to make 
recommendation to the Congress.~.that such a dam be under-
taken by the United States a completely useless action." When 
Costello made his recommendation to the Commission, a flurry 
of protests came forth. The supporters of the comprehensive 
plan demanded that Costello had, in effect, exceeded his 
authority. The Examiner's duty, they declared, was to weigh 
the evidence impartially on the relative merits of the two 
arguments, not to act as "a political weather bureau." The 
high dam congressmen thus vowed an all-out fight in Congress 
for their project. 22 
22
"Private Power Wins Again," Business Week (December 4, 
1954), 32; Ellis, A Giant Step, 129; FPC, .Examiner's Brief 
(May 6, 1955), Project No. 19?1, Part 10, 6-7; New York Times, 
May ?, 1955. · 
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The worst suspicions of the federal dam advocates seemed 
confirmed when, on August 4, 1955, the Federal Power Commis-
sion, all Eisenhower appointees, concurred with Costello's 
reasoning. The Commission said that flood control facilities 
could be found elsewhere and the navigation and recreation 
aspects of the two cases were about equal. Also, they noted 
the benefit-cost ratio for the hydroelectric power between 
the two proposals was about one to one. Finally, the Com-
mission laconically observed that, by law, "it is not in the 
public interest for the United States to undertake every 
water-power development ••• " Idaho Power lost little time and, 
in November, announced that it had signed a contract with the 
:r-Iorrison-Knudson Company, Inc., to build the Brownlee and 
Oxbow projects. Business Week accurately interpreted the 
FPC's decision as "a monumental victory for private power," 
and the American Farm Bureau Federation urged uncommitted 
Senators to defeat the federal Hells Canyon bill in Congress. 
The National Reclamation Association also approved the FPC's 
decision. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 
on the other hand, thought the Commission's ruling "prepos-
terous and presumptive," and asked for the resignation of 
McKay and two of his assistants. "This order," Senator Morse 
added, "shows how the FPO is responding to the signals of 
the Eisenhower Administration for propaganda purposes with-
out actually requiring construction of the thl;'ee dams." Af-
ter the Commission denied the interveners' request for a re-
hearing, two·avenues for redress still remained open. The 
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advocates of comprehensive planning appealed the FPC decision 
to the Federal Court of Appeals and sought congressional ap-
proval for a high dam. 23 
The conservationists had faced an uphill struggle in 
Congress all along. Between 1952 and 1954 little progress 
had been expected from the Republican Congress. They had 
wisely decided to drag out the FPC proceedings until after 
the elections o.f 1954, when, hope.fully, a recepti.ve Democratic 
congress would be elected. In these elections Richard Neu-
berger, a nationally known conservationist, defeated Guy Cor-
don, a veteran Republican Senator .from Oregon. Dixon-Yates 
and Hells Canyon had been the main issues. The wishes of 
the high dam adherents came true; the Democrats recaptured 
Congress. w"nen, shortly after the elections six Democrat;ic 
senators .from the Paci.fie Northwest asked Eisenhower to 
"recommend early authorization o.f the High Hells Canyon Dam" 
in his State of the Union Message, they were told that while 
the matter was before the FPC, the Administration would take 
no position. Instead, the President's message reiterated the 
23Federal Po~er Commission, Opinion No. 283 (August 4~ 
1955), Project Nos. 1971, 2132, 2133, Part 11, 5-6, 8-9, 11, 
16-17, 18-19; House Subcommittee on Interior and Reclamation 
hearings (July 1955), 319; Ellis, A Giant Step, 130; Special 
Report of the Chairman to Senate Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs on H~arings Scheduled for Week of September 
19, 1955 on Subjects of Hells Canyon,, Power Preference Clause, 
and Power Partnership (September 1, 1955), 17; "FPC Won't Re-
consider Snake River Power Decision," Business Week (October 
8, 1955), 158; "Private Utility Gets Hells Canyon," Business 
Week (August 13, 1955), 28; Charles C. Butler, American Farm 
I3ul:'eau Federation, to Adams, June 29, 1956, Eisenhower Libra-
ry, Central Files, OF-155-E-l, Box 838; New York Times, Aug-
ust 6, 18; September 2, 23; September 30, 14; October 19, 
1954; November 10, 53; November 29, 1955, 21. 
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main points outlining his partnership policy. The Bureau of 
the Budget went so far as to ask the Senate Interior Commit-
tee to defer its action until the Commission had acted. In 
April 1955, the Senate Interior Committee opened hearings in 
the Pacific Northwest on the subject. That same mo·nth the 
Senatorial sponsors of a high dam bill requested that the 
Federal Power Commission "hold in abeyance any action on the 
application of the Idaho Power Company ••• pending action by 
Congress." The Commission refused, saying the matter was now 
before its Examiner and must await his de.cision. Later, the 
Senate Interior Committee and Senator Kefauver's Antimonopoly 
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee announced they 
would conduct a "series of coordinated hearings on public and 
private power program.s."24 
A note of urgency was struck by the high dam advocates. 
One of the sponsors of the House bill, Representative Don 
Magnuson, for instance, told his colleagues that unless they 
24
"Hellspox," Life, v. 35, No. 19 (November 11, 1953), 
27; December 30, 19~Senators Murray, Mansfield, Morse, Neu-
berger, Magnuson and Jackson to Eisenhower, Central Files, 
OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower Library; Senate, Subcommittee 
on Irrigation and Reclamation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., A Bill 
to Authorize the Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of 
the Hells Can on Dam on the Snake River Between Idaho and Ore-
~on, and for Related Ptiraoses 1 , 3 0- l; July , 1 5 , 
larence Davis to Bernar M. Shanley, Secretary to the Presi-
dent, Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central 
Files, no box number, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Mary-
land; Senate Report 2275, 34-35; Special Report of the Chair-
man (September 1, 1955), 18, 19-20, 20-21, 21-22, 23-24. The 
Senate Antimonopoly Subcommittee had been investigating the 
Dixon-Yates contract and thus these coordinated hearings were 
an outgrowth of both the Dixon-Yates and Hells Canyon contro-
versies. It was an effort to discredit the Administration's 
entire power program. 
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acted that session it would "foreclose forever the possibility 
of full development of the hydroelectric potf~ntial" in Hells 
Canyon. On July 27, 1955, the same day the FPC reached its 
decision, the House Interior Subcommittee, along strict party 
lines, narrowly approved a bill authorizing construction of a 
government dam at Hells Canyon. The following year both the 
House and Senate Interior Committees favorably reported out 
bills calling for a federal dam. Significantly, the Senate 
Interior Committee maintained it had "continuing jurisdiction 
••• of the subject matter [Hells Canyon] ••• , in spite of the 
issuance by the Federal Power Commission of a license for 
construction of the private project.-" But the Senate rejected 
the bill by a vote of 51 to 41. Afterwards Speaker Sam Ray-
burn decided there would be no attempt to present the bill to 
the House. 25 
The.Hells Canyon issue provided fuel for the political 
fires in the Pacific Northwest's elections of 1956. As early 
as 1953 the Denver Post had warned the Administration "that 
the political consequences of a final decision on the Snake 
River which is not fully justified in terms of the public 
interest--present and future--will invite strong reaction at 
25House Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation (July 
1955), 9-10; Senate Report 2275, 10, House of Representatives, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess., Report 2542 (July 29, 1956); Congression-
al Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 102, Part 10 (July 19, 
1956), 13498; New York Times, July 20, 1956, 1. The FPC had 
reached its decision on July 27 but delayed its decision until 
August 4, 1955. Also, seven Southern Democrats had voted 
against the Senate bill and only two Republicans voted for it. 
While this was a victory for partnership, it was also a vic-
tory for the Dixicrat-Republican coalition. 
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the polls." In the Senate races Magnuson defeated Langlie in 
Washington, Morse defeated former Secretary of the Interior 
McKay, and Frank Church, a young unknown lawyer, upset incum-
bent Herman Welker in Idaho. The Hells Canyon issue was also 
felt in races for the House. For example, a past president 
of the Hells Canyon Association, Albert Ullman, defeated one 
of partnership's staunchest defenders. 26 
Despite these impressive political victories, bad news 
was in the offing. In October 1956, the Federal Court of 
Appeals upheld the Federal Power Commission's ruling. Typi-
cally, the New Renublic chanted the familiar refrain that 
private interests were "buying one of America's great nation-
al assets" and the Administration was "selling it because it 
hates public power." Wayne Morse vowed the decision would 
be appealed to the Supreme Court. It was, but in April 1957, 
the high court decided overwhelmingly to refuse to review the 
Court of Appeal's ruling. The only remaining possibility for 
reversing the FPC decision was immediate congressional action. 27 
26nenver Post, May 17, 1953; Maley, "Hell's Canyon and 
1956," Newsweek, 46 (August 29, 1955), 80; New York Times, 
September 5, 32; October 20, 1956, 13. Senator Magnuson 
clearly recognized the politics of the issue. He made this 
statement in 1953 during Kuykendall's nomination hearings: 
"I want to say to the committee, in all fairness to my friend 
Mr. Kuykendall, that this has not only become a dispute be-
tween the Idaho Power Co. and the people who propose Hells 
Canyon, but in some cases, unfortunately, it has become a 
part of our political life in Idaho, Washington and Oregon." 
Senate Commerce Committee, Kuykendall Nomination (1953), 8. 
27The decision can be found in: Senate, Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Nomi-
nation of Jerome K. Ku kendall of Washington to be a Memoer 
0 
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It appeared highly unlikely Congress would act swiftly 
enough on the matter. Representative Clair Engle, Chairman 
of the House Interior Committee, envisioned a perplexing 
problem should federal dam legislation be enacted. If such 
a bill were approved, it would then be necessary, he noted, 
to condemn all the work already done by the Idaho Power Com-
pany. Another congressman told Sherman Adams that, after 
all, Idaho Power, acting "in good faith," had spent $5? mil-
lion on construction thus far. "If this federal dam is ap-
proved," he contended, "this will be money down the river." 
By a strange twist of events, however, the Senate quickly 
passed the federal dam bill. On this occasion five southern~ 
ers reversed their former stand and voted for the bill. Com-
menting on this sudden about face, Senator Charles Potter (R-
Mich.) claimed the supporters of a federal dam had sold Eisen-
hower's civil rights bill "down the river." It was his belief 
that some Northern Democrats, "fellows supposed to be great 
advocates of civil rights," had struck a bargain with these 
Southern Senators whereby they would vote against putting the 
civil rights bill on the calendar in return for their votes 
on Hells Canyon. The Democrats, of course, denied the alle-
gation. Whether it was true or not mattered little as chances 
of extracting the bill from the House Interior Committee 
proved slim. In July the Committee voted 16-14 against the 
measure. Two southern representatives voted along with .a 
Profits of .Partnership," New Re~ublic, 135 (October 22, 1956), 
2; The Oregonian, October Io, I 56; New York Times, April 2, 
195?, 1. 
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solid Republican minority to kill the bill. With that vote, 
advocates of comprehensive planning had.run out of rope; 
partnership had won an important victory. 28 
28
"Dams: Government Will Build More," Interview with 
Representative Clair Engle, U.S. News and World Report, XLII, 
No. 2 (January 11, 1957), 127-28; Rep. A. L. Hiller to Adams, 
July 12, 195?, Central Files, OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower 
Library; Con~ressional Record, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 103, 
Part 8 (June 21, 1957), 9976; New York Times, June 22, l; 
July 25, 195?, l; Clyde T. Ellis to Senator Paul Douglas, 
June 8, 1957, Paul Douglas Papers, Box ?08, Chicago Histori-
cal Society, thanking him for his support of the bill, said 
that "at pres·ent that House Interior Committee appears to 
have acted negatively on the bill." 
CHAPTER VII 
RECLAMATION Ort 'WILDERNESS? 
A1though it is generally agreed that the multiple purpose 
dam is the best form of land and reclamation management, all 
potential policy-making problems are not automatically elimi-
nated. A conflict arises, for example, when reclamationist 
and wilderness adherents desire incompatible objectives for 
the same site. In such cases both sides can claim, with jus-
tification, to be advocating "conservation;" politically, the 
Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service then draw 
support from their client groups outside the government. 
Quite often, however, ths·goverr.iment's reclamation and park 
bureaus become the prisoners of their constituents, thus 
making compromise an all but futile effort. A case of this 
type developed during E~senhower's administration over a pro-
posed dam for Dinosaur National Monument. 1 
A contest of wills between the National Park Service and 
the Bureau of Reclamation, both agencies within the interior 
department, arose over the need to develop the upper Colorado 
River. Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico, states com-
prising the upper Colorado basin, were sparsely populated 
1Roderick Nash (ed.), The American Environment: Readings 
in the History of Conservation (Massachusetts, 1968), 183; 
Coyle, Conservation, 242. 
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and had little industry outside the Denver-P~eblo and Ogden-
Sal t Lake-Provo urban centers. And its was obvious this area 
would remain "a colony," as one senator put it, until the 
upper Colorado River was developed. Most people in the 
upper basin made their living, to some degree, from tourism, 
agriculture, or mining. But the area's economic potential 
was severely limited by a shortage of water. Cheap power, 
for example, would have made possible the exploitation of the 
region's phosphate rock. Finally, it was also imperative 
that a method be found to eliminate the recurring menaces of 
flood and drought that plagued the area. The Bureau of Recla-
mation thus set out to remedy these prob1ems. 2 
The Bureau of Reclamation had focused its attention on 
developing th~ Colorado River for some time. When the Bureau 
proposed building a reservoir on the Colorado River's lower 
basin, the people living in the upper region protested stren-
uously, feeling that if the reservoir were built.the lower 
basin would then acquire prior right to all unapportioned 
water, thus hampering future development in the upper basin. 
To allay these fears Congress authorized the negotiation of 
an interstate compact between the upper and lower basins. In 
1922, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, 
2Pb.illip Sirotkin and Owen Stratton, The Echo Park Con-
trovers~ (Inter-University Case Program, Indianapolis, 1959), 
1-2. T e Colorado River rises in the Rocky Mountains of 
Colorado and western Wyoming, flows across southwestern Utah 
and northwestern Arizona, and from there enters the Gulf of 
California in. New Mexico. This basin is about 250,000 square 
miles or about one-twelfth of the country. 
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and California signed the Colorado River Compact at Santa Fe, 
New Mexico. The compact's specified purpose was to establish 
order in the Colorado River region by insuring that each of 
the signatories would get a fair share of the River's water. 
Accordingly, each basin was apportioned a "beneficial con-
sumptive use" of 7.5 million acre-feet of water per annum. 
Also,_ the ·upper basin states were obliged not to deplete the 
flow of water at Lee Ferry, the demarcation between the upper 
and lower basins, below 75 million acre-feet in any period of 
ten consecutive years. Development of the lower basin then 
proceeded. In 1928, the Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized 
construction of Hoover Dam and corollary facilities. The 
Bureau of Reclamation leased the dam's power to the City of 
Los Angeles, the Southern California Edison Company, and tha 
Metropolitan Water District of Southerri California. 
When the upper basin states decided to push for develop-
ment of their area the Department of Interior informed them 
that they would be required to negotiate a compact among 
themselves for the division of their water before the federal 
government could make any commitment. Utah, however, proved 
intractable. Thinking it would not obtain quality water 
once Wyoming received its share from the Green River, Utah 
balked at signing the compact. This impasse was not resolved 
until Colorado agreed to let Utah have an annual average of 
500,000 acre-feet of Yampa River water. But there still.re-
mained one s~icky point. Utah could not secure the Yampa 
water unless a dam was constructed at Echo Park or some site 
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nearby. To secure this compact, then, all the participants, 
including the Bureau of Reclamation, assured Utah that Echo 
Park Dam would be built. In short, Echo Park Dam became the 
heart of the entire Upper Colorado River Storage Project; 
without it, the whole project might well die and with it the 
upper basin's hope for economic progress. When, in 1950, the 
Bureau of Reclamation submitted its report to Secretary Chap-
man it called for construction of a billion-dollar Upper Col-
orado River Storage Project, a ten-dam plan for the develop-
ment of the Colorado River and its tributaries. Echo Park 
Dam was the second largest dam in the Project.3 
The National Park Service, which supervised Dinosaur 
National Monument, did not become actively involved until 
1949, when it first discovered the Bureau of Reclamation's 
intentions. Because of its grandeur and fossil deposits, 
Echo Park held great interest for paleontologists and natur-
alists alike. Dinosaur National Monument was located on the 
Green and Yampa Rivers in western Colorado and eastern Utah. 
In 1915 President Wilson had proclaimed an 80-acre tract in 
Utah a monument and Franklin Roosevelt, in 1938, had expanded 
the monument to about 205,000 acres. The site became known 
3senate, Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), A Bill to Authorize the Secre-
taR of the Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the 
Co orado River Stora e ?ro·ect and Particinatinp; Pro·ects, 
an or 0 er Purposes, , - erea er re erre o as 
Sen. Subc., Colorado River (1955)]; Commission on the Organi-
zation of the .Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force 
on Water Resources and Power (June, 1955), 476-79; Sirotkin 
and Stratton, Echo Park, 4-8, 27-28, 35, 39. 
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as Dinosaur National Monument. The National Park Service 
thus became alarmed when it learned the Bureau of Reclamation 
was conducting reconnaissance activities in Echo Park. A 
1946 Park Service report on the recreational resources of the 
Colorado River Basin made its position plain. "Construction 
of dams at these sites [Echo Park and Split Mountain]," it 
warned, "would adversely alter the dominant geological and 
wilderness qualities and the relatively minor archeological 
and wildlife values of the Canyon Unit so that it would no 
longer possess national monument qualifications." In April 
1949, the Park Service's Washington office informed its 
field offices that it intended to oppose construction of a 
dam at Echo Park. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Reclamation had 
continued surveying the monument. Echo Park's superintendent 
advised the Park Service to do something immediately~...to halt 
the Bureau's activities. By this time, however, the Bureau 
had defined its plans for Echo Park. 4 
The conflict was thus thrown into. the lap of the Secre-
tary of Interior. In April 1950, Secretary Chapman held hear-
ings to determine which agency would prevail. The Department 
heard a wide range of testomony, including upper basin sena-
tors and congressmen, the two Interior bureaus, and various 
conservation leaders. The congressional delegation from the 
upper basin states was unanimous in its advocacy of the dam. 
Senator Elbert D. Thomas (D-Utah) succinctly expressed'their 
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interest: "From earliest pioneer times, the lack of abundance 
of water has controlled our destiny, and times have not 
changed." The Bureau of Reclamation, of course, agreed, not-
ing that the Project constituted "the most efficient means 
of attaining comprehensive reservoir development in the Upper 
Colorado River Basin." The National Park Service and its 
constituency, on the other hand, was not timid in delivering 
its views. Newton Drury, Director of the Park Service, said: 
"We feel that this issue should be dealt with from a long-
range and national standpoint and not from the standpoint of 
temporary and local interests." The lines were now clearly 
drawn~ 
After the hearings Chapman carefully reviewed the record. 
While he weighed the evidence each side besieged him to rule 
in its favor. Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah pressed Chap-
man to speed up his decision so Congress would have time to 
authorize the Project for 1951. Watkins, a Republican, was 
not adverse to m~king political capita~ out of Chapman's de-
lay either. Democratic congressmen from the upper basin were 
equally mindful of the political significance of Echo Park 
Dam and the Upper Colorado River Storage Project for their 
own off-year elections; an, adverse decision, they conten~ed, 
could ruin their chances for reelection. Drury also contin-
ued to defend his bailiwick's position. With characteristic 
sarcasm, for example, he asked Chapman: "How about wasting a 
national monument? 11 In June Chapman finally ruled in favor 
of the reclrunationisus. He pointed out that the Bureau of 
Reclamation's plan was the most economical one in a desert 
river basin and that construction of the dam would not, as 
the wilderness enthusiasts had argued, set a precedent for 
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future invasions of other parks or monuments. "Much superb 
wilderness within the monument," he added, "will not be affec-
ted, excepting through increased accessibility." 
Chapman's decision fully alerted the wilderness advo-
cates that the fox was now at the gate. In a poignant arti-
cle in the Saturday Evening Post, Bernard Devoto, a nation-
ally known wilderness enthusiast, sounded· the call for oppo-. 
sition to Echo Park Dam. "The parks do not belong to any 
bureau, a!\Ygroup of planners or engineers, any state or sec-
tion," he protested. "They belong to all' of us. Do we want 
them? Will our grandchildren want them?" Until his juncture, 
the wilderness defenders had been ill-organized; henceforth 
they were no·t. The Bureau of Reclamation would indeed have 
to fight to preserve its position.5 
The forces marshalled against the dam sought to convince 
Chapman that he had erred. Nature Magazine frankly declared 
that it did not trust the intentions of the Bureau of Recla-
mation and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs also dis-
sented. Within the government, the National Park Service 
5Ise, Park Policy, 478; Department of ~he Interior, P££-
ceedin s before the De artment of the Interior. Hearin-s on 
Dinosaur Nationa Iionument 2cho Park and S lit r·!oun ain Dams 
Apri , , , , ; June , , Wa ·ins o _c ap-
man; Memo, June 27, 1950, Chapman to Drury and Straus; Memo, 
June 16, 1950, Drury to Chapman, in Department of Interior, 
Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, 
Box 3597, National Archives; Bernard DeVoto, "Shall We Let 
Them Ruin Our National Parks.?", Saturday Evening Post (July, 
1950), 17-19, 42-49. 
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persisted in its opposition to the dam. While it was prohib-
ited from publicly criticizing the decision and from distrib-
uting the DeVoto article, Drury told the Secretary of Interior 
that "the fundamental question" raised by the article "is 
still the number one problem of your National Park Service." 
Drury's usefulness to the cause was doubtful, however, f~r 
the political objectives and personalities of Drury and Chap-
man clashed at every point. They had never gotten along any-
way, but so long as the Park Service was headquartered in 
Chicago during the war the distance separating them amelior-
ated the tension. After 194?, when the Service returned to 
the nation's capitol, Chapman and Drury were in close proxim-
ity and their feud bubbled over with the Echo Park decision. 
wnen Chapman, bent on getting rid of the Park Service director, 
offered him a lesser post than his present one, Drury resigned. 
Nonetheless, the Park Service continued to oppose Chapman's 
decision. The wilderness crusaders were joined by other 
government agencies opposing the entire Upper Colorado River 
Storage Project. The Corps of Engineers questioned the econ-
omic feasibility of the Project; the staff of the Department 
of Agriculture likewise felt that the Project's irrigation 
provision would not stand .up under careful scrutiny; and the 
Federal Power Commission was simply noncommittal. 
In December 1952, these efforts were rewarded when Chap-
man revised his decision. In recommending that the Upper 
Colorado River Storage Project be submitted to Congress, 
Chapman advised that a dam b.e built at Echo Park or some 
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alternate site, depending on further studies of the problem 
by the Department of Interior. While this temporary re-
prieve gave the Park Service reason to breathe more easily, 
the Bureau of Reclamation was greatly distur'Qed. :Michael 
Straus, Commissioner of the Bureau and not a man to mince 
words, charged that the opposition ("self-styled conserva-
tionists") had shown "a complete lack of vision." He asked: 
"Why don't we try again and get out from behind the 'iron 
curtain'?" The final decision on Echo Park's fate now rested 
in the hands of the new Secretary of Interior and Bureau of 
the Budget.6 
It was difficult to tell what the new Administration's 
position would be on Echo Park Dam, in particular, and the 
Upper Colorado River Storage Project, in general. There was 
no doubting the new partnership policy was hostile to public 
power and the Bureau of Reclamation. What the Republican 
campaign fulminations against the New Deal bureaucracy did 
not reveal, McKay's decision on Hells Canyon seemingly did. 
In addition, the Bureau of Reclamation's budget was dramatic-
611Let's Be Fair," Nature :Magazine, v. 44 (October 1951), 
425; Arthur H. Carhart, "The Menaced Dinosaur Monument," 
National Parks Magazine (January-March, 1952), 1-12; Resolu-
tion of the Federation of Outdoor Clubs, Labor Day, 1950; 
Memo, July 19, 1950, Drury to Chapman; Memo, Aug. 14, 1950, 
Dr~. to Regional Directors, in Department of Interior, Of-
fice of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 
3597, National Archives; :Memo, Dec. 15, 1952, Straus to Chap-
man et al, and Dec. 12, 1952, Chapman to Truman, in Department 
of IiiterTor, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 
1937-53, Box 3577, National Archives; 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 
House Document 364 (1954), 323; 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate 
Report 128 (1955), 37-38; Ise, Park Policy, 479-80; Donald 
Swain, Wilderness Defender: Horace M. Albri ht and Conserva-
tion (C icago, • 
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ally reduced from $364 million in fiscal 1950 to about $165 
million in fiscal 1955, a reduction of more than fifty percent. 
Shortly after taking office McKay directed Undersecretary 
Ralph Tudor to personally review Echo Park and the Project. 
From the beginning McKay did not, as he told the governors 
of Wyoming, New Mexico, and Colorado, intend to withhold his 
approval of Echo Park Dam unless Tudor's investiga~ion proved 
"conclusively" that there was a substantially better plan. 
In November 1953 Tudor recommended that Echo Park Dam be in-
cluded in the Upper Colorado Project. Even though "the al-
teration [of the site] will be substantial" Tudor felt that 
"the beauty of the park will by no means be destroyed and it 
will remain an area of great attraction to many people." The 
important upshot: "None of the alternative sites which have 
been suggested can compare from·the standpoint of evaporation." 
McKay then pproved Tudor's recommendation and sent it to the 
Bureau of the Budget. The Secretary explained the apparent 
incongruity between his Hells Canyon and Echo Park decisions 
to the National Rivers and Harbors Congress. "The Department," 
he said, "will support the construction by the Federal Govern-
ment of river basin projects, including hydroelectric devel-
opments, where such projects are needed and where they are 
beyond the means of local public or private enterprise." In 
short, the Idaho Power Company was in a position to build 
the dam in Hells Canyon whereas local interests did not pos-
sess sufficient financial resources to construct the Upper 
Colorado Project. In other words, the Federal Government was 
not needed in Hells Canyon but was in the Upper Colorado 
Basin.? 
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It appeared the main obstacle would be the Administra-
tion's Bureau of the Budget. Through Circular A-4?, the Bur-
eau of the Budget had seriously circumscribed the Bureau of 
Reclamation's activities. The Circular did not sit well with 
the Bureau of Reclamation's primary constituent, the National 
Reclamation Association. In 1954 the Association warned that 
it would not stand for an executive veto "over what new pro-
jects may be presented to Congress for consideration." Its 
finger suggested that Circular A-4? "should [be] so modified· 
or administered as to require the Bureau of the Budget prompt-
ly to submit to the Congress those projects which have been 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior together with any 
appropriate comments." With record speed the Bureau of the 
Budget approved, with some qualifications, the Upper Colorado 
River Storage Project. The National Reclamation Assocation 
interpreted the Bureau's approval as a victory of sorts.8 
?Memo, Nov. 11, 1953, Tudor to McKay; July 3, 1953, McKay 
to Governor Thornton et al, Secretary of Interior, Office of 
the Secretary, Centrar-crassified Files, 1937-53, Box 369?, 
National Archives; House of Representatives, Subcoill!Ilittee on 
Irrigation and Reclamation, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 17-
18 rmore often referred to as House Subc. on Colorado Project 
(19"54)]; House Document 364 (1954), 44; Dec. 12, 1953, Press 
Release, Eisenhower Library, Central Files, OF-155-A, Box 828; 
McKay, Speech to National Rivers and Harbors Congress, May 25, 
1954, Washington, D.C., Elmer F. Bennett Papers, Box 11, Eisen-
hower Library. 
8National Reclamation Association, National Water Polic~ 
Statement, ~esented to the Task Force On Water Resources an 
Power of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government (Denver, Colorado, May l?, 1954), 10, 
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Opposition to the Upper Colorado River Storage Project 
was centered around an unstable coalition consisting of preser-
vationist advocates, economic opponents, and Californians. 
The preservation crusaders were opposed solely to construe-
tion of Echo Park Dam, not to the rest of the Project. The 
National Park Service, of course, opposed the dam but exerted 
little influence after McKay made his decision. Conrad Wirth, 
Director of the Park Service, found himself in a touchy situa-
tion. He had been appointed to the post by Truman and, like 
Drury, had pressured Chapman to revise his opinion on Echo 
Park. When !1cKay, the new Secretary of Interior, dismissed 
Albert Day as Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service for 
his "independence," Wirth knew he had better tread softly. 
Besides, Wirth was even suspect within preservationist cir-
cles, for he championed recreational as much as wilderness 
values. Wirth did, however, publicly oppose Echo Park Dam 
before Tudor made his recoI:ll:lendation to McKay. But once the 
Secretary of Interior approved the Project, the Director of 
the National Park Service fell silent on the issue. The 
fight to save Dinosaur National Monument was carried on 
mainly by the friends of the Park Service residing outside 
the goverr..ment.9 
39-40; Proceedin s of the Twent -Second Annual Meetin • 
!\ationa i.ec ana ion j_ssociation \./ashington, D.C., 1 53), 
314, in Elmer F. Bennett Papers, Eisenhower Library; Sen. 
Subc., Colorado River (1955), 731-32. 
9swain, Albright, 194, 291-92; Sirotkin and Stratton, 
Echo Park, 65-66; l~ov. 2, 1953, Rep. Douglas Stringfellow to 
NcKay; I·ieno, !Iov. 16, 1953, Wirth to McKay; Dec. 17, 1953, 
McKay to Stringfellow; Memo, July 9, 1953, Wirth to Tudor; 
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The proponents of wilderness values were national in 
scope. Bernard Devoto of Harper's and John B. Oakes of the 
New York Times wrote extensively against the dam, while the 
Wilderness Society, l~ational Parks Association, Izaak Wal ton 
League and the Wildlife Vianagenent Institute applied pres-
sure to congressmen. The Sierra Club, based mainly on the 
West Coast, also figured prominently in the fight. Influen-
tial individuals, like Alfred A. Knopf, the publisher, con-
tributed to the cause as well. In order to better coordin-
ate their efforts, the leaders of 32 opposition organizations 
created the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources to act 
as a registered lobbying agent. All in all, as one partici-
pant estimated, "somewhere between a million and two million 
conservationists, in one way or another," took 
struggle.10 
The preservationists argued that construction of the dam 
would set a dangerous precedent for the future. The rape of 
Hetch Hetchy was a constant reminder of what could happen if 
the Bureau of Reclamation won. Once the Bureau of Reclama-
tion had invaded Echo Park, it would, they felt, then attack 
Memo, May 26, 1953, Wirth to Ass. Seer., in Depart:CTent of 
Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 
1937-53, Box 3597, National Archives; "Echo ?ark Dam Threat: 
An Editorial," Nature Magazine, 47 (March 1954), 145; Angus 
M. Woodbury, "Colorado Dan Controversy," Scientific Monthly, 
82 (June, 1956), 310; Fred N. Packard, l~a tional Parks Assn., 
to McKay, July 10, 1953, Department of Interior, Central 
Classified Files, 1937-53, Box 3577, National Archives.. 
10
sirotkin and Stratton, Echo Park, 18-23; Jan. 4, 19·54, 
Alfred A. Yillopf to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-155-E-l, 
Box 838, Eisenhower Library;_ Horace Albright O.H., 836-41. 
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Glacier, Olympic and Yellowstone National Parks, among others. 
If Congress should follow the recom:r;iendation of the Secretary 
of Interior, Devoto flatly predicted, "the national park 
system as we know it, as it was intended to be, will be open 
to destruction." In lieu of an expanding population, what 
was needed, they therefore emphasized, were more parks, not 
fewer. Besides, the majestic view of Dinosaur National Monu-
ment possessed an intangible value. Senator Paul Douglas 
noted that Echo Park Dam would flood an "awe-inspiring can-
yon" that "gives man a sense of his littleness in the :face of 
the mighty :forces of nature." (To make this point the wilder-
ness proponents stressed that the President ought to visit 
the park to see :for himself. To their disappointment, however, 
the ?residant only flew over tha area, rather than touring it 
from the ground.) Consequently, they felt that rather than 
destroying it, Echo Park ought to be raised to national park 
status. Finally, the wilderness advocates sought to use FDR's 
proclamation of 1938 as legal evidence to prevent the Bureau 
of Reclamation's encroachment. 11 
While the wilderness forces opposed only Echo Park Dam, 
11Bernard Devoto, "Intramural Giveaway," Harper's, 208 
(Narch 1954), 10 and "Parks and Pictures," 208 (Feb. 1954), 
12ff; New York Times, April 20, 1955; Sen. Subc., Colorado 
River (1955), 381; House Subc. on Colorado Project (1954), 
791-93, 857-58, 872; May 4, 1954, Charles H. Wilkins, Col-
orado Citizens Comnittee, to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-
155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower Library; March 7, 1955, Harold C. 
Bradley to Sherman Adams, and Hay 26, 1954, David Brower to 
Adams, in Central Files, 0§-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower 
Library; John B. Oakes, "Conservation: Federal Program," · 
New York Times, April 4, 1954, II, 25; W. K. Oliver," Izaak 
Walton League, to Eisenhower, March 27, 1954, Central Files, 
OF-155-E-l, Box 838, Eisenhower Library. 
r 
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there were opponents to the entire Upper Colorado River 
Storage Project. Strangely enough, Senator Paul Douglas, 
a New Dealer, Raymond Moley, generally an apologist for 
partnership, and Leslie I1iller, foroer governor of Wyoming 
and presently head of the task force on power for the Second 
Hoover Commission, fell into bed together over this issue. 
They criticized the entire Project for its economic infeasi-
bility. They argued, among other things, that the power 
costs of the project were too high to justify construction. 
The trio objected especially to the basin account method of 
financing the Project. Moreover, it made little sense, they 
observed, to irrigate land which would stimulate more agri-
cultural production in the area when farm surplus was already 
a problem requiring governmental subsidy. Finally they noted 
that alternate power sources, coal, shale and oil, were avail-
able in the area. Douglas contended, in fact, "that on the 
Upper Colorado River power can be generated more cheaply from 
coal, in all probability, than it can by the use of water 
power ••• "12 
12Moley, "Stop, Look and Listen," Newsweek, 43 (May 10, 
1954), 108; "Water, Land, and Bookkeeping," Newsweek, 43 
(April 12, 1954), 112; "Pork Unlimited," Newsweek, 54 (May 9, 
1955), 108; Leslie Miller to Eisenhower, June 11, 1954, Cen-
tral Files, OF-155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower Library; Congres-
sional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 101 (April 18, 1955), 
4574-80. Several times opponents of the Project suggested 
that Congress defer action until the Second Hoover Commission 
could make its recormendations. The proponents of the Project 
did not take this suggestion seriously on the legitimate 
ground that Miller, already publicly opposed to the Project, 
was the head of the Commission's task force on power. For 
example, when Ben P. Griffith, President of the Board of Water 
and ?ower Coo.o.ission of the City of Los An~eles, suggested 
that Congress wait for the report of the Second Hoover Com-
mission, Senator Anderson shot back: "You want to leave it to 
the fellow you know will kill it?" Sen. Subc., Colorado Riv-
~ (1955), 506. 
.. 
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Opposition to the Upper Colorado Project was rounded out 
by the State of California. Basically California feared that 
its $695,000,000 investment in facilities for supplying water 
and power from the Colorado River would be seriously impaired. 
It took particular exception to the Bureau of Reclamation's 
argument that the upper basin states fulfilled their obliga-
tion so long as 75,000,000 acre-feet of water were allowed to 
California in each ten-year period. California instead em-
phasized that the Compact of 1922 provided that the upper 
basin states were not entitled to more than 7,500,000 acre-
feet in an given year and, besides, they were obligated to 
allow 75,000,000 acre-feet to California in each ten-year per-
iod, even if it meant cutting their own share below the 
7,500,000 acre-feet for a year or so. P~n..,..ec:::e-nt~ +:;'ti"~ C..,..a; er 
-'""'.I:'- - •• - -- " - - -o 
Hosmer of California contended that the problem was even cru-
cial to the defense of the country. Southern California, he 
noted, was important to the nation's defense aircraft indus-
try. "This and all other activities of the area," he conclu-
ded, "depend on full availability of the Colorado River water 
to which the region has rights." California remained intran-
sigently opposed to the Project throughout the controversy. 13 
The political coalition favoring authorization of the 
Project was composed of the Bureau of Reclamation, the federal, 
state, and local political officials, bureaucratic and quasi-
l3Sirotkin and Stratton, Ee.ho Park, 87, 90-91; Sen. Subc.. , 
Colorado River, 403-51, 503-38; House Document 364 (1954), 11, 
13, 17-19, 294-98; Feb. 20, 1956, Craig rtosmer to Bryce Har-
low, Central Files, OF-155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower Library • 
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bureaucratic officials, the Upper Colorado River CoI!lIDission, 
and local business leaders. Basically the attitude of this 
coalition was, as Senator Barnett of Wyoming put it, the 
West ought to be allowed to develop the Upper Colorado as it, 
and not as the East, wished. 
The Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service 
derived their strength from different clienteles. Support 
for the Park Service's position was national in scope while 
the Bureau of Reclamation's was confined to the region of 
the Upper Colorado. Hence, the Bureau worked closely with 
regional political officials. The Bureau's strength was 
based mainly in the Senate; the Park ·service's advantage came 
in the House where populous non-reclamation states had heavy 
representation. Moreover, unlike the Hells Canyon episode, 
the Bureau now had the full support of the Ad.mini~tration. 14 
The opponents of the Project contended that construction 
of a dam at Echo Park would constitute an invasion of the 
national park system, thus setting a dangerous precedent for 
future invasions, and would be a flagrant legal violation of 
FDR's proclamation in 1939. The Bureaus of the Budget and 
Reclamation, the Upper Colorado River Commission, and Senator 
Arthur Watkins took exception to this reasoning. The Upper 
Colorado River Commission felt the fears of the wilderness 
advocates were unfounded. "Similar circumstances," the Com-
mission suggested, "do not exist in connection with the 
14sirotkin and Stratton, Scho Park, 16-18, 21; House 
Subc. on Colorado Project (1954), 236-37. 
r--
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creation of any other national park or monument, and, there-
fore, the authorization based upon the unique circumstances 
of this case would not constitute a precedent for others." 
While the area was to be definitely administered by the Park 
Service, the proponents of the dam further pointed out that 
Roosevelt's proclamation clearly did not intend to use the 
area exclusively for park purposes to the exclusion of needed 
power projects. Quite the contrary, power and water conser-
vation, they said, had "prior right" to use of the park. 
Watki!s, in fact, did not think the area was then or ever 
had been "under the exclusive possession and justification 
of the National Park ad.ministration; ·rather than being an in-
vasion by the Bureau of Reclamation, he interpreted it as 
just the reverse, an invasion of reclamation areas by the 
National Park Service. The Federal Power Commission substan-
- tiated Watkins' contention. 15 
The proponents also noted that electric power was essen-
tial if the region was to develop industrially and economic-
ally. Industry, they argued, would be enticed to the region 
only if there were sufficient power potentials. The revenues 
produced from this power development would then pay for the 
irrigation costs. Irrigation, in turn, would encourage agri-
cultural development of the area. In other words, without 
maximum generation of power, the entire plan would fall 
15 . Memo, undated, Carl H. Schwartz to Dodge, Central Files, 
OF-155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower Library; Congressional Record, 
84th Cong., l~t Sess., v. 103, part 3 (March 28, 1955), 380?-
16; Sen. Subc., Colorado Pro~ect (1955), 18, 382-83; House 
Subc. on Colorado Project (1 54), 890-91. 
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through. Accordin~ to Tudor, Echo Park Dam was essential to 
the entire concept. " ••• the elimination of Echo Park and the 
substitution of any alternative," he said, "decreases the 
total amount of power that can be generated and, by the same 
token, reduces the revenues that are available." The National 
Rural Electric Co-operative Association, in putting its stamp 
of approval on the Project, further noted that the preference 
clause provision would aid rural electric cooperatives. The 
Federal Power Commission, Corps of Engineers, and Department 
of Agriculture, all of whom in varying degrees had formerly 
opposed or had been noncommittal to the Upper Colorado Project, 
now approved it. 16 
The Ad.ministration did not ignore the specific charges 
of Moley, Douglas, and Miller. First off, it was conceded 
there was no disputing the trio's facts. But the matter, as 
the Administration viewed it, was a question of choosing be-
7 tween a financial consideration and economic feasibility. 
Thus: "If the administration feels that in the broad sense it 
[the Upper Colorado River Project] adds to the economic strength 
of the nation to populate these arid areas by attractive irri-
gation inducement, that is an economic benefit which trans-
cends figures." In short, this was a subsidy "for a worthy 
purpose ••• " ~xheimer, Commissioner of the Bureau of Recla-
mation, especially took out after Miller and Moley. He pointed 
16House Subc. on Colorado Project (1954), 15, 22-23; 
House Document 364 (1954), 20, 24; 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., Sen-
ate Report 1983 (1954), 18-19; Sen. Subc., Colorado River 
(1955), 330-31. 
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out that ":cost of the products of western irrigated farms" 
were already under price support or acreage control and thus 
were not surplus. Besides, he said, seventy-five percent of 
the irrigated land would go toward livestock--not agricultur-
al--production.17 
The problem of evaporation at the Echo Park site was 
crucial to the reclamationists' argument. The Bureau of Re-
clamation reports purported that Echo Park was the best avail-
able site because water evaporation would be lowest there. 
The wilderness forces, under the leadership of General U.S. 
Grant III, a former member of the Corps of Engineers now 
representing the American Planning and Civic Association, 
challenged the Bureau's data. Through an extensive statis-
tical analysis Grant sought to demonstrate that the Bureauis 
figures were in error and that, in fact, Echo Park was not 
the best site. The preservationists contended that, Glen Can-
yon, for example, would be preferable to Echo Park. When J. 
R. Riter, chief hydrologist of the Project Development Branch 
of the Bureau of Reclamation, scrutinized the plan the Bur-
eau's evaporation figures declined from 300,000 to between 
100,000 to 200,000. Upon taking the reins of the Interior 
Department, McKay instructed Tudor, a former engineer, to 
conduct a personal examination. Tudor's findings agreed with 
Riter's. Using simple arithmetic, David Brower of the Sierra 
17Memo, May 26, 1954, J. S. Bragdon to Arthur Burns, John 
Bragdon Papers, Box 11, Eisenhower Library; May 13, 1955, 
Press Release, Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 
Elmer F. Bennett Papers, Box 11, Eisenhower Library. Brag-
don's emphasis. 
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Club laid even these revised figures to waste before the 
House Subcoomittee on Irrigation and Reclamation. If Con-
gress approves the Project, Dinosaur Monument, DeVoto lamen-
ted, "will have been ruined and the national park system 
undermined on the basis of errors in arithmetic too gross to 
be permitted a schoolboy." Nevertheless, the Bureau of 
Reclamation refused to concede the point; quite the contrary, 
the Bureau attempted to demonstrate that its figures were 
indeed the correct ones. But in the end, TUdor admitted that 
the Bureau's evaporation figures for Echo Park and Glen Can-
yon had been nistaken. Nevertheless he did not conclude that 
Glen Canyon would be a justifiable substitute for Echo Park. 
Significantly, though, the preservationists had cast doubt 
on the accuracy of the Bureau of Reclamation's arguments. 
With this crack in the dike water now began to seep through. 18 
In 1954, the Echo Park Dam champions met strong resis-
tance in Congress and had to cancel their plans until the next 
session. A couple of days after the Senate Interior Committee 
favorably reported out the bill, a coalition of eastern, sou-
thern, and California representatives combined to defeat the 
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project for Colorado in the House. Since 
the issues were essentially the same, this was generally 
interpreted as a test vote for the Echo Park reclamationists. 
18nepartraent of Interior, Hearings on Dinosaur National 
Nonument (April 3, 1950), 375-87; House Subc. on Colorado 
Project (1954), 794-99, 824-30; Devoto, "And Fractions Drive 
Me Nad," Harter's, 209 (Sept. 1954), 11; May 13, 1954, Ralph 
Tudor to lJil iam H. Harrison, Central Files, OF-155-1, Box 
838, Eisenhower Library; Sirotkin and Stratton, Echo Park, 
28-30. 
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Actually, the Department of Interior and Bureau of the Budget 
regretted ever having approved the Fryingpan Project in the 
first place and now wanted it to die in the House. Charles 
Willis correctly foresaw that "the long-range political prob-
lems of sponsoring such a piece of legislation might be much 
more severe" than allowing it to be defeated. Sherman Adams 
agreed. Nevertheless, the defeat of the Fryingpan-Arkansas 
bill sent tremors up the spines of the supporters of the Upper 
Colorado Project. The Denver ~' for instance, accused the 
Republican leadership of allowing the Fryingpan-Arkansas Pro-
ject to die and inferred that the leadership had also destroyed 
any chance that the Upper Colorado .Proje.ct would be passed. 
Senator Wallace F. Bennett complained to Eisenhower that the 
Post editorial uindicates the extent to which our opponents 
are prepared to go to turn it against us even though in this 
case the [Fryingpan-Arkansas] bill was actually killed by the 
Democrats in the House." When he requested a "top-level 
statement" reaffirming the Administration's support of the 
Upper Colorado Project, Eisenhower complied. In a letter to 
Bennett, the President announced his continued support of 
the Upper Colorado Project. At the urging of Senator Watkins, 
who had recently overseen the senatorial censure of McCarthy 
for the President, the Upper Colorado Project was included 
in the Budget message. The ?reject was also endorsed in his 
State of the Union message. 19 
l983rd Cong., 2d Sess., House Report 1943 (1954); Memo, 
July 23, 1954, Charles F. Willis, Jr., to Adams; Memo, undated, 
Adams to Willis, in Central Files, OF-155-K, Box 841, Eisen-
hower Library; Aug. 5, 1954, Wallace F. Bennett to Eisenhower; 
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Indeed, the Upper Colorado Project ran a gauntlet well 
prepared by the opposition coalition. The Western-dominated 
Subcommittees on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Senate and 
House held hearings on the Upper Colorado Project. Echo Park 
Dam was included in both of their favorable reports. Led by 
Representative John Saylor (R-Pa.) the preservationists made 
the full committee vote in the House so close (13 to 12) that 
the pro-dam advocates were more determined than ever to get 
as good a vote as possible in the Senate. The Senate Interior 
Committee voted overwhelmingly to approve the Project. Never-
theless, not long before the test vote on the Fryingpan-Arkan-
sas Project, Sherman Adams conceded to the governor of Wyoming 
that "at the present time prospects for enactment of this 
legislation [Upper Colorado Project] do not appear bright." 
A.fter the test vote on the Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, the 
Upper Colorado bill was dropped until the next session of 
Congress. 20 
After the Democrats recaptured Congress in the 1954 elec-
tions, the Administration continued to support inclusion of 
Echo Park Dam in the Upper Colorado Project. "Our power policy 
Sept. 15, 1954, Eisenhower to Bennett, Central Files, OF-125-
B, Box 643, Eisenhower Library; Con~ressional Record, 83rd 
Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100 (July 28, 1 54), pt. 5, 12453; Arthur 
V. Watkins, Enourrh Ro e: The Inside Ster of the Censure of 
Senator Joe HcCart His Co lea ues, ••• New Jersey, 1 ), 
-· 20Nash, 'Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven, 1967), 
215; John Oakes, "Conservation: The Echo Park Issue," New York 
Times, June 6, 1954, II, 29; 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., House Re-
port 1774 (1954); New York Times, July 25, 1954, 45; 83rd Cong., 
2d Sess., Senate Report 1983 (1954); July 13, 1954, Adams to 
C. J. Rogers, Central Files, OF-155-A, Box 828, Eisenhower 
Library. 
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has not changed," McKay announced shortly after the elections. 
"We still look with favor on legislation proposing partner-
ship projects that we believe fall within the scope of our 
policy." The Secretary then reiterated his support of the 
Upper Colorado Project. Western Republican and Democratic 
senators banded together in an effort to push the Upper Col-
orado Project through the next session of Congress. For their 
part, the preservationists evinced a disposition to withdraw 
their opposition to the Project, providing Echo Park Dam was 
dropped from the bill. Richard Neuberger, the first Demo-
cratic senator iri the history of Oregon, found himself torn 
between these two positions. In his.campaign to unseat vet-
eran Republican Senator Guy Cordon.in 1954, Neuberger, a 
nationally known conservationist, had largely campaigned on 
the public power issue. He excoriated the Administration for 
its offshore oil, Dixon-Yates, and Hells Canyon decisions. 
Yet, as an outdoorsman and member of the Wilderness Society, 
he also held preservationist sympathies. In the end, however, 
he voted in committee for the Project, while seeking an amen~ 
ment to delete Echo Park Dam. 21 
In the next session of Congress, the bill sailed through 
the Senate Interior Committee with comparative ease. After 
its hearings, the committee rejected an amendment by Ueuberger 
to exclude Echo Park from the Project. Senators Clinton Ander-
son, a disciple of Aldo Leopold, one of the fathers of modern 
21 . New York Times, Dec. 16, 40; Dec. 12, 59; Nov. 18, 
1954, 23; Senate Report 128 (1955}, 33. 
ecology, and Thomas Kuchel of California joined rreuberger. 
The bill then passed out of coI!ll!littee and was approved by 
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the Senate. Once again, however, the fate of the Project was 
determined in the House, where the wilderness crusaders had 
most of their support. After the House subcommittee accepted 
an amendment by Saylor to exclude Echo Park Dam from the bill, 
the bill then passed out of the comnittee. The pro-Echo Park 
Dam reclamationists recognized, as Representative William A. 
Dawson of Utah said, that their plan faced "certain defeat," 
unless Echo Park were deleted. In view of this impasse, in 
August 1955, watkins, .McKay and Dexheimer huddled for a strat-
egy session in Denver. On November 1, the upper basin gover-
nors and congressmen agreed to strike Echo Park Dam from the 
Upper Colorado River Storage Project. Not long afterwards, 
•1 K t"f" d th · · h 22 1 c ay ra J. ie . eir wis es. 
Even with the passing of this storm, the Project faced an 
uncertain course in Congress. There were two remaining ob-
stacles. First, the revised bill provided certain technical 
provisions to which the Bureau of the Budget and John s. Brag-
don, Special Assistant to the President for Public works Plan-
ning, had serious objections. The bill increased the pay-out 
period for power from the normal fifty years to one hundred 
22Nash, American .Mind, 217-18; New York Times, March 30, 
5; June 10, 23; June 15, 31; July 27, 12; Nov. 5, 9; Nov. 30, 
1955, 66; Sen. Subc., Colorado Pro~ect (1955), 5-9; Senate Re-
port 128 (1955); Con§. Record, 84t Cong., 1st Sess., v. 101, 
part 4 (April 30, 19 5), 4866, 4813; Aug. 18, 1955, Bernard M. 
Shanley to Watkins, and Aug. 24, 1955, .Memo for the Record, 
in Central Files, OF-125-B, Box 643, Eisenhower Library. 
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years and another provision stipulated that while the payment 
of excess revenues would go to the states of the upper basin 
it limited their use to prepayment of costs of the projects. 
The Administration was now put in the embarrassing position 
of publicly supporting a bill which, if passed, would require 
the Administration to revise its entire water policy state-
ment. "It might be difficult," Bragdon warned Fred Seaton, 
the new Secretary of Interior, "to veto a bill authorizing a 
development which has been supported by the Administration, 
even though financing arrangements may be objectionable, and 
yet its approval could not but result in a complete reorien-
tation of the rate structures for the existing projects and 
in a breakdown in the requirements for a demonstration of 
financial feasibility for future projects." Moreover, the 
Ad.ministration objected to new units being added to the House 
and Senate bills. Also, the House bill omitted the provision 
that the participating projects should be subject to a reexam-
ination by the Secretary of Interior with the cooperation of 
the Secretary of Agriculture. After the bill passed the House 
and Senate, the conferees acceded to the wishes of the Admini-
stration. 23 
The second obstacle laid in actually securing passage of 
the bill. There was some apprehension over whether Eisenhower 
23Memo, Feb. 24, 1956, Bragdon to Seaton; Feb. 28, 1956, 
Memo for the Record; and March 29, 1956, I!emo for the Record, 
Floyd D. Peterson, in John S. Bragdon Staff Files, Box 11, 
Eisenhower Library; Hemo, March 1, 1956, Rowland Hughes to 
Bryce Harlow, and Memo, March 2, 1956, Homer Gruenther to 
Harlow, in Bryce Harlow Papers, Box 23, Eisenhower Library. 
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would seek another term. The problem was simple: if he chose 
not to seek reelection, many congressmen might vote against 
the Project; otherwise, these congressmen might well cast 
their lot with the President's wishes for obvious political 
reasons. Simply, by the Administration's own estimates, 
there were nd;enough votes to obtain passage of the bill. 
Part of the difficulty was put at the doorstep of the Saint 
Lawrence Seaway states. The states of the upper basin felt 
betrayed because, according to their analysis, they had been 
"mainly responsible'' for passage of the Saint Lawrence Seaway 
legislation. But now the Saint Lawrence states were balking 
in cooperating on the Upper Colorado Project. Thus, Senator 
Denis Chavez (D-N.M.), chairman of the Public Works CoI:lIIlittee, 
assured the Administration that he would delay all requests 
for public works projects, including approval of $125 million 
for channel development in the Great Lakes as part of the 
Saint Lawrence Seaway project. Arthur Watkins argued that a 
state like Ohio was "a tremendous beneficiary of an extensive 
water development program" stimulated by the federal govern-
ment, and, therefore, Ohio now ought to assist the Upper Col-
orado states escape their "crown-colony" status. This was 
not a partisan cause, for some Republicans strongly opposed 
the Project. In the end, however, these obstacles were over-
come, Congress passed the Project, and Eisenhower signed the 
bill. 24 
24Memo, Jan. 26, 1956, Gruenther to Harlow; Memo, Jan. 
27, 1956, Gruenther to Harlow; Watkins, letter to the editor, 
Cincinnati Times-Star, Jan. 31, 1956; and Feb. 20, 1956, 
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The Echo Park controversy had aroused intense feelings 
and at least one casualty was left in its wake. Richard H. 
Pough, chairman of the Department of Conservation and General 
Ecology of the American I'Iuseum of Natural History, had op-
posed construction of Echo Park Dam. In one article, for 
example, he had sharply defined the issue: "Shall we preserve 
our National Parks and Monuments as originally intended for 
the benefit of all, or shall we hand them over one by one to 
powerful special interests?" During the dispute, the Museum 
fired Pough. Opponents of the dam charged that the dismissal 
was a result of Pough's outspoken objections to the dam. Hor-
ace M. Albright, for example, believed the Museum's action was 
a reaction to Pough's stand on Echo Park. Dr. Albert Parr, 
Director of the Museum, called such allegations 0 complete non-
sense. "25 
While Echo Park Dam received most of the national publi-
city, it was not the only wilderness controversy of the decade. 
The preservationists were quite correct, indeed, in contend-
ing that plans were being formulated to attack other recrea-
tional and wilderness areas. As part of its "308" Report, 
the Corps of Engineers put a keen eye on Glacier View in Gla-
cier National Park. The Department of Interior opposed such 
a dam; instead it recommended a dam at Paradise or Clark Fork 
sites. Thus, while the Corps and Interior Department were 
25Richard H. Pough, "Would You Dam Dinosaur National Mon-
ument," Natur<;.l History Magazine, 63 (March 1954), 144; "As 
Dinosaur Goes ••• ," Natural :-J:isto~ Ma~azine, 64 (Feb. 1955), 
60-62; New York Times, l'iay 3, 19 , 2 • 
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able to reach an accord on development of the Columbia River, 
they left developoent of Glacier national Park to the future. 26 
When McKay took office he was confronted with making a 
decision on what to do with Glacier National Park: turn it 
over to the Bureau of Reclamation for a tunnel development 
with Canada or leave it as it was? Conrad Wirth of the Park 
Service opposed even allowing the Bureau of Reclamation to 
conduct reconnaissance surveys and studies in the Park. Fin-
ally, the Department sided with Wirth. With the Echo Park 
controversy so much in the headlines, apparently the decision 
makers at Interior were sensitive to the accusations of the 
preservationists. One Interior official expressed it thus: 
"While it might seem harmless to allow a reconnaissance-type 
survey for the purpose of gathering data, such an action could 
and probably would be interpreted as implying Departmental 
interest in the possibilities of the tunnel project. I do 
not wish that anyone should gain such an impression .• " 
In a similar vein, Olympic National Park, which had figured 
prominently during Franklin Roosevelt's administration, re-
emerged as an issue in the fifties. When Governor Langlie of 
Washington set up the Olympic National Park Review Committee, 
the wilderness advocates interpreted this as the beginning 
of an attack on that park. Noalterations were made here ei-
ther. The opposition to alterations in Echo Park, Glacier 
View, and Olympic National Parks had been effective. 27 -
26r-lcKinley, Uncle Sam, 636-3?, 639-40, 641-42. 
27July 22, 1954, Memo, Wirth to Lewis, and Nov. 3, 1954, 
Clarence Davies to J. Hugo Aronson, Gov. of Montana, in Office 
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The preservationists were not only defenders, however. 
With the cooperation of the Department of Interior, Jackson 
Hole Preserve, located in Wyoming, was made part of the 
national park system. In 1929 the National Park Service had 
secured the Grand Tetons but Jackson Hole remained beyond its 
grasp. The acquisition of Jackson Hole thus became one of 
Horace Albright's lifelong projects. Like the Echo Park dis-
pute, this controversy involved the weighing of national and 
local interests. The local hunters, ranchers, foresters, and 
developers were arrayed against the National Park Service. A 
deciding factor was John D. Rockefeller, Jr., who had pur-
chased the land but was prohibited by local interests from 
donating it to the Federal Government. Nevertheless, in 1943, 
Jackson Hole became a national monument. Fearing loss of 
their grazing rights, the cattle interests had vigorously 
opposed even this. Under the leadership of Wyoming Senators 
Joseph O'Mahoney and Hunt, a reconciliation of views was 
reached. In 1950 all but nine thousand acres of the monument 
were transferred to Grand Teton, National Elk Refuge, and the 
Teton National Forest. When Rockefeller asked the Eisenhower 
ad.ministration to supply matching funds for acquisition of 
privately owned lands in Jackson Hole Preserve, he received 
its full cooperation. " ••• it is our belief," the Bureau o:f 
of the Secretary, Department of the Interior, Central Classi-
:fied Files, no box number, Suitland, Maryland, National Ar-
chives; Riesch, "FDR and Conservation," 319-20; John B. 
Oakes, "Conservation: Debate on National Parklands," New York 
Times, Feb. 17, 1954, II, 25; New York Times, Feb. 21, IV, 8; 
Jan. 24, 1954, IV, 10. 
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the Budget significantly told Sherman Adams, "that funds for 
the acquisition of lands by the National Park Service, either 
on a matching basis, or at full cost to the Government, would 
be used for genuinely worthwhile purposes." The Administra-
tion subsequently asked Congress for a supplemental appropri-
ation for such purposes. 28 
While the preservationists' political clout was impres-
sive, they were not able to obtain passage of a bill estab-
lishing a National Wilderness System during Eisenhower's 
ad.ministration. Representative Saylor and Senators Humphrey, 
Douglas, and Neuberger submitted such bills but they were not 
successful until, in 1964, the Wilderness Act was passed. 
While the preservationists were winning major victories, 
the recreationists were likewise successful in a war of their 
own. Simply, the volume of visitors to the national parks 
had outrun the National Park Service's capacity. An Admini-
stration study in 1954 showed convincingly it was now time 
that progress be stimulated in the area of recreational ac-
tivity. "As our economy grows," the study noted, "our parks 
provide an increasing opportunity for rest, relaxation, and 
inspiration, and the maintenance of human productiveness and 
morale." For example, as the study indicated, paid vacations 
had tripled in the past twenty-five years. And it was also 
28rse, Park Polic~, 491-502; Swain, Albright, 282-84; 
March 31, 1954, Kennet Chorley to Wirth; Memo, April 15, 1954, 
Adams to Dodge; Memo, April 26, 1954, Rowland Hughes to Adams, 
in Central Files, OF-4-Q-3, Box 122, Eisenhower Library; 82nd 
Cong., 2d Sess., House Document 428 (1954); 85th Cong., 2d 
Sess., HR 301·3 (June 18, 1958) and 85th Cong., 2d Sess., S. 
4028 (June 18, 1958). 
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true, as John Bragdon showed, that the number of visitors to 
the national parks continued to increase dramatically; in 
1952, 42,300,000 people had visited the parks and, in 1954, 
47,834,000 had come. The ratio of visitors to the popula-
tion had also increased "at a striking rate," from 1 in 300 
in 1916 to 1 in 3 in 1954. 29 
The idea of increased appropriations for the National 
Park Service received impetus, once again, from John D. Rocke-
feller, Jr., who wrote Eisenhower in late 1953 expressing his 
concern over the future of the national parks. The President 
then asked McKay to look into the matter. The National Recre-
ation Association suggested that the President convene a con-
ference to deal with the nation's recreational problems. The 
Administration decided against holding such a conference, 
however. Of course, the preservationists who had opposed 
Echo Park Dam took the opportunity to note that what was need-
ed was not less but more recreational facilities, along the 
line of Echo Park. While all of these lines of communication 
undoubtedly exerted some influence on the Administration's 
thinking, the political aspect to the equation certainly 
loomed large. There was concern that the Democrats would 
use the inadequacy of national park facilities as an issue 
in the elections of 1956. Michael Kirwin, a member of the 
House Democratic Election Committee, had frankly conveyed his 
party's intentions to Representative John Heselton (R-flass.). 
29 Sept. 9, 1954, John G. Marr to Bragdon, and June 27, 
1955, Bragdon to Joseph S. Davies, in Bragdon Papers, Box 
87, Eisenhower Library. 
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In turn, Adams suggested to McKay that this certainly was "a 
vulnerable point" for the Administration. It seems, therefore, 
that the Administration would be receptive to the idea of 
increased funding for the Park Service.30 
The Park Service struck while the iron remained hot. In 
its study, the National Park Service reviewed the evolution 
of the concept of the national park, the creation of the Park 
Service and its subsequent history. It bleakly reported: 
"Developed and staffed to meet the needs of perhaps 25,000,000 
visitors, the [national park] System is now called upon to 
take care of twice that many." It anticipated that the num-
ber of visitors would be about 80 million by 1966. The Park 
Service then recommended "Mission 66 11--a_plan calling for 
sufficiently updating the national park system by the decade 
ending in 1966. The National Park Service estimated the total 
cost for "Mission 66" at $124,165,600.31 
Subsequently the Administration recommended Mission 66 
30Eisenhower, Mandate, 549-50; Dec. 10, 1953, John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr., to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-4-Q-3, 
Box 122, Eisenhower Library; Feb. 15, 1955, National Recrea-
tional Assn. to Eisenhower; March 18, 1955, Adams to Otto 
Mallery; March 17, 1955, Minnich to Adams, Central Files, 
OF-142-A-5-A, Box 733, Eisenhower Library; Nature Magazine, 
49 (June 1956), 287; Sept. 26, 1955, John Hesselton to Adams; 
Sept. 29, 1955, Adams to McKay, Central Files, OF-4-Q-3, Box 
122, Eisenhower Library. 
31Department of Interior, National Park Service, Mission 
66: To Provide Ade uate Protection and Development of the 
National ?ark S~stem for Human Use Jan. 1 , in OF- -Q-3, 
Central Files,ox 122, Eisenhower Library. Floyd Peterson 
estimated the cost of the Mission 66 program to be $786,545,000 
for the entire ten-year period. The major portion of the in-
crease in park appropriations would go for maintenance and 
operating costs. Memo, Feb. 16, 1956, Peterson to Bragdon, 
Bragdon Papers, Box 60, Eisenhower Library. 
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and Congress passed it. The plan's significance was that the 
National Park Service had now officially emerged from the gov-
ernmental doldrums to which it had been cast during the war 
years. In 1942, as part of the wartime pinch., the Park Ser-
vice's budget had been slashed about fifty percent and its 
permanent staff substantially reduced. Furthermore, the Park 
Service bad been ostracized to Chicago. Politically the Park 
Service was thus in no position to protect its own interests. 
After the war, however, it returned to Washington and, once 
again, began to defend its protectorate from encroachment by 
the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of Engineers, and private 
interests. With Mission 66 the Park Service's budget sky-
rocketed. Finally, the National outdoor Recreation Resour-
ces Review Commission was established in 1958 to study the 
role of the Federal Government in outdoor recreation. Among 
the political members of the Commission were Senators Ander-
son, Neuberger, Barrett and Watkins and Representatives Say-
lor, Pfost, Al Ullman, and John Rhodes.32 
While they had not immediately secured all they had 
wanted, by 1960 the preservationists could at least point to 
signif'icant successes in having defended the integrity of the 
national park system. Also, the National Park Service amply 
demonstrated that it was again a political power to be 
. 32swain, Albright, 292-93, 260; John B. Oakes, New York 
Times, May 2, 1954, II, 28; Feb. 2, 1956, Eisenhower to Ray-
ourn, and Feb. 2, 1956, Eisenhower to Nixon, Central Files, 
OF-4-Q-3, Box 122, Eisenhower Library; Public Law 85-470, 
85th Cong., S. 846 (June 28, 1958); Sept. 28, 1958, Press 
Release, in Central Files, OF-143-I, Box 735, Eisenhower 
Library. 
reckoned with in terms of defending its domain and, when 
possible, in increasing its appropriations. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
BENSON AND PARTNERSHIP 
Although the main struggle confronting it was parity, 
the Department of Agriculture (USDA) also became critically 
involved in partnership politics--so involved, in fact, that 
the futures of two New Deal-created agencies, the Soil Con-
servation Service and the Rural Electrification Administra-
tion were seriously jeopardized. Grazing and timber rights--
always hot items out West--invited controversy for the De-
partment as well. The personality and beliefs of the new 
Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, thus set the 
tempo for the department. 
Benson became Secretary of Agriculture at the President's 
personal insistence. Like Eisenhower, he was deepiy religious 
and steadfastly opposed to the concept of government aid; the 
two men, in fact, equated religion and democracy with an indi-
vidualistic economy. Benson had earned a masters degree in 
agriculture at Utah State Agricultural College. Politically 
he paid his dues to the Taft wing of the Party. In 1952, 
Benson had lent his name to a Citizens for Taft Committee. 
In short, for many, Benson's appointment symbolized a refresh-
ing trend toward restoring free enterprise and dismantling 
the New Deal. Allan B. Kline, President of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, for example, thought the appointment was 
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"top-notch." When the rumor spread that he might retire from 
the Cabinet because of some severe criticism, Representative 
Harris Ellsworth of Oregon exemplified the attitude of the 
Secretary's admirers. "It is our obligation to fight the 
20-year trend toward paternalism, statism and socialism," 
he reminded Benson. "It is not necessarily our obligation to 
win political victories. But if we turn and run after our 
first contact with the enemy we shall have denied our primary 
obligation and deserve political failure." Benson, of course, 
did not resign, and, instead, accepted a central role in the 
drama unfolding over partnership. 1 
Right from the start Benson found himself in a skirmish. 
Shortly after taking office he announced a major departmental 
overhaul, although, he emphasized, it would not entail mas-
sive dismissals, Benson was indirectly critical of his New 
Deal predecessors for allowing the department to swell "into 
a huge bureaucracy of twenty agencies and bureaus ••• " Ac-
cording to his reorganization plan, the department's agencies 
were regrouped into five new categories. Ostensibly the pur-
poses of this reorganization were "to simplify and make effec-
tive the operation of the Department of Agriculture, to plan 
1Eric Goldman, The Crucial Decade--And After America, 
1945-60 (New York, 1960), 242; Kenneth S. Davis, ''A Bigger 
Ifole for Farm Co-ops," New York Times, Jan. 4, 1954, IV; 
Senate, Committee on Agriculture and .Forestry, 83rd Cong., 
1st Sess., On the Anticinated Nomination of Ezra Taft Benson, 
of Idaho to be Secretar of A~riculture (Jan. 15, 1953); 
Eisen ower, Nandate, ; Novem er , 1953, Ellsworth to 
Benson, Central Files, OF-1, Box 1, Eisenhower Library (Ells-
worth's emphasis). 
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the administration of farm programs close to the State and 
local levels, and to adapt the administration of the programs 
of the Department to regional, State, and local conditions." 
Politically, as Benson freely admitted, the reorganization 
constituted an attempt to blunt the Democratic Party's influ-
ence with the farmer. The Agricultural Conservation Program, 
for example, was pulled out of the Production and Marketing 
Administration (PMA) because it had, in Benson's estimation, 
"become ••• almost bigger than the Department itself." He felt 
H1A, with its system of county committeemen, had become graf-
ted onto the Democratic Party. In short, PMA, under Benson's 
reorganization, was eliminated. 2 Some critics, likewise inter-
preted the proposed reorganization as nothing more than a 
subtle attempt to emasculate the Soil Conservation Service 
and the Rural Electrification Administration. 
The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) had been created in 
1935 as an agency designeq. to hel:p j;each farmers· t~e proper 
methods for tilling their soil. Among the enemies it had 
accumulated over the years were the §arm Bureau, Extension 
Service, and agricultural colleges. SCS, a line and "action 
2Public Pa~ers of the Presidents 1953, 122-26; Con~res­
sional Record,3rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), part 4, v.9, 
5652; New York Times, Jan. 23, 1953, l; Benson, Cross Fire: 
The Eight Years with Eisenhower (New York, 1962), 52. Ben-
son's original plan called for organizing the Department of 
Agriculture into these five agencies: (1) Commodity Market-
inf!; and Adjustment; (2) Research, Extension and Land Use; 
(3) Departmental Administration; (4) Agricultural Cred~t; and 
(5) Office of the Solicitor. Benson also added fuel to the 
flames by submitting to Congress a revised version of Truman's 
budget. Benson's budget called for approximately 10% less 
than HST's had. The heaviest cuts were in conservation and 
land use categories. 
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agency," rubbed raw nerves in by-passing state and local agen-
cies in its operations. Instead it operated through its own 
network of Soil Conservation Districts. The Service was dis-
tinguished from its chief rival, the Extension Service, a 
highly decentralized agency acting primarily as a research 
and education program in cooperation with the agricultural 
colleges. In its political struggles SCS had always success-
fully resisted efforts to combine it with other national pro-
grams and agencies. And this was not a partisan issue either. 
In 1950, the Service aided in defeating President Truman's 
reorganization plan for the Department of Agriculture. While 
the following year the Service felt compelled to bow to re-
newed pressure for reogranization, it still retained consider-
'% 
able control over its affairs./ 
In the early years of the Eisenhower Administration, how-
ever, the Soil Conservation Service's back was forced to the 
wall. Under Benson's plan SCS would have been transferred to 
the newly created Research, Extension, and Land Use category--
together with the Extension and Forest Services. \.Jhen he at-
tempted to eliminate seven SCS regional offices and to trans-
fer their functions to state agencies he provoked a fury of 
protest. The Izaak Walton, League and the National Associa-
tion of Soil Conservation Districts charged Benson with 
3For background on SCS, cf. Charles Harden, The Politics 
of Agriculture (1952), Ch. IV; David Cushman Coyle, Conserva-
tion: An Auerican Stor of Conflict and Aecom lishment (New 
Jersey, , 11 - ; Barrow Lyons, Tomorrow s Bir ight: A 
Political and Economic Inter retation of Our Hatural Resources 
New 
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attempting to take soil conservation out of the hands of the 
farmer and instead giving it over to the Farm Bureau Federa-
tion and its ally, the Extension Service. Nevertheless, 
Eisenhower and the Farm Bureau Federation continued to sup-
port the plan.4 
The Soil Conservation Service was saved from apparent 
emasculation through passage of the Watershed and Flood Pre-
vention Act of 1954. The Watershed Act had first been intro-
duced in 1951 and was reintroduced in the following Congress. 
It gradually gained support and was passed. The Act provided 
for strong local initiative and the SCS quickly accommodated 
its watershed program to this dictate. It was clear, as the 
Second Hoover CoI!ll:lission correctly noted, that the Service 
envisioned "a prodigious construction program." In 1955, the 
SCS' appropriation was $7,250,000 and by 1959 it had more than 
tripled. Dam construction thus became the Service's central 
activity, so much so that today it now has a project orienta-
tion similar to the Corps of Engineers.5 
The department's reorganization plan also attacked ano-
ther prominent New Deal bailiwick, the Rural Electrification 
Administration (REA). The REA, created in 1935 as an indepen-
dent agency to revolutionize rural life, was authorized to 
4Benson, Cross Fire, 154-55; John B. Oakes, New York 
Times, Nov. 8, 19~3, II, 29. 
5Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democrac 
(New York, 1966), 225-2 ; ornmission on Organiza ion o e 
Executive Branch of the Government (June, 1955), 785, 780-82. 
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borrow funds fron the Secretary of the Treasury which, in 
turn, were to be loaned to local farmers. The emergence of 
rural electric co-operatives grew apace. By 1953, REA pro-
vided funding both for rural electrification arid telephone 
programs. And the rural electrification program was an ob-
vious success; in 1935 nine out of ten American farms had no 
electricity but by 1950 the ratio had been narrowed to one in 
ten. During the decade of the fifties electrical consumption 
per farm served almost doubled. But REA was not without its 
enemies, for the agency was widely viewed as a powerful poli-
tical instrument of the New Deal. For instance, Congressman 
John V. Beamer (R-Ind.) complained to Sherman Adams in 1953 
that REA had labored against his recent re-election. "How-
ever, under the influence of the men working under Mr. Wick-
ard [the REA Administrator]," he further protested, "it is 
evident that their organization now wants to promote Federal 
ownership of public utilities." The Administration devised 
its own plan to curb REA's influence. 6 
As part of Benson's reorganization plan the REA, previous-
ly an independent agency, was incorporated into the Department 
of Agriculture's newly formed Agricultural Credit Services 
division. This proposal was not entirely new, however. The 
aborted reorganization plan of 1939 and the First Hoover 
6Harold Vatter, The U.S. Economy in the 1950's (New York, 
1963), 174; William Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and 
The New Deal; 1932-1940 (New York, 1963), 157-58; Coyle, Con-
servation, 1 6-67; Jan. 26, 1953, Beamer to Adams, Centrar--
~iles, GF-18-0, Box 332, Eisenhower Library. 
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Co!1rlission had aade a similar recownendation. In 1953, the 
plan for REA caused barely a ripple of criticism as it easily 
sailed through Congress.7 
But Benson opened the flood gates when he decided to 
replace the present REA Administrator, Claude R. Wickard, 
with his own appointee. When Benson approached him about 
resigning his post, though, Wickard at first balked, inform-
ing the Secretary that two years remained in his tenure. 
After some persuasion, however, Wickard, a .former Secretary 
of Agriculture, relented. "He did resign" Benson later said, 
"and I'm glad of it and I think we can improve the administra-
tion." Ancher Nelson, recently elected lieutenant governor 
of Minnesota and long active in the Farm Bureau affairs, was 
appointed to take wickard's place. ~a~ura~~Y ~e~son was in 
accord with the Administration•s·partnership goals.8 
The firing of Wickard aroused the National Rural Elec-
tric Cooperative Association. The Association looked upon 
Wickard's resignation as a portentious sign of the Administra-
tion's true intentions. Even some Republicans, though support-
ing Benson's decision, thought its "timing" had been poor and 
?Benson, Cross Fire, 450; Eisenhower, Mandate, 392; Com-
mission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government, Department of Agriculture, A Report to the Con~ress 
(Feb. 1949); 86th Cong., 1st Sess., House Report 235 (1959 
8Benson, Cross Fire, 108-09; March 16, 1953, Wickard to 
Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-J-2, Box 10, Eisenhower Library; 
New York Times, March 25, 1953, 27; Ancher Nelson, "Eisen-
hower Administration," transcript of a tape recorded interview 
conducted by Ed Edwin (Columbia University, for Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Oral History Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 
Abilene, Kansas, 1971). 
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that it might prove "costly to the friends of the Administra-
tion who are also strong R.E.A. supporters." But the deed 
was done and the fight had begun.9 
The Administration revealed its intention by directly 
attacking REA's loan structure and cutting back the funds 
for adainistering the agency. As early as 1954 the National 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association protested that reduc-
tions in funding for administering the REA program were creat-
ing a backlog in service. The Administration was reluctant 
to increase these funds because, as the President's Council 
of Economic Advisors noted, "90% of U.S. farms have already 
been electrified so that REA's prime purpose would appear to 
be about accomplished." Consistent with the Administration's 
thinking on REA, the Second Hoover Commission recommended that 
REA be reorganized on a "self-supporting basis." Specifically 
the Commission felt REA should be abolished and replaced by 
a new financial corporation which would use private capital 
. 10 
rather than government funding. 
In keeping with these general recommendations the Admini-
stration stirred the ire of REA advocates by refusing to ap-
prove a $60-million loan for a group of Indiana cooperatives 
9clyde T. Ellis, A Giant Step (New York, 1966), 106-0?; 
undated memo, Homer Gruenther to Wilton Persons, Central 
Files, OF-J-2, Box 10, Eisenhower Library. 
10sept. ~O, 1954, J. E. Smith to Eisenhower, Central 
Files, OF-140-A, Box ?25, Eisenhower Library; memo, June 28, 
1954, Council of Economic Advisors, Bragdon Papers, Box 68, 
Eisenhower Library; Commission on the Executive Branch of 
the Government, Lending Agencies, A Report to the Congress 
(March 1955), 75-?6. 
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planning to supply power to a local aluminum company. In-
stead, the Bureau of the Budget and Department of Agriculture 
drafted legislation which would "ultimately" permit the Fed-
eral Government to withdraw from financing REA". In his Annu-
al Budget Message for fiscal 1959, Eisenhower proposed that 
the interest rate at which REA loaned money be increased. 
The Administration maintained that the present rate of 2% 
did not cover the current costs of the program. Besides, 
the President pointed out, "approximately one-half of REA elec-
tric power now goes to rural industrial and nonfarm consumers, 
and in the future these nonfarmer users will account for a 
larger share of the increasing demands. 1111 
REA's friends, however, did not rest idly by. In 1959, 
Senator Hubert Humphrey and Representative Melvin Price intro-
duced bills transferring REA out of the Department of Agri-
culture. The measure was sparked by the general disgruntle-
ment of public power advocates with the Administration's 
partnership policy. The "resignation" of Wickard had been 
only the beginning, in the eyes of the supporters of the bill. 
Although Nelson tenaciously denied it, Clyde Ellis of NRECA 
charged that in 1957 Benson "moved in to usurp the authority 
of the REA Administrator and [to] take over personal control 
of.the agency •••• " Moreover, Joseph Campbell, the Comptroller 
· 
11Memo, Jan. 8, 1958, Maurice Stans to Jack Anderson; 
memo, Feb. 10, 1958, Stans to Sec. of the Treasury; and memo, 
Feb. 11, 1958,. Anderson to Adams, in Central Files, OF-1-J-2, 
Box 10, Eisenhower Library; Eisenhower Public Papers, 1958, 
66-67; Eisenhower, Mandate, 393. 
r 
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General, was accused of attempting to revise the REA law so 
that all rural electrification growth would cease. Ellis, 
not one to miss an analogy, wryly pointed out that formerly 
Campbell had been a commissioner "on the AEC long enough to 
help launch the ill-fated Dixon-Yates scandal." One congress-
man subsequently called .for the Comptroller's resignation. 
Finally, Price summed up the reason prompting his bill: "It 
has since become obvious that the lack of independence on the 
part of the [REA] Administrator in certain areas and particu-
larly in the loan area, could eventually destroy REA., should 
it become subservient to any administration which had not 
created it and might be lacking in enthusiasm for it. 1112 
The Price-Humphrey bill passed Congress and was sent to 
Eisenhower's desk. .A!llong others, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation urged the President to veto the bill. Contending 
that the REA had been "working well and progressing efficiently 
under the existing administrative arrangements," Eisenhower 
did just that. The Senate overrode the veto but the House 
sustained it by only four votes. Hence, the Department of 
Agriculture retained control of REA but that agency's interest 
rates remained unchanged. 13 
12House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government 
Operations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Modif ing Reor anization 
Plan No. II of 1939 and Reor anization ? an Ho. Rura Elec-
rification Adninistra~ion 1 , , lff, 1 ; Aug. 3, 
1958, Rep. LeRoy Anderson to Eisenhower, Central Files, GF-
18-0, Box 332, Eisenhower Library. 
13cong. Rec., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 105, pt. 4 (1959), 
5526; Cong. Rec., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 105, pt. 5 (1959), 
6022-6023, 69.f9'; Cong. Rec., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 105, pt. 
6 (1959), 7207; U.S. Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 
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The Department of Agriculture also found itself in the 
middle of a heated controversy over grazing on Forest Ser-
vice lands. The Forest Service managed 168,000,000 acres of 
land, much of it leased for grazing. In the 1952 election 
the Democratic and Republican parties had adopted differing 
views of how these lands could be best managed. Stevenson 
told a group in Phoenix, Arizona that he was "unalterably 
opposed to turning over control of these lands to private 
interests." In other words, he favored strict management 
and regulation of the lands. The Republican platform, on the 
other hand, pledged itself to the elimination of arbitrary 
bureaucratic practices on these lands. Specifically the GOP 
favored "legislation to define the rights and privileges of 
grazers and other cooperators and usars, to provide protec-
tion of independent judicial review against administrative 
invasions of these rights and privileges, and to protect the 
public against corrupt or monopolistic and bureaucratic fav-
oritism." As the Administ~ation soon discovered, it was no 
easy task fulfilling its platform pledge. 14 
In early 1953, Representativ~ wesley D'Ewart (R-Mont.) 
and Senator Frank Barrett (R-Wyo.) introduced a grazing bill 
admittedly drawn up by the western stockmen. The net effect 
of the bill would have been to grant the prsent grazing per-
mi ttees increased legal property rights on government owned 
Document 25; April 21, 1959, Charles B. Sherman to Eisenhower, 
Central Files, GF-18-0, Box 332, Eisenhower Library. 
14 Coyle, Conservation, 14; New York ~imes, Sept. 13, 
1952, 8. 
r 
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land while decreasing the government's administrative author-
ity. In a speech before the Mid-Century Conference on Re-
sources for the Future, D'Ewart justifi·ed his bill's objec-
tives by arguing that "whenever possible, private responsi-
bility for protection of land is best for this country." The 
private individual, he thought, ought to be permitted owner-
ship of the land. "The people of the fourteen western states, 
where half of the surface is federally controlled," D'Ewart 
explained, "think that they have grown up, that there are 
those among their citizens who are to be trusted to wisely 
operate in the management of these areas in the best public 
interest ••• " Western wool growers and the Farm Bureau Feder-
ation sang from the same hymna1. 1 5 
The Forest Service and all.the conservation organizations 
vehemently objected to the stockfilen's bill. They claimed the 
bill would give the present permittees preferred status, 
would encourage a concentration of permits in the hands of a 
l5Resources for the Future, Mid-Century Conference 
(Washington, D.C., 1953), Sec. 4, 3-5; Wesley A. D'Ewart, 
"Eisenhower Administration Project," transcript of a tape 
recorded interview conducted by Ed Edwin (Columbia University, 
for Dwight D. Eisenhower Oral History Project, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, 1967), 79-81; June 24, 
1953, Frank Barrett to Aiken, Central Files, OF-125-B, Box 
643, Eisenhower Library; Aug. 3, 1953, James Hooper to John 
Davis, no box number, Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service 
Files, Suitland, Maryland. The D'Ewart-Barrett bill would 
have given the present grazing permittees the "privileged 
right" to range resources. The permittees, moreover, would 
have been allowed to transfer their grazing privileges to 
their successors. The permittees would have been required 
to follow the regulations established by the Department of 
Agriculture, based on the advice and recommendations of the 
local advisory boards. Finally, public ranges were to be 
closed to all but the present permit holders, except for the 
purchase of the existing "base property" rights. 
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relatively few operators, and would tie the hands of the gov-
ernment in regulating the land. The bill provided that appeals 
would be subject to formal hearings and that the decisions 
of the Secretary of Agriculture would be subject to court 
review. The Forest Service, on the other hand, felt that the 
ad.ministration of public lands required technical decisions 
based on professional knowledge and, therefore, these deci-
sions would be better left to the discretion of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture than to the courts. The Izaak Walton 
League flatly characterized the D'Ewart bill "a further endea-
vor by the favored few who are blessed with grazing privileges 
on our national forests to obtain legal status and convert 
their privileges to rights. 1116 
The uproar over the bill was sufficient to persuade its 
original sponsors that compromise would be necessary to get 
passage of a grazing bill. In June 1953, Senator Barrett and 
Congressman D'Ewart met with Senator George Aiken, Chairman 
of the Senate Agricultural and Forestry Committee, Forest 
Service officials, and Earl Coke, Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture, to revise the bill. A new grazing bill was 
drawn up. Coke agreed to submit a favorable report to the 
Department of Agriculture on the Hope-Aiken bill and it was 
assumed the Bureau of the Budget also would support this 
16Memo, Hay 18, 1953, Laura lJ. Lokke to McKittrick, Cen-
tral Files, OF-124-G, Box 644, Eisenhower Library; Hearings, 
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture, 83rd 
Cong., 2d Sess., National Forest Grazing Lands (July 14-15, 
1954), 21-22; Aug. 21, 1953, True D. Morse to James Hooper, 
Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service Files, No box number, 
Suitland, .Maryland. 
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compromise measure. 
The new bill provided that the Secretary of Agriculture 
should encourage range improvements. To do this the Secre-
tary would be authorized to conpensate a permittee for what-
ever improvements he made on the land he leased from the 
Forest Service when the permittee lost that land through 
"subsequent governmental action ••• not caused by unlawful 
acts ••• " No permit was to be issued which would entitle a 
new permittee until that prior permittee was compensated by 
either the Federal Government or the new permittee. Also, 
the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to conduct "a 
comprehensive economic study" to determine a method of charg-
ing grazing fees. Finally, the bill provided for a compli-
cated system of appeals in the event a permittee disagreed 
with a decision of the Chief of the Forest Service. The per-
mi ttee, according to the bill, could petition to have the 
Chief's decision reviewed by a three-man advisory board. One 
of the members of the board was to be an employee of the 
Department of Agriculture, but not of the Forest Service; 
the second would be chosen by the permittee; and the third 
was to be selected by the first two. After the hearing, the 
board would make a recommendation to the Secretary of Agri-
culture. If the board's recommendation was not to his liking 
the permittee could petition the Secretary to review the 
entire case de novo. Should this decision still not sit well, 
the permittee was entitled to take his case to the United 
\ 
11, 
I
I j 
~ 
111, 
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States Court of Appeals. 1? 
Hearings were not held on the Hope-Aiken bill until the 
following year, even though the Bureau of the Budget and the 
De.partment of Agriculture lent it support. Senator Aiken 
and the Bureau of the Budget thought it would be better first 
to hold hearings in the West on the general problem of graz-
ing. For the most part the stockmen approved of Hope-Aiken, 
although with some qualifications. The attitude of the Utah 
State Wool Growers Association was typical. The Association 
did not feel the bill offered "sufficient protection to the 
stockmen's rights and privileges," but did consider it a 
ttstep in the right direction." Its main objection was that 
the bill did not provide enough stability for the livestock 
operators.18 
Although the Department of Agriculture officially ap-
proved the Hope-Aiken bill, the Forest Service harbored some 
reservations. The Service wanted the bill extended to include 
all national forests administered by the agriculture depart-
ment, not just those in the fourteen Western states. Also, 
the Service suggested that the Appeals Board be broadened to 
include timber and recreation interests, as well as stockmen. 
Furthermore, the Forest Service pressed for the establishment 
l?HearinGs, U.S. Senate, Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., Administration of the National 
Forests (Jan. 21-22, 1954), 2-4. 
18Memo, June 30, 1953, Dodge to Adams, Central Files, 
OF-125-B, Box 643, Eisenhower Library; Senate, Administra-
tion (1954), 6-9. 
I 
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of multiple-use advisory councils, the members of which should 
have their travel and subsistence expenses paid by the govern-
ment. Finally, the Forest Service felt that if a permittee 
incurred a loss occasioned "by action of an agency other than 
the Department of Agriculture," that agency, not the Forest 
Service, ought to provide the compensation to the stockmen. 
In this way, the Forest Service was attempting to protect it-
self from the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers. 
As one Service official succinctly put it:. "It would be un-
fortunate if the Forest Service had to provide the funds from 
its meager allotments for compensation in such cases." The 
bill introduced by Aiken in January 1954 incorporated all 
~h--e ~~~--es 19 
" c;:, \,; 1.1.Cl.il!:J • 
The revised Hope-Aiken bill received the tacit support 
of the Forest Service and the stockmen. The cattlemen favored 
the bill, despite some concern that it did not go far enough, 
because it offered them more security of tenure. Now, they 
surmised, it would be easier for them to obtain loans for 
range improvements. Moreover, it was felt that the stockmen 
would be more amenable to obligating themselves for long range 
capital improvements on the.range. In the past stockmen had 
been reluctant to make such improvements, lest they lose their 
l9Memo, Nov. 13, 1953, H. E. Marshall to Earl Loveridge; 
memo, Nove. 24, 1953, Behre, for the record; memo, Crafts to 
McArdle; memo, Dec. 28, 1953, Crafts, for the record, in 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service Files, no box num-
ber, Suitland, Maryland; Senate, Administration (1954), 1, 
42-54, 6-9. 
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investments through an arbitrary bureaucratic decision. The 
Hope-Aiken bill, they maintained, now would give them the 
necessary financial security for making these investments. 
"If this bill is written into law," ore analyst argued, "it 
will then be possible for the banks, FHA [Farmers Home Ad-
ministration], and other leaders to make loans for the pur-
pose of range improvements." They did object, however, to 
the provision for a fee study. It was their belief that such 
a study would constitute a threat of increased range fees 
and, therefore, would act as a deterrent to stockmen to make 
investments in range improvements. The American Farm Bureau 
Federation, National Grange, American National Cattlemen's 
Association, and National Wool Grower's Association exerted 
their support on behalf of the bill. 20 
Despite its numerous revisions the conservationists re-
mained adamantly opposed to the bill. Only the National Wild-
life Federation supported the Forest Service after the last 
revisions were made on Hope-Aiken. The conservationists sim-
ply could not see a need for any legislation at all. In fact, 
they contended that the very reason the stockmen wanted a law 
in the first place was precisely because the Forest Service 
performed its duties too well. They, therefore, declared 
that the regulations and administration of the range should 
be left in the palms of the Forest Service. In their estim-
20Memo, May 27, 1955, Sherman Hazeltine to B. P. Atchley; 
July 1, 1955, Harvey Dahl to Jay.Taylor; memo, Feb. 9, 1954, 
C. A. Joy, for the record; Feb. 2, 1954, David H. Jones to 
Benson; in Dept. of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary, no 
box number, National Archives; House, National Forest (1954), 
48, 59, ?8-79, 89-90. 
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ation the core of the grazing problem was not administrative; 
rather, it was, as the Director of the Wilderness Society 
put it, "the condition of the range. The biological law of 
forage growth and maintenance cannot be altered by legisla-
tion." Moreover, the Conservation Society feared that des-
pite its new amendments, the bill would "be a move in the 
direction of establishing vested rights" on the range. The 
conservationists particularly objected to the provision allow-
ing for judicial review of the Secretary of Agriculture's 
decision. How, they asked, can a judge be expected to render 
a more competent or just judgment than an expert in the area 
of range management, such as the Secretary of Agriculture?21 
The Hope-Aiken bill was reported out of the Senate Agri-
cultural and Forestry Committee. The Senate then passed it 
but the bill met a snag in the House Interior Committee. Con-
sequently, when the ·House was considering the agricultural 
bill for 1954, Clinton Anderson presented the Hope-Aiken 
measure again, this time as an amendment to the Senate's ver-
sion of the agricultural bill. The amendment narrowly slid 
out of the Senate but did not escape the House. While the 
21The National wildlife Federation's difference of opin-
ion with the other conservation organizations can be found in 
the Files of the Forest Service. Some of the more signifi-
cant documents are: memo, Sept. 9, 1953, Hugh B. Woodward to 
Charles Callison; Feb. 8, 1954, Woodward to William Voigt, 
Jr.; memo, Sept. 12, 1953, Woodward to Voigt, Jr.; Jan. 18, 
1954, Woodward to Ira Gabrielson, in Dept. of Agriculture, 
Forest Service Files, no box number, Suitland, Maryland; 
Hearings, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Agri-
culture, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., National Forest Grazing Lands 
(Feb. 25-26, 1954), 40-43, 95-100, 73-75, 113-15, 161, 123-25; 
Cong. Rec., 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100, pt. 11 (Aug. 10, 
1954), 13900. 
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House-Senate conferences were deliberating the fate of Ander-
son's amendment, Eisenhower publicly urged the conferees to 
retain the amendment in the final version of the agricultural 
bill. The President's overture came to naught, however, as 
they dropped Anderson's grazing amendment from the agricul-
tural bill. 22 
There were varying interpretations of the significance 
of the failure to achieve passage of the Hope-Aiken bill. 
"The recent scrimmage over [Hope-Aiken]," C. R. Gutermuth of 
the Wildlife Management Institute commented, "represents only 
another encounter in the long 'range feud,' and they will be 
back again in the next Congress." The Forest Service still 
favored legislation along the lines of Hope-Aiken. "The Graz-
ing Bill was a good bill," the .Executive Secretary of the 
American Cattlemen's Association contended. "It should have 
been passed and we resent the fact that we were made the vic-
tims of a very obvious political coup." One thing had to 
be admitted by all the parties to the controversy: the con-
servationists' opposition to this bill, as in the Echo Park 
dispute, ~roved formidable. 23 
While the stockmen may have been unsuccessful in securing 
22 . Senate Report 1042 (March 3, 1954); Con~. Rec., 83rd 
Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100, pt. 11 (Aug. 10, 1954 , 13889-13890, 
13906; Public Paners of the Presidents 19 , 18; New York 
Times, Aug. 14, l • 
23c. R. Guttermuth, "Why the Furor Over the National 
Forest Grazing Bill?" (Mimeographed, Aug. 1954); Nov. 18, 
1954, McArdle to Woodward; and F. E. Mollin to Clifford 
Hope, in Department of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary, 
Central Files, no box number, National Archives. 
l.. 
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passage of the Hope-Aiken bill, they did obtain new grazing 
advantages on land regulated by the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment (BLM). The Bureau, by its own estimation, administered 
142,403,429 acres of grazing land. In 1953, Orme Lewis, 
Assistant Secretary of Interior, established a survey team, 
under the direction of Floyd Hart, President of Timbers Struc-
tures Corporation, to study the organization and operations 
of the Bureau of Land Management. Hart's report concluded 
there was too great a concentration of operations in the 
Washington and regional offices. Thus: "The number of super-
visory and operating personnel should be reduced •••• Operations 
should be decentralized to the field." The report was approved 
by McKay who instructed the Director of the Bureau of Land 
Management to institute its reorganization proposals. The 
end result of this decentralization, however, was to put more 
power and decision-making influence into the willing hands of 
the large local stockmen. Also, the Bureau's range fee sys-
tem, although reformed under the new Director, Edward Wooz-
ley, still remained lower than the Forest Service's and those 
fees charged by private owners of range land. Finally, the 
Bureau and its political sponsors successfully resisted a 
proposal to incorporate the BLM with the Forest Service. The 
conservationists interpreted all of these policies of the 
Bureau as another example of the Administration giving away 
the nation's natural resources. The Administration, on the 
other hand, contended that these policies only represented an 
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attempt to return power to the local communities. 24 
But grazing was not the only land interest the Forest 
Service and Bureau of Land Management shared in common. They 
also regulated timber lands. Early in the Administration 
Congressman Harris Ellsworth sponsored what came to be known 
as the timber transfer bill. The intent of Ellsworth's bill 
was to protect the operations of private owners of timber 
lands displaced by federal projects, such as dam construction. 
The bill permitted private owners whose lands were taken by 
the Federal Government to obtain Federal forest lands as com-
pensation for the loss of their private lands. Ordinarily 
the Federal Government pays cash for the acquisition of such 
private property. According to this bill, however, the trans-
fer of federal forest land to private lumber operations would 
be sanctioned. In this process the Forest Service and the 
Bureau of Land Management would lose control over the selec-
tion of the lands to be exchanged. 25 
The Department of Interior was divided on the Ellsworth 
24Memo, Dec. 18, 1953, Survey Team (Floyd Hart, Chairman) 
to Sec. Lewis, Dept. of Interior, Special Office Files, no 
box number, National Archives; U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau 
of Land Management, Delegation Order 541, April 21, 1954, in 
Federal Register (April 28, 1954), 2473-77; Philip O. Foss, 
Politics and Grass: The Administration of Grazing on the 
Public Domain (New York, 1960), 192-93, 91-92, 96-98; memo, 
March 12, 1953, Persons, for the record, in Gerald Morgan 
Papers, Box 9, Eisenhower Library; March 18, 1953, McCarran 
to Eisenhower, Central Files, Office of the SoligJtor, OF-4-A, 
Box 117, Eisenhower Library; March 11, 1953, Goldwater to 
Adams, Central Files, OF-1, Box 1, Eisenhower Library; McCon-
nell, Private Power, 206-07; Oct. 7, 1955, Morse to Chardoff, 
Dept. of Agriculture, Office -of the Secretary, Correspondence, 
1955, Box 2720, National Archives. 
25 . John B. Oakes, New York Times, March 7, 1954, II, 27. 
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bill. BLM approved it, provided some amendments were made. 
The Bureau wanted a proviso stipulating that the displacing 
agency or project would "pay for the cost involved in losses 
both to federal and private sustained-yield forestry opera-
tions." In this sense the Bureau was attempting to protect 
its own budget. Elmer F. Bennett, the Department's legis-
lative counsel, Otis Beasley, and Administrative Assistant, 
and the Bureau of the Budget argued that BLM's amendment 
should not be included in the bill. "Governmentally-owned 
forest lands," Bennett explained, "are not the property of 
the administering bureaus, but, rather, they are the property 
of the United States." Consequently, when lands are trans-
ferred from forest purposes to reclamation it involves a pol-
icy decision as to.which of the two purposes serves "the 
greater public interest." Thus, the whole question of reim-
bursement, Bennett concluded, became a totally irrelevant 
matter. 26 
The conservationists, the National Park Service and the 
Forest Service becane exercised over the bill. The original 
draft of the bill exempted national parks, national monuments, 
wilderness areas and wildlife refuges from the bill. In a 
revised draft of the bill, however, this stipulation was not-
ably absent. When the Emergency Committee on Natural Resour-
ces heard of this development it began to lobby against the 
bill. The Park Service, of course, demanded the reinsertion 
26 Memo, Nov. 30, 1953, Woozley to Lewis; memo, Dec. 1, 
1953, Bennett to Lewis; and memo, Dec. 11, 1953, Beasley to 
Lewis, in Dept. of Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central 
Files, no box number, National Archives. 
255 
of the clause. The Department of Interior recommended that 
the bill be enacted provided that clause were reinstated. 
These efforts were unsuccessful, as the bill reported out of 
the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee did not 
exempt Park Service timber. 27 
The Forest Service, for its own reasons, opposed enact-
ment of the bill. The Service predicted that the bill would 
result in timber land being removed from multiple-purpose 
and permanent sustained-yield management and that the "econ-
omy of communities dependent on national-forest timber would 
be disrupted and dependent operators would be discriminated 
against. 11 Finally, the Forest Service objected to the fact 
that public timber would be removed from competitive sale to 
the highest bidder; instead, the timber iiwould be transferred 
through mandatory exchange to a single individual." Offi-
cially the Department of Agriculture and the Forest Service 
took a noncommittal position, although the Service expressed 
a willingness to work with Ellsworth and the House Interior 
Committee in developing a solution the Department could sup-
port. 28 
The bill was supported by the National Lumber Manufac-
tures Association which to,ok particular exception to the For-
est Service's arguments. The Assocation pointed out the 
27Memo, June 15, 1953, Lanigan to Solicitor; memo, July 
23, 1953, Tolson to Solicitor; and Jan. 22, 1954, Lewi~ to 
Miller, Dept. of Interior, Central Files, no box number, 
National Archives. 
28Memo, Aug. 27, 1953, Crafts to Hendre; memo, Dec. 28, 
1953, Crafts, for the record', in Dept. of Agriculture, Forest 
Service Files, no box number, Suitland, Maryland. 
r 
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federal government was not alone in practicing sustained-yield. 
''Watershed, wildlife, recreational and other tangible and in-
tangible values arising out of good land management," it said, 
"are as everpresent on private lands as on federal lands." 
The Association also contended that the economies of only a 
few communities would be affected by this legislation, con-
trary to what the Forest Service seemed to imply. Finally, 
the lumberers thought the Forest Service's argument concern-
ing competitive bidding put the shoe on the wrong foot. Ra-
ther: "In the first instance, it is the privately-owned tim-
ber that is renoved from competitive sale by the acquisition-
ing or condemnation activities of the federal government. 1129 
Ellsworth's bill was passed out of committee and came 
to the floor, where it gained ardent support from Representa-
tives Sam Coon of Oregon and Wesley D'Ewart, both staunch 
defenders of partnership. Representatives John Saylor and 
Lee :Metcalf (D-Mont.), both leading opponents of Echo Park 
Dam, led the fight against the bill. The Emergency Committee 
on Natural Resources and the Forest Service won a victory as 
the House, on a motion by Metcalf, recommitted the bill to 
comnittee.30 
The Forest Service's image also was enhanced by a major 
timber land controversy in Oregon. Originally the area in 
29 11 Personal and Confidential," July 16, 1953, Leo Bodine 
to Coke, Dept. of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary, Cen-
tral Files, no box number, National Archives. Cf. also, "Per-
sonal and Confidential," July 28, 1953, E. L. Kurth to Benson, 
same source. 
30 . ( Cong. Rec., 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., v. 100, pt. 2 Feb. 
16-1?, 1954), 1835, 1840, 1936-3?. 
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question had been staked out as a gold claim but not enough 
gold was found to justify large development. Thus, in 1924, 
a physician from Birmingham, Alabama, Herbert McDonald, be-
came interested in these unexploited claims and organized Al 
Sarena, Inc., which obtained the twenty-one old claims and 
filed on two others as well. The twenty-three claims encom-
passed a total area of four hundred acres. But very little 
was done with the claims until, in October 1948, Al Sarena 
applied for patents (clear title) on its claims. If the 
patents were granted the company would have been permitted 
to sell all the products of the land, including the timber. 
The law concerning the granting of such patents specified 
that a miner must prove a valid discovery of minerals and 
must spend $500 developing each of the claims. The company 
paid its fees and, in 1949, the twenty-three claims were put 
on the tax rolls of Jackson County, Oregon. Subsequently, 
some of the taxes were paid. Until this point the case was 
routine but thereafter it became confused in a web of partisan 
and bureaucratic politics.31 
The Al Sarena case assumed significant importance for 
the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management because 
of the increased demand for timber after World War II. For 
example, between 1946 and 1952 the price of timber sold from 
the Oregon and California land jumped from $4 to $25 per 1,000 
board feet. After three investigations the agencies concluded 
31For background cf. William Worden, "Grudge Fight in 
Oregon," Life, 229 (Aug. 4, .1956), 26-27 ff. 
r 
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that the company had not sufficiently demonstrated a discovery 
on fifteen of the claims to warrant granting the patents. 
Moreover, the two agencies contended the company had not done 
enough work on the claims. Consequently the regional offices 
of the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service con-
tested 15 of the 23 Al Sarena claims. The fifteen claims 
were located within the Rogue River National Forest.32 
In 1950 a hearing was conducted before the manager of 
BLM's Portland office to decide the validity of Al Sarena's 
request. When the hearing manager, Pierce Rice, denied a 
company motion for demurer, Al Sarena's counsel left the 
hearing, charging that the manager had violated an oral agree-
ment the company had negotiated with the Solicitor of the 
Department of Interior. Nevertheless, Rice heard the Forest 
Service's evidence, prepared the case, and transmitted it to 
the Director of the Bureau of Land Management. He asked the 
Director to render the original decision in the case since 
he had been accused of being "prejudiced and highhanded." 
The Director, however, returned the record to Pierce with 
instructions for him to make the decision anyway. Pierce 
then decided in favor of the Forest Service. The company 
appealed-this decision but, on April 27, 1951, the assistant 
32Joint Hearings, Special Subcommittee on the Legisla-
tive Oversight Function, 84th Cong., 1st and 2d Sessions, The 
Al Sarena Case (1956), 26-35, 3, 5, 104-05; Marion Clawson, 
The Bureau of Land Management (New York, 1971), 20, 22, 47, 49. Since the Forest Service administers the surface resour-
ces of the national forests and the Bureau of Land Management 
administers the mining laws both departments had an interest 
in these mining claims. 
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director of BIJ1 sustained Pierce's decision. The claimants 
next took their case to the Secretary of Interior, where it 
rested until the new administration took over.33 
When Clarence Davis joined the Department of Interior 
there were 2?8 cases pending, one of which was the Al Sarena 
claim. In March 1953, a meeting arranged by Congressman 
Ellsworth, between Davis, Herbert, McDonald, and his brother, 
took place. The claimants asked Davis for a speedy decision 
because five years had elapsed from when they had originally 
filed for the patents. In that time taxes had accumulated on 
the property and now they were threatened with foreclosure. 
Further, they insisted that the Bureau of Land Management had 
acted in collusion with the Forest Service, thus prejudicing 
the case against them. Congressman Ellsworth concurred in 
their reasoning. After reviewing the record Davis, agreeing 
with the claimants' charges, ordered an independent assay of 
the claims. The new mineral investigation was overseen by 
Richard Appling, a mining engineer for the U.S. Bureau of 
Mines. Appling and D. Ford McCormick, a representative for 
Al Sarena, took sanples from the disputed lands. At McCor-
mick's suggestion, these samples were then sent to the A. W. 
Williams Inspection Company in Alabama. A. w. Williams' anal-
ysis found Al Sarena's claims to be valid. Eyebrows were 
raised when Appling divulged that he had not rechecked the 
reserve samples that had been retained after sending the primary 
33Joi·nt Heari'ngs, Al Sarena (1956) 143 67 3 5 9 11 
' - '' ''' 15-17. 
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ones to Alabama. Indeed, since he had destroyed the reserve 
samples there was now no way to double check the report of 
A. W. Williams Company. Subsequently, without giving the 
Forest Service prior notice, Davis issued a patent to Al 
Sarena for all 23 claims.34 
The Al Sarena case was used by the opponents of the Ad-
ministration to illustrate their more general charge that the 
Department of Interior was giving away the federal govern-
ment's property. Richard Neuberger was a consistent critic 
of the Administration on this score. While an Oregon state 
senator he relentlessly chided Douglas NcKay for generally 
following the wishes of the large timber interests. And after 
his election to the U.S. Senate in 1954, Neuberger employed 
the Al Sarena case to prove this contention. He pointedly 
charged that the "culprit in this [Al Sarena] case is the De-
partment of the Interior." He questioned, for example, the 
Department's use of a private assay made in "far-off Mobile, 
Alabama, to cancel out assays undertaken by the Forest Ser-
vice, by the Bureau of Land Management, and by the Bureau of 
Mines Laboratory in Albany, Oregon." Neuberger emphasized 
that since Davis' decision there had been no mining of miner-
als on the twenty-three cl~ims "but over 2 million board feet 
of lumber had been cut commercially." While Neuberger found 
fault with the Interior Department he had nothing but high 
praise for the Forest Service and Secretary Benson as -
34Joint Hearings, Al Sarena (1956), 530-32, 539-46, 89-90, 
109-25, 124-25, 136-43, 16-15, 419, 35. 
r 
representinG 11 the public interest and welfare" in the Al 
Sarena case.35 
Clarence Davis and Congressman Ellsworth, of course, 
had their side of the story. The Al Sarena case, they 
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argued, was not a matter "of discretion or of political ac-
tion;" rather, it was a legal question. They noted it was 
for this reason, in fact, that the case had been brought 
directly to the Solicitor of the Department of Interior, whose 
decision was final unless the Secretary specifically requested 
to intervene personally. Davis thus made it clear that, con-
trary to the accusations of Neuberger and other critics, :McKay 
had absolutely no part in deciding the case. At any rate, 
Davis and Ellsworth noted that Al Sarena, Inc., had complied 
with the letter of the law by spending the requisite amount of 
money on development of the claims and had proven a valid 
discovery of minerals. Therefore, they surmised, the company 
deserved the patents. Finally, the Solicitor pointed out 
there was "no reference to timber in the minerals law; whether 
there is much, little, or no timber makes no difference what-
ever as a.matter of law. 11 36 
While to Ellsworth and Davis the case may have been sim-
ply a legal matter, it certainly provided fuel for the 1954 
off-year elections in Oregon. The nationally syndicated 
35ueuberger, "Westerner Against the West," New Re~ublic, 
129 (Dec. 7, 1953), 11-12; Con~. Rec., 84th Cong., 2d ess., 
v. 102, pt. 2 (Feb. 6, 1956), 045=46. 
36Joint Hearings, Al Sarena (1956), 51-52, 530, 533, 
546-50. 
r 
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columnist Drew Pearson accused the Administration of hanky-
panky in the case and the Eugene Register Guard ran an exten-
sive five-part series of articles on the matter exonerating 
Ellsworth, Davis, and McKay from any wrongdoing. During the 
campaign Ellsworth even accused the Forest Service of active-
ly working for his de.feat. The Service denied the charge, 
however. The case was also instrtIBlental in Senator Wayne 
Morse's de.feat of Douglas McKay in the 1956 senatorial race 
in Oregon.3? 
Whatever its electoral ramifications, the Al Sarena case 
had the effect of causing the enactment of a new subsurface 
mining law. The American Forestry Association was in the fore-
front proposing such a revision of the law. At its fourth 
Annual Forest Congress in 1953, the Association approved a 
general framework for a national forestry policy. Likewise, 
shortly after the elections of 1954, Secretary McKay, address-
ing the Western Forestry Conference, encouraged conservation-
ists and western foresters to support legislation safeguard-
ing against abuses of the mining laws. Consequently, in Feb-
ruary 1955, the American Forestry Association hosted a meet-
ing of representatives of the Departments of Agriculture and 
Interior and the mining industry to design a revision of the 
old subsurface mining law. Out of this meeting came a bill, 
sponsored by Ellsworth and others, which sought to revise the 
3?Joint Hearings, ·Al Sarena (1956), 55-78; March 6, 1954, 
Ellsworth to Adams, and .March 16, 1954, I1cArdle to Willis, 
in Central Files, OF-134-E, Box 678, Eisenhower Library • 
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mining laws in such a way as to correct abuses arising from 
the filing of mining claims when a claimant's actual inten-
tion is to gain control of the timber, grazing land, and 
water on the land. In short, the bill's intention was to 
encourage legitimate multiple use of subsurface mining 
elaims.38 
The major contestants in the Al Sarena case approved of 
the bill. Both the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Manage-
ment urged its enactment and, although he noticed "one glar-
ing defect," Senator Neuberger also supported the bill. The 
mining interests likewise lined up behind it. Congress passed 
the bill and Eisenhower signed it into law.39 
While they gave the Department of Agriculture high marks 
for its part in the Al Sarena case, conservationists condemned 
Benson's attitude toward REA, SCS, and grazing. As with the 
Federal Power Commission and the Department of Interior, the 
department was viewed as a tool of big business interests. 
This interpretation of the Administration's oil, natural gas, 
public power, grazing and timber policies spilled over into 
the electoral arena, where the citizenry expressed its confir-
mation or rejection of partnership. 
38senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 84th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Multiple Surface Uses of the Public Domain 
(.May 18-19,1955), 128; American Forestry Association, riFirst 
Step Toward Correcting Abuses of the Mining Laws," reprinted 
in Cong. Rec., 84th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 101, pt. 5 (May 10, 
1955), 6003-04; New York Times, Dec. 9, 1954, 50; Henry Clep-
per and Lowell Besley, "Forests" in Callison (ed.), America's 
Natural Resources (New York, 1957). 
39senate Committee on Interior, Multi~le Surface Uses 
(1955), 16-55., 81-82, 108-09; Senate Hepor 554 (1955), 22; 
New York Times, July 24, 1955, 41; Paul Wallace Gates, His-
~g~; of Public Land Law Development (Washington, D.C., I9bB), 
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CONGRESS AND ELECTORAL PARTNERSHIP 
The litmus test of popular acceptability for partnership 
was t~n in the 1954 and 1956 elections. The Pacific North-
west, as correctly recorded by contemporary commentators, 
was the area in which the two sides most clearly stood at 
sword's length. Moreover, while the impress of Presidential 
power is always deeply felt in congressional elections, the 
power of the opposition party should never be underestimated, 
particularly when it controls Congress. All of these poli-
tical factors were freely vented in these elections. 
In 1954, four senate races, in particular, drew attention 
to the partnership controversy. In Oregon, Richard Neuberger, 
a state senator, author, and nationally known conservationist, 
challenged the incumbent, Guy Cordon, an Eisenhower favorite 
and chairman of the crucial Senate Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs. Cordon's importance was shown by the power-
ful support he received during the campaign. In his Newsweek 
column, Raymond Maley endorsed him as one of "the half dozen 
most intelligent, useful, and constructive members" of the 
Senate; Under Secretary Davis stressed Cordon's seniority; 
McKay praised the Senator's efforts to secure passage of the 
McNary and Dales dams; and, indeed, President Eisenhower, in 
dedicating McNary Dam, claimed that responsibility for the 
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dam was due to the tireless labor of "my good friend, Sena-
tor Guy Cordon. 111 
Cordon and Neuberger disagreed specifically on the Tide-
lands Oil, Dixon-Yates, and Hells Canyon issues, in addition 
to the Hope-Aiken grazing and Ellsworth timber bills. Cor-
don had been a strong supporter of the Administration on all 
of these questions. Al Ullman, past president of the Hells 
Canyon Association and now a candidate for Congress, put the 
issue squarely; Cordon, he claimed, had "played power poli-
tics with Hells Canyon dam and must take responsibility for 
lack o:f congressional authorization." Nueberger relentlessly 
pursued this and other conservation arguments. He denoted 
Cordon's partnership as a "giveaway" of natural resources to 
big business--a policy, he contended, that would be the cause 
of major unemployment for the Pacific Northwest unless it 
were stopped irnmediately. To be sure, the AF of L agreed and 
endorsed Neuberger and his fellow Democrats. Cordon, of course, 
answered such charges. Rather than contributing to an employ-
ment crisis, the Senator countered that actually partnership 
would increase employment by stimulating the mechanism of free 
enterprise. The Oregonian accurately described the contest 
as "bitter. 112 
1The Oregonian, Sept. 24, Oct. 6, 1954; Sept. l?, 1954, 
Davis, speech before the Republican Council of Oregon Women, 
Inc., Portland, Oregon, in Department of Interior, Special Of-
fice Files, no box number, National Archives; Meley, "The John 
Day Partnership," Newsweek, 44 (July 26, 1954), 88 and "The 
Quiescent Northwest," Hewsweek, 44 (Aug. 23, 1953), 80. 
2 . ~ ·. 
Cf. The. Oregonian for Sept.-Oct., 1954· The race re-
ceived daily coverage. 
266 
In Wyoming New Dealer Joseph O'Mahoney, whose re-elec-
tion effort had been buried by the Eisenhower landslide of 
1952, staged a successful comback against Congressman William 
Henry Harrison. An especially heated campaign was waged in 
Montana between Representative Wesley D'Ewart, author of the 
original stock.men's grazing bill, and Senator James E. Murray. 
D'Ewart tried to paint Murray's New Dealism with McCarthyite 
brushes. In Idaho, Len Jordan, the state's former Republican 
governor, ran for the Senate against Glen Taylor, the Vice 
Presidential candidate on Henry Wallace's ticket in 1948. 
Except for Jordan, these exponents of partnership went 
down to defeat. In fact Neuberger became the first Democrat 
ever to win a Senate seat in Oregon. Additionally, ·the Penn-
sylvania conservationists, led by Representative John Saylor, 
a Republican, achieved victory. Some pundits even attributed 
the defeat of Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky to the 
unpopularity of the Administration's position on Dixon-Yates. 
Also, Senator Clinton Anderson was re-elected. In short, 
Congress now fell under the dominance of the Democrats, though 
they gained a majority in the Senate only when Wayne I1orse, 
a maverick who had campaigned actively for Neuberger, allied 
with them for organizational purposes. Bernard DeVoto could 
hardly contain his jubilation and Business Week conceded that 
indeed the election results were a setback for the administra-
ti on' s partnership policy. Meley, howeve~r, threw cold water 
on any speculation that the Democratic victory automatically 
decreed partnership dead. Noting that the "conservative wing 
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of the Democratic Party will be stronger than ever," he fore-
cast that the President still would have a working ideologi-
cal majority. While Haley's point was basically correct it 
overlooked that the chairmanships of the powerful Senate Com-
merce and Interior committees would now fall into the hands 
of two New Dealers, Warren Magnuson and James Murray, respec-
tively. Entrenched in these two influential positions the 
opponents of partnership possessed a solid base from which to 
launch their attacks on the Administration during the succeed-
ing years.3 
If the Administration had faced stiff opposition in the 
1954 elections it was even more so in the races two years 
later. Clearly the Administration had its work cut out. "The 
power program of the Administration," Cordon observed in the 
middle of 1955, "has not been accepted by the general public 
because there has been no effective, coordinated effort on 
the part of the Administration to inform the public of its 
programs ••• " The defeated Senator suggested that the Admini-
stration "immediately undertake a real 'selling' program." 
The elections of 1956 were to prove how well his advice had 
been heeded.4 
The platforms of' the two parties widely·diverged on the 
3New York Times, Nov. 5, 1954, 9; DeVoto, "One-Way Part-
nership Derailed," Harner's, 201 (Jan. 1955), 12-14; "Demo-
crats' First Target, 11 Business Week, 1315 (Nov. 13, 1954), 27; 
Moley, "Pattern of Conservatism, 11 Newswee~k, 44 (Nov. 15, 1954), 
124. -
4 Memo, May 26, 1955, Hughes to Adams, Howard Pyle Papers, 
Box 38, Eisenhower Library. 
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issue of natural resources. The Democrats, calling for a 
return to New Deal solutions, characterized the Eisenhower 
partnership policy as a "faithless performance." Conversely, 
the Republicans called attention to their achievements, such 
as Mission 66, the Upper Colorado Storage Project, and devel-
opments in atomic energy. The pronouncements of the two pres-
idential candidates, Adlai Stevenson and Dwight Eisenhower, 
simply mirrored these rivaling contentions. Several censer-
vationists, such as Rachel Carson, John Ise, Lyle Watts, and 
Hugh Bennett, banded together to support Stevenson. As Eisen-
hewer's record on natural resources was widely criticized by 
conservationists, Sherman Adams and Gabriel Hauge asked Hor-
ace M. Albright to publicly endorse the President. Now that 
Echo Park dam was defeated and Mission 66 secured, Albright; 
late in the campaign, commended-Eisenhower on his first term, 
stating that the public land, national park system, wildlife 
refuges and national forests were "better protected than ever 
before." While the presidential contest stimulated some con-
cern over the partnership policy, other world and national 
issues pervaded the race making it difficult to measure what 
influence--if indeed any--the issue of conservation had on 
the election's outcome. In the congressional and senatorial 
races in the Pacific Northwest, however, there was no doubt.5 
From their vantage point on the Senate Interior Committee 
5New York Times, Aug. 16, 13; Aug. 22, 1956, 17; Sept. 
28, 1956, Shirley Allen to Fellow Conservationists; and Nov. 
2, 1956, Albright to Eisenhower, in Central Files, OF-134-B, 
Box 677, Eisenhower Library; Swain, Albright, 302-03. 
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the opponents of partnership now mounted a concerted campaign 
against the Administration in preparation for the 1956 races 
in Oregon, Idaho, and Washington. Murray's interior commit-
tee, in conjunction with the Senate Committee on Public Works, 
for example, passed a resolution condemning the Bureau of the 
Budget's Circular A-47. The crux of the resolution: "The pur-
pose of this Senate resolution is to correct a situation in 
which the executive agencies of the Government are progres-
sively arrogating to themselves land and water resources 
development policymaking functions which properly reside with 
the Congress." Ironically the resolution resembled the same 
anti-bureaucratic arguments the Republicans had used in 1952, 
only this time the cast of characters was reversed. 6 
The spotlight especially was focused on the Oregon sena-
torial race, for here all the political facets of the partner-
ship issue came to a climax. For one thing a script writer 
could not have asked for two more dramatic characters than 
Wayne Morse and Douglas McKay. Morse, the incumbent, was 
anathema to the White House on personal and ideological 
grounds •. As a Republican he had bitterly chastised Eisen-
hower during the 1952 campaign, then he turned Independent, 
and after helping elect Neuberger in 1954, he provided the 
majority vote so the Democrats could organize the Senate. 
Before the 1956 race Morse officially became a Democrat. 
6 . Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., v. 102, pt. 
8 (June.13, 1956), 1015-55; Senate Report 2686 (1956), l; 
Memo, June 15, 1956, Colonel .Meek to Bragdon, in Bragdon 
Papers, Box 69, Eisenhower Library. · 
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Thus, when the governor of Oregon, who had been scheduled to 
run against Morse, suddenly died, Sherman Adams and Leonard 
Hall, Chairman of the Republican national Committee, pre-
vailed upon :McKay to pick up the cudgel. McKay reluctantly 
agreed. Both men shared one characteristic in common--a pen-
chant for blunt outspokenness. But they could not have been 
any different in their views.7 
In 1955, the Democratic-controlled Interior and Public 
Works committees prepared the way for Morse's re-election 
campaign by holding public hearings in Oregon. The ostensi-
ble purpose of these hearings was to investigate the Ad.mini-
stration's timber policy, in general, and the Al Sarena case, 
in particular. The committees' majority report condemned the 
Administration; s timber policy as part of the ngiveaway:: 
philosophy. The Republicans charged, probably correctly, 
that the hearings and report were politically inspired and 
directed specifically toward helping re-elect Morse and de-
feating Congressmen Harris Ellsworth and Sam Coon. 8 
?Adams, Firsthand, 235-36; Eisenhower, Mandate, 550; 
Davis Oral History, 54-55. Not everyone felt l'-lcKay should 
make the race. Benson, for example, feared that McKay would 
lose viability in ~he Oregon primary. Benson, Cross-Fire, 
330. There was a primary but Benson's fears were for naught. 
Cf. Memo, July 6, 1956, Pyle to Adams, Pyle Papers, Box 28, 
Eisenhower Library. The campaign had personal overtones. 
Early in 1953 Morse wrote a letter to a friend expressing his 
misgivings about Eisenhower. "I have," he said, "absolutely 
no confidence in him and I am satisfied that he is lacking in 
all political morality. In my judgment, he is the most dan-
gerous man who will ever have been in the White House." The 
White House never forgave him for this remark after the let-
ter was published. 
8Joint Hearings, Senate, Special Subcommittee on the 
Legislative Oversight Function of the Committee on Interior 
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When McKay resigned from the interior post to announce 
his candidacy, Eisenhower was left in the politically sensi-
tive position of having to appoint a successor. Clarence 
Davis, the acting secretary, had the support of the Republi-
can senators and governors from the West, as well as from 
two influential private organizations, the national Cattle-
men's Association and the National Reclamation Association. 
Howard Pyle, a White House election aide, warned that the 
Oregon race would be "tough ••• at best" and agreed that Davis 
should receive the appointment "at least until the present 
term expires," lest it appear the President was repudiating 
his former Secretary of Interior, McKay.9 Instead, Eisenhower 
chose Fred Seaton, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
and presently a member of the White House staff. It seems 
likely that Davis did not get the appointment because the 
forthcoming Al Sarena report condemned his involvement in the 
case.10 
The two issues that predominated in the campaign were, 
in fact, Al Sarena and public power. McKay proudly defended 
his tenure as Secretary of Interior. For example, regarding 
and Insular Affairs, and House, Subcommittee on Public works 
and Resources of the Government Operations Committee, 84th 
Cong., 1st and 2d Sessions, 2 parts (1955-56); Joint Hear-
ings, Al Sarena (1956), 2, 52-53, 117, 248; House Report 2960 (1956), 13, 29-31; Seymour E. Harris, The Economics of the 
Political Parties (New York, 1962), 30 • 
9The recommendations can be found in Central Files, GF-
17-A, Box 308, Eisenhower Library; and I1emo, May 22, 1956, 
Pyle to Adams, same source. 
10 . 
New York Times, May 30, 1956, 17, 19. 
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Al Sarena, NcKay stated flatly: "They were legitimate mining 
claims by mining people." Morse's tactic was to continually 
attack his opponent's record. He effectively used Hells Can-
yon and Al Sarena as examples of the Administration's "give-
away" policy and contended that Mission 66 saw the light of 
day only because 1956 was an election year. 11 
Oregon's congressional races were also injected with the 
partnership debate. While Harris Ellsworth had won re-elec-
tion by a comfortable margin in 1954 his percentage had de-
clined drastically from 66.3% in 1952 to 55.9%. Ellsworth 
was, as one White House insider noted, "marked for destruc-
tion in 1956 ••• " Representative Sa.I:l Coon .found himself in 
a similar predicament. Two years previous he had won with 
52.6%, a decline of approximately 6% from his 1952 perform-
ance. It was felt, nevertheless, that he was not in any 
serious trouble. Howard Pyle, sent by the President to size 
up the political prospects in the Pacific Northwest, reported 
in March 1955 that the Administration must do a better job of 
selling itself, a message Cordon also conveyed. Toward that 
end Coon and Heuberger publicly debated the merits and criti-
cisms of partnership ten times during October and September, 
1955.12 
11speech, May 8, 1956, McKay, in Pyle Papers, Box 16, 
Eisenhower Library; The Oregonian, Sept. 6, 14, and 16, 1956. 
12Memo, March 19, 1956, Pyle, "The Situation in Oregon," 
Pyle Papers, Box 38, Eisenhower Library; Con~ressman Sam Coon 
vs. Senator Richard Neuberger (Oregon, 1955), in Elmer F. 
Bennett ?apers, Box 12, Eisenhower Libra.ry. 
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In Washington an equally inportant senatorial race loomed 
large on the partnership horizon. Senator Warren Magnuson, 
Chairman of the Commerce Committee, was challenged by popular 
three-term governor, Arthur Langlie. Langlie was reluctant 
to make the race but it was felt he was the only Republican 
with a chance of winning the seat.13 Magnuson, like Morse, 
had consistently opposed partnership and had the full backing 
of organized labor. Langlie had been especially outspoken 
in his defense of the Administration's decisions on Hells 
Canyon, Tidelands Oil and natural gas. 
In Idaho the senatorial situation was somewhat different. 
Here thirty-two year old Democrat Frank Church challenged a 
Republican incumbent, Herman Welker. The Republicans also 
decided to take aim on Representative Gracie Pfost. And 
Hells Canyon was predicted to be one of the poignant issues. 
In fact Howard Pyle recommended that the Federal Power Com-
mission should be urged to release its decision on Helis Can-
yon "as soon as possible." He reasoned that delay only aggra-
vated the political situation but that if the decision favored 
the Idaho Power Company "the work on the dams could be well 
underway previous to the 1956 election. 1114 
The Montana senatorial race, once again, revolved around 
the partnership issue. This time Wesley D'Ewart squared off 
l3Nemo, March 30, 1956, Pyle, "The Situation in Washing-
ton," .P;y~le Papers, Box 38, Eisenhower Library; Moley, "Wash-
ington Turns Right," Newsweek, 48 (July 30, 1956), 88.-
14 Memo, April 4, 1955, Pyle, "The Situation in Idaho," 
Pyle Papers, Box 38, Eisenhower Library. 
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against I'like Mansfield. After his unsuccessful bid in 1954, 
D'Ewart ran into still another roadblock. When Orme Lewis 
resigned as Assistant Secretary of Interior, Eisenhower nom-
inated D'Ewart to become the replacement. The nomination 
never got past the Senate Interior Committee, however. Sen-
ator James Murray, chairman of that committee, made it clear 
he still harbored a personal grudge over D'Ewart's smear tac-
tics in the recent race. Consequently he stepped aside and 
let Senator Anderson chair the hearing. Nevertheless the 
cards were stacked against the nominee; Neuberger, O'Mahoney, 
Henry Jackson and Anderson vigorously cross-examined D'Ewart 
about his political philosophy and campaign techniques. The 
Citizens Committee on Natural Resources joined this chorus of 
criticism. Subsequently the committee turned thumbs down on 
D'Ewart•s nomination. Sherman Adams then convinced him to 
run against Mansfield and Charles Willis, a White House aide, 
pledged he would receive "all the support" the Administration 
could give him. 15 
The results of the congressional races indicated an over-
whelming rejection of partnership, even though Eisenhower swept 
the presidential election. In Oregon the rejection was most 
obvious. Representatives Coon and Ellsworth were defeated 
15n'Ewart Oral History, 14, 121-29; Memo, Feb. 17, 1954, 
Willis to Adams, Central Files, OF-138-A-4, Box 700, Eisen-
hower Library; Senate, Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess., Nomination of Wesle A. D'Ewart to be 
Assistant Secretar of the Interior July 11 and 13, 19 , 
1- , , .?l, 5; Robert Griffi h, 'i' e Poli tics of Fear (Uni-. 
varsity Press· of Kentucky, 1970), 224-25. 
r 
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and Morse narrowly beat McKay. In the election postmortems 
it was variously conceded that McKay's downfall could be 
attributed to the negativism of his campaign and, by contrast, 
to the professionalism of Morse's campaign. Also, part of 
the blame was given to the vagueness of the partnership pol-
icy itself. One anonymous Administration source put it suc-
cinctly: "The partnership policy has never been adequately 
explained nor properly implemented since its inception in 
1952." In other important races Church won in Idaho, Mag-
nuson in Washington, and Mansfield in Montana. Gracie "Hells 
Belle" Pfost retained her seat in the House. The Democrats 
won the gubernatorial seats in Washington, Oregon and Idaho 
as well. All in all these victories strengthened the hand 
of the opponents of partnership in congress, especially in 
the Senate where the Jerome Kuykendall and Lewis Strauss 
nominations required advice and consent. 16 
Early in the new session of Congress Eisenhower nomi-
nated Jerome Kuykendall for another term as FPC Chairman. 
The Commission's activities became a target of investigation 
for congressional opponents of partnership. In an inquiry 
into the operation of the regulatory agencies, the House Sub-
16For more information on the Senate and House races see 
Richard Austin Smith, "Five Hot Senate Races," Fortune, 54 
(Oct. 1956), 1?2ff; Ernest K. Lindley, "Politics Be 1Damned,'" 
Newsweek, 48 (Oct. 15, 1956), 52. For the Administration's 
postmortem estimation see Memo, Dec. 17, 1956, anonymous, "In 
Re Water Resources and Partnership," in G·erald Morgan Papers, 
Box 30; "Post Election Survey, 4th Congressional District, Ore-
gon, December 1956;" Nov. 14, 1956, Robert Short to Charles 
I·Iasterow; I-lemo, Dec. 3, 1956, "Survey of Oregon: Condensed Re-
port, Nov.-Dec. 1956;" Memo, Dec. 6, 1956, Paul F. Ewing to 
Seaton, in Pyle Papers, Boxes 42-43. 
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committee on Small Business, for example, scrutinized Kuyken-
dall's past political associations in the State of Washing-
ton and his involvement in the Hells Canyon and Dixon-Yates 
controversies. In its scathing report, the subcommittee 
concluded that the FPC, among other regulatory agencies, was 
no longer an independent body; rather, it surmised, the Com-
mission was subjected to so much outside influence that it 
was now nothing more than an adjunct of the Executive Branch, 
particularly the Bureau of the Budget. 17 
The nomination was routed to the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee, where Kuykendall could expect a tough time. For one 
thing, :Magnuson, the chairman of the ·committee, had just de-
feated Kuykendall's political mentor, Arthur Langlie. Also, 
several Democratic senators from the Pacific Northwest were 
irked by Eisenhower's recent refusal to meet with them to 
discuss the Hells Canyon case. Thus Kuykendall received the 
blunt edge of their criticism for his participation in the 
Hells Canyon, natural gas and Dixon-Yates decisions. Sena-
tor Neuberger, for instance, castigated Kuykendall for permit-
ting "the FPC to be used as the tool of a political decision" 
which had "wholly destroyed a painstaking, detailed, integra-
ted, comprehensive plan for the Nation's second largest river 
basin [the Snake River], proposed by thorough and objective 
l7House, Subcommittee No. 1 of the Select Committee on 
Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., The Organization and 
Procedures of the Federal Re ulator Cor:l.CTissions and A encies 
and ?heir Zffect on Srna 1 Business 1 ; House 
Report 2967 (1956), 42, 72-81. 
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engineering studies of the United States Army Corps of Engin-
eers and the United States Bureau of Reclamation." Further-
more, Neuberger pointed out that McKay had been "retired from 
public life" and that other public power advocates had de-
feated partnership senators in the Pacific Northwest. These 
victories, he concluded, signified that the citizenry wanted 
the Federal Government to develop the Hells Canyon site. 
Newly elected Congressman Ullman and the National Hells Can-
yon Association also opposed Kuykendall's nomination--just 
as they originally had in 1953. The Washington Public Util-
ity District Association, the National Farmers Union, and, 
of course, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
expressed dissatisfaction with Kuykendall's handling of FPC 
affairs. 18 
Kuykendall's propriety in executing the Administration's 
desires on natural gas legislation was also put under a criti-
cal magnifying glass. After Eisenhower vetoed the Harris-Ful-
bright bill, the FPO Chairman had been instructed by Gerald 
Morgan, a presidential legal advisor, to begin drafting a 
new bill. In pursuing this objective Kuykendall met secretly 
with representatives of southern gas producers and northern 
gas distributors in an attempt to reach a compromise between 
them. When nationally syndicated columnist Drew Pearson made 
18senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
84th Cong., 1st Sess., Nomination of Jeror:ie K. Kuykendall, of 
Washin ton to be a Me:r::tber of the ?ederal ..:?ower Coomission for 
the Ex irinr- June 1. ointcrent 
-15, 45-4 ' 1 o. 
r 
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this disclosure public Kuykendall was called on the carpet 
by his congressional enemies. Congressman Torbert Macdonald 
(D-Mass.), a member of the House Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee which was then considering revised natural 
gas legislation, led the charge. Macdonald accused Kuyken-
dall of betraying his oath of office because consumer inter-
ests had not been represented at the secret meeting. In short, 
the Chairman's opponents questioned how he could claim to be 
impartial when he consulted only industry leaders to the ex-
clusion of consumer representatives. 19 
In a lengthy statement to the Commerce Committee Kuyken-
dall defended his conduct in Hells Canyon, Dixon-Yates and 
formulation of natural gas legislation. He denied the deci-
sion favoring the Idaho Power Company had been the result of 
his own predisposition or pressure from the White House. His 
former association with Langlie, Kuykendall said, was not a 
factor in that decision. The Chairman's critics had pointed 
out that the FPC had ignored the adverse report of the Com-
mission's Bureau of Law when it recommended approval of the 
Dixon-Yates contract. To put it mildly, was this not a rather 
significant oversight, they asked? Kuykendall explained that 
the AEC had asked the FPC only for its recommendations on the 
19senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
Nomination of Kutkendall (1957), 41-42, 52ff., 88-104. Senator 
Morse put the ma ter squarely: "The issue is the propriety of 
the head of a regulatory agency to sit down, in secret, with 
the representatives of an industry subject to his agency's jurisdiction and work out proposed legislation without making 
the fact known when the result is formulated into a legisla-
tive recor:lillendation and without notice and opportunity for 
other groups with a vital interest to confer on the same terms." 
~·' 36-3?. 
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contract's power provisions--not for legal advice. The AEC, 
he added, "had the assistance of the Attorney General and 
their own lawyers." Finally, Kuykendall defended his meeting 
with representatives of the gas industry. His participation, 
he lamely explained, "was to endeavor to frame a bill which 
met the requirements of the President's veto message ••• " It 
should be recalled, he noted, that the President had objected 
to "arrogant lobbyists," not to the bill itself. Also, since 
consumer interests would countenance no change in the law 
there was no reason, in his estimation, to consult them. 
Although Magnuson succeeded in holding up confirmation for 
about five months, Kuykendall finally received senatorial 
approval. Even though that trout had gotten away the public 
power senators caught a much larger fish later. 20 
In one of the most bitterly fought confirmation proceed-
ings, the Senate rejected the nomination of Lewis Strauss 
for Secretary of Commerce. In October 1958, Sinclair Weeks 
resigned as Secretary of Commerce. Senator Clinton Anderson 
had made it clear that Strauss probably would not be con-
firmed by the Senate if he were renominated to the AEC. In-
stead, then, the President appointed Strauss to fill the com-
merce vacancy. The following year the Senate took up the 
nomination. 21 
20senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
Nomination of Kuykendall (1957), 172-74, 186-99, 202-20; Con-
~ressional ~ecord, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., v. 103, part II-
Aug. 15, 1957), 14886-87; New York Times, July 26, 1957, 38. 
21
oct. 28, 1958, Weeks to Eisenhower, Central Files, OF-
2, Box 14, Eisenhower Library; Benson, Cross-Fire, 457-58; 
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There certainly was no doubting that Strauss was walking 
headlong into a lion's den, for his nomination was sent to 
Magnuson's Commerce Committee. Strauss' brusk demeanor had 
personally piqued many senators and his participation in the 
Oppenheimer case had earned him the antipathy of a good number 
of prominent scientists. But the Dixon-Yates controversy pro-
vided the political catalyst; in fact, his enemies cited 
Strauss• role here as documentary evidence of his utter con-
tempt for Congress itself. Strauss, it was alleged, had 
failed to keep the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic 
Energy "fully and currently informed," as Section 202 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 had demanded. This point was 
stressed at great length by Strauss' longtime nemesis, Clin-
ton Anderson, whom the committee allowed the senatorial cour-
tesy of participating in the hearings as an interrogator. The 
attack on Strauss was not entirely partisan, for Senator wil-
liam Langer, a New Deal Republican, described the secretary 
designate as "one of the chief conspirators" in a scheme to 
wreck TVA and REA. Perhaps the case against Strauss was best 
articulated by Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.). Basically 
McCarthy argued that cabinet officers had become "much more 
than advisors to the President, and much more than simple 
administrators of clearly stated laws of limited application." 
Since· these public officials were delegated "discretionary 
authority" by both the Congress and the President, they exer-
cise executiv~ and legislative powers. In sum: "It is ••• 
vitally important that the men in charge of these high offices 
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be responsive to the will of the Congress as well as to the 
will and interest of the President, as they interpret and 
apply the law ••• " McCarthy predicted, therefore, that a 
vote for Strauss "could be fairly interpreted" as an approval 
of "unwarranted extension of executive secrecy and the inde-
pendence of the Executive Branch in determination of policy 
and the administration of laws passed by Congress." Both 
Fortune and the New Eepublic commented that, correctly or 
incorrectly, Strauss was being boiled in this political water 
because Congress felt the encroachment of the Executive Branch 
on its prerogatives had gone too far. Hence, Strauss had be-
come a symbol of excessive presidential authority. 22 
In his own behalf Strauss argued that he had always com-
plied with the law. The JCAE, he contended, had been kept 
informed and no information necessary for its proper function-
ing had ever been kept from it. Three members of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, Democrat Pastore and Republicans 
Bricker and Hickenlooper, confirmed Strauss' defense. Citing 
the importance of maintaining the President's prestige in the 
world, Albert Gore, one of the nominee's more consistent 
Senate, Hearings, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, Hearings on the Nomination of Lewis L. Strauss to be 
Secretary of Commerce (1959), 50?. 
22Francis Rourke, "Administrative Secrecy: A Congressional 
Dilemma," American Political Review, 54 (Sept., 1960), 684-85; 
Rosenthal and Green, Government of the Atom, 94; Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Nomination of Strauss (1959), 
365-66, 429-45, 492-97, 508-10, 712-24, 782-83; New York 
Times, May 29, 48; 21, 1959, 4; "Why Thresh Old Straws?" New 
Republic, 140. (May 11, 1959), 4-5; "Editorial I~otes," Fortillie, 
59 (June 1959), 96. 
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critics, announced his intention to vote for confirmation. 
Describing his old friend as ''un-poli tical," Herbert Hoover 
expressed support for Strauss. And from the scientific com-
munity Dr. Edward Teller added an influential voice to 
Strauss' case. 23 
As a harbinger of future trouble, the Commerce Committee 
passed the nomination by only a single vote. Three Democrats 
had voted with the committee's six Republicans to make the 
majority. Eisenhower publicly pledged to use all the influ-
ence at his disposal to get full Senate approval. Neverthe-
less, by a vote of 49 to 46 the Senate dramatically rejected 
Strauss. Indeed, Senator Anderson and the other opponents of 
partnership had won a very large victory. 24 
The Adilli11istration was ilot completely routed, however, 
for one of its prime objectives, limiting the influence of 
TVA, was accomplished. Since the Authority had received no 
appropriations from Congress, a new plan to finance TVA had 
to be devised. One thing was certain: the Administration 
wanted to get the Federal Government out of TVA's business. 
In April 195?, Walter von Tresckow suggested that TVA under-
take its own financing through the sale of revenue bonds. 
23senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
Nomination of Strauss (1959), 636-37, 711, 775, 576-83, 584-
629; New York Times, Hay 24, 33; and May 16, 1959, 28;,May 9, 
1959, Hoover to Magnuson, Central Files, OF-2, Box 14, Eisen-
hower Library. 
24
science, 129 (June 5, 1959), 1533-34; Congressional 
Record, 86th ~ong., 1st Sess. (June 5, 1959), 99 2-87; New 
York Times, June 18, 1959, 14. 
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Although this idea was not entirely new, it held a certain 
appeal for Percival Brundage, Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget. If TVA financed itself through the issuance of rev-
enue bonds, Brundage thought it would allow the Federal Gov-
ernment to reduce its own investment in the Authority to a 
more manageable size. But when Senator Robert Kerr introduced 
legislation partially designed to accomplish this purpose, the 
Administration raised some objections. Fundamentally the 
Bureau of the Budget feared that Kerr's bill would give TVA 
"a blank check" in the issuance of revenue bonds and in the 
use of power revenues for plant expansion--the very aims that 
were absolutely contrary to the dictates of partnership. Among 
other terms, the Administration proposed that the TVA power 
service area be "specifically and precisely" limited and that 
the use of power revenues for expansion of power facilities 
be made subject to the approval of Congress in connection 
with the President's budget recommendations. In other words, 
the Administration desired to retain control over TVA's bud-
get while the Fe.deral Government no longer financed it. 25 
In 1959, the Administration succeeded in getting its 
plan approved, though not without some diff~lty. The Kerr 
bill was resurrected, once.again, and amassed sufficient 
stre~gth to pass Congress. While this bill provided for 
25April 22, 1957, von Tresckow to Adams; Memo, April 
30, 1957, Brundage to Adams; July 1, 1957, Robert Merr~am to 
Jack Martin, in Central Files, OF-51, Box 235, Eisenhower 
Library; I1ay 27, 1955, Vogel to Sen. Chavez, Bryce Harlow 
Papers, Box 23, Eisenhower Library. 
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containment of TVA expansion, the Bureau of the Budget and 
some members of Congress still objected. "When they [TVA] 
get this bondraising authority, they will be ready to expand 
TVA all over the South," Congressman Scherer of Ohio warned. 
"The illusory fence placed around TVA's service area in this 
bill will fold like a stack of cards." The President, for 
his part, felt that enactcent of the bill would constitute 
an erosion of Presidential power. Consequently, Eisenhower 
balked at signing the bill until Congress agreed to an amend-
ment providing for Executive review of TVA's construction 
program. To do otherwise, the President pointed out, "could 
result in budgetary chaos." After the TVA Board--the members 
of which had been appointed by Eisenhower--and the congres-
sional leadership assured the President they had no obj~ctions 
to such an amendment, Eisenhower signed the bill. The partner-
ship policy toward TVA had not been entirely successful but 
with passage of the TVA Revenue Bond Act the Authority was 
now financially independent but still accountable to Congress 
and the President. Thus, the Administration accomplished one 
~ important objective: the Authority was limited in the area to 
which it could expand. 26 
It should also be recalled that the Administration and 
26wildavsky, "TVA and Power Politics," American Politi-
cal Science Review, 55 (Sept., 1961), 588-90; July 23, 1959, 
Eisenhower to Case; July 28, 1959, Scherer to Eisenhower; 
Aug. 6, 1959, Press Release; Aug. 14, 1959, TVA Board to 
Eisenhower; Aug. 14, 1959, Eisenhower to Vogel; Aug. 20, 
1959, Vogel to Eisenhower, in Central Files, OF-51, Box 236, 
Eisenhower Library. 
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its enemies stood each other off concerning the future of 
REAo The Humphrey-Price bill (1959), taking REA out of the 
Department of Agriculture, passed Congress and was vetoed. 
The Senate overrode the veto but the House barely did not. 
The TVA Revenue Bond Act and, to a lesser extent, the failure 
to override the REA veto simply confirmed, as Moley had pre-
dicted earlier, that the Dixicrat-Republican alliance provided 
the President with a working ideological majority. 
CHAPrER X 
CONCLUSIONS AND SOI1E PERSPECTIVES 
While the implementation of the policy of partnership 
was only partially successful, the debate it engendered gave 
the guise of grappling with the fundamental issues of modern 
industrial America. And, indeed, in some respects it did; in 
many other ways, though, both the conservationists and part-
nership exponents were confronting much older issues. The 
politics of partnership thus must be set in a wider perspec-
\"'-. 
tive. 
Simply put, the philosophy of partnership attempted to 
shrink the role of the Federal Government and, accordingly, 
to restore free enterprise to its once preeminent place in 
American life. As one high Administration official capsul-
ized: "I shall like to remind you that this [New Deal-Fair 
Deal] philosophy is not new, that it is bottomed upon the 
Government control of all natural resources, water, land, and 
energy, and that that program is the heart of the program of 
State Socialism."1 Politically, it consisted of a coalition 
of Republicans and Dixicrats; as long as the Southern Demo-
crats stuck with Eisenhower, as in the offshore oil, Hells 
Canyon, TVA Revenue Bond, and natural gas legislation, 
1speech, April 25, 1955, Clarence Davis before Idaho· 
State Reclamation Association, Idaho Falls, Idaho, Department 
of Interior, Special Office Files, no box number, National 
Archives. 
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partnership was victorious. But partnership was only a brick 
in a much larger Administration edifice. 'Jhile there might 
have been disagreements on certain specifics, by 1952, both 
political parties had arrived at a basic consensus on a for-
eign policy of rigid anti-communism. Actually the widest 
political differences arose over domestic policy. Partner-
ship was, in effect, the reverse side of the Republican Par-
ty's foreign policy. For according to this weltanschauung, 
the New Deal had given birth to an invidious creed--direct 
\ 
governmental intervention in the economy. TVA, REA, and SCS, \ 
for example, were equated with an evil vaguely described as 
"creeping socialism." Thus being associated with the New 
Deal was tantamount, in theeyes of the apostles of partner-
ship, to lean.ing toward accepting coiilliiunisill on both domestic 
and foreign levels. Yalta and TVA were only opposite sides 
of the same coin. 
Eisenhower was only partially successful in implementing 
his policy. Offshore oil, Hells Canyon and the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 were unequivocal successes while deregulation of 
natural gas certainly would have been except for the Case 
affair and subsequently the questionable involvement of the 
Chairman of the Federal Power Commission in a secret meeting 
with industry leaders. The Administration also met certain 
failure on the Echo Park, Dixon-Yates and grazing issues. 
Moreover, other than reorganizing the RE.A, the bureaucracy 
successfully ~esisted administrative change, just as it al-
ways had in the past; the Corps of Engineers, Forest Service, 
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and Bureau of Land Management all remained exactly where 
they had been at Eisenhower's first inauguration. One thing 
was certain, however; without question, the Eisenhower 
Administration took a more active interest in the development 
of natural resources than past histories of the decade have 
indicated. 
The politics of partnership highlighted one of the funda-
mental dilemmas of the twentieth century--the growing inter-
relationship between the Federal Government and the business 
community. Federal regulation and management of natural re-
sources was of utmost concern to the business community. The 
Federal Power Commission, Atomic Energy Commission, and the 
TVA Board were all staffed with advocates of partnership. In 
the Hells Canyon, natural gas, and Dixon-Yates questions the 
Federal Power Commission unswervingly hewed to the White House 
line; the activities of the AEC in Dixon-Yates and the TVA 
Board in the Revenue Bond Act of 1959 were likewise pro-Admini-
stration. 2 The direct tie between the White House and the 
commissions clearly unveiled the shortcomings of the regula-
tory system instituted by the progressives and New Dealers. 
To wit: to what extent, one may legitimately ask, is it con-
ceivable for regulatory commissions to perform their duties 
trl.lly independent of pressure from the executive branch of 
20f course the regulatory commissions were not the only 
agencies involved. In the Al Sarena case, for example, the 
Secretary of Interior acted against one of his own agencies, 
the Bureau of Land Management, in favor of the interests of 
a business concern. 
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the government? Naming Jerone Kuykendall and Lewis Strauss 
chairmen o.f the Federal Power Commission and Atomic Energy 
Commission, respectively, was akin to putting a rabbit in 
charge of the lettuce patch. Surely, Kuykendall's role in 
helping formulate natural gas legislation after President 
Eisenhower vetoed the Fulbright-Harris bill raises a serious 
question of propriety. Furthermore, that the commissions 
were heavily weighted in favor of business is clearly evident 
from the lack of consumer representation on the FPC and AEC. 
As a corollary, it should be observed that the men appointed 
to these commissions formerly came from the very businesses 
they were now supposed to regulate. This interlocking direc-
torate makes one wonder if, indeed, the regulatory commissions 
themselves were not actually being regulated by the industry, 
rather than vice versa, as the law directed. In other words, 
did the tail of business not wag the governmental dog? Fin-
ally, the growth of the power of this bureaucracy meant a 
further diminition of the power of Congress and an increase 
in presidential power. 
The effect of the close relationship between business 
and government becomes even clearer in the case of the coal 
and oil resources. Conceptually the energy market operates 
on the idea of competing alternate forms of energy. In the 
1950s the moribund coal interests opposed legislation favor-
able to atomic energy, oil and natural gas. This was as it 
should have been. By the middle of the 1960s, however, the 
coal industry had recovered from its depressed state. But 
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ownership of coal had substantially changed hands. The oil 
industry, seeing a resurgence of coal, had bought a control-
ling interest in its competitor. By 1971, the oil industry's 
efforts paid rich dividends. It accounted for 84% of the 
nation's refining capacity, 72% of the natural gas produc-
tion and reserve ownership, 30% of the domestic coal reserve, 
and 20% of the domestic coal production capacity. The oil 
industry also bought into the source of another competitor, 
the slowly developing atomic energy industry. Presently, the 
oil industry's investment accounts for over 50% of the urani-
um. reserves and 25% of the uranium milling capacity.3 In 
short, the oil industry bought a predominant interest in two 
of its competitors. One is led to the inescapable conclusion 
that the anti-trust laws were soft-pedalled because of the 
inordinate influence of the big oil interests in the Federal 
Government. 
The position of the conservationists, on the other hand, 
became apparent enough by the end of Eisenhower's first year 
in office. In warning the White House of the dangers ahead, 
Palmer Hoyte, editor and publisher of the influential Denver 
Post, accurately summed up the conservationists' perception 
of partnership: 
It would seem to me that it would be a very bad thing 
for the Eisenhower administration if Idaho Power 
3cf. House of Representatives, Subcorr.mi ttee on Special 
Small Business Problems, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Concentration 
b Com etinO" Raw Fuel Industries in the Ener Market and Its 
• 
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[CompanyJ was able, for example, to destroy the Hell's 
Canyon site by building one dam ••• It would be unfor-
tunate if the people of the United States got the idea 
that the Eisenhower administration was more interested 
in the 'interests' than in the interests of the people •••• 
Certainly that issue was somewhat clouded in 
the Tidelands Oil case. It could be even more clouded 
in the Hell's Canyon case. Let us hope that the 
stockmen of the west will not make any substantial 
around end at the expense of the ta.xpayers.4 
The Ad.ministration's openly skeptical attitude toward the Mid-
Century Conference on Resources for the Future simply con-
firmed these suspicions. From then on the nation's conserva-
tion leaders painted the Administration with old New Deal 
colors. Accordingly, partnership was variously depicted as a 
"giveaway" to big business, that is, to "the special inter-
ests." Actually, their arguments contained little original-
ity; even their phraseology was borrowed from a past era. 
Indeed, for the most part, the conservationists were only 
defending the integrity of such New Deal agencies as the REA, 
SCS, and TVA. They made little--if any--contribution toward 
new perspectives on the environment. 
The apostles and opponents of partnership thus showed 
great purblindness in their level of insight. Essentially 
both sides continued to think in the same utilitarian terms 
originally defined at the turn of the century and continuing 
through the New Deal. While the role of the Federal Govern-
ment in the development of natural resources was examined, 
other equally crucial questions went virtually untouched. 
4 May 25, 1953, Hoyt to Adams, Central Files, OF-155-E-l, 
Box 838, Eisenhower Library. 
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Aside from certain limited aspects of the Echo Park imbroglio, 
neither side gave much serious thought to the more serious 
problem of ecology. 
The modern trend in American conservation has sh.own a 
strong utilitarian bent. According to this view nature is 
inherently at odds with man, thereby requiring man to subdue 
and conquer her if he is to survive. The theory of Social 
Darwinism and the frontier experience served to confirm this 
attitude. Reclamation, for example, was seen as man taming 
an essentially hostile force in nature, in this particular 
case, water. Electricity, one of the modern marvels turned 
necessity, was, of course, placed in.the same category. To 
utilitarians the primary question, then, was whether govern-
ment or private enterprise ought to direct the .American 
fight to conquer nature. There was no doubt that man was 
compelled to fight nature if he--the fittest--was to survive. 
Bureau of the Budget Director Joseph Dodge was not far off · 
the mark when, in 1953, he advised President Eisenhower that 
the conservation movement was stagnant and "has not had a 
new thought for fifty years. 11 
It was not until 1962 that "the new conservation move-
ment" was officially born. In that year Rachel Carson pub-
lished Silent Spring, a book attacking the use of the pesti-
cide DDT while contending that man was part of nature, not 
an entity hostile to it. Although the least representative 
of her ecolog.ical thinking, Silent Spring harkened to a tra-
-7 dition whose war ings largely had been silenced by the 
293 
twentieth century's fixation with utilitarianism. Among Car-
son's intellectual ancestors were the New England transcen-
dalists Emerson and Thoreau, George Perkins Marsh, and John 
Muir. But it was Aldo Leopold who really breathed life into 
the new conservation movement. Leopold, who had joined the 
U.S. Forest Service in 1909 and was one of the founders of 
the wilderness Society in 1935, vigorously argued preserva-
tionists' sympathies. His two books, A Sand County Almanac 
(1949) and Round River (1953), were, as one observer commen-
ted, the Tablets of the Law for the new conservation move-
ment. The main leaders of the movement, Rachel Carson and 
David Brower, executive director of the Sierra Club from 
1952 to 1969, acknowledged their debt to Leopold. 
While the utilitarians stressed chemistry and physics, 
the ecologists accented the study of bacteriology, zoology, 
botany, and geology. Rachel Carson obtained a Masters degree 
in zoology and afterwards worked for the U.S. Bureau of 
Fisheries and later the Fish and Wildlife Service. And John 
Muir, who successfully fought to make Yosemite a national 
park, was a geologist and biologist. In short, these thinkers 
pointed less to man's relation to man than to "the relation 
of all life" and, therefore, of life to its physical environ-
ment.5 
5The main characteristic of the ecologists of the 1960s 
and 1970s was their bent toward the biological sciences. 
Among others, Paul Ehrlich is a professor of biology at Stan-
ford University; Barry Commoner's academic career centered 
around plant physiology; Rene Dubos studied soil bacteriology; 
and before becoming professor of human ecology, Garrett Har-
din taught biology at the University of California {Santa 
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At the turn of the century the ecological and utilitar-
ian views contended with one another until finally the utili-
tarian won out. The ecologists, led by John Muir and his 
Sierra Club, favored preserving nature as it was. They urged 
the establishment of inviolate national parks. The utilitar-
ians, led by Gifford Pinchot and his Forest Service, believed 
in regulating the exploitation of nature. Accordingly, re-
sources on federal properties should be prudently used--but 
used nevertheless. The crowning battle between these two 
opposing camps took place over the future of Hetchy-Hetchy 
Valley, located in Yosemite National Park. The cutting edge 
was whether a dam ought to be constructed in the Valley or 
left undisturbed. Muir opposed the dam and Pinchot supported 
its construction. In 1914, Pinchot won and the utilitarians 
gained the upper hand in the con·servation movement. The ecol-
ogists won a victory of sorts when, in 191?, the National 
Park Service was created within the Department of Interior.· 
The Forest Service (Department ··of Agriculture) and National 
Park Service (Department of Interior) have been at odds ever 
since. 
The Eisenhower Administration's basic attitude toward 
Barbara). 
For works discussing the origins of and the present study 
of ecology see, Donald Fleming, ".Roots of the New Conserva-
tion Movement," Pers ectives in Anerican Eistor , VI (Charles 
Warren Center, 1 , ; Davi Lm·1en .a , George Perkins 
Marsh (New York, 1958); Roderick Hash, 'w'i.lderness and the 
American Mind (New Haven, 1967); and Samuel Hays, Conserva-
tion and ~he Gos el of Efficienc • The Pro ressive Conserva-
tion Movement, 1890-19 0 Cambridge, 1 5 
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nature was expressly the ru38ed utilitarianism of the business-
man in free interprise and the frontier. It favored Echo 
Park dam much the same as its utilitarian predecessors had 
Hetch-Hetchy dam. The Administration's appointments also be-
trayed a discrimination against biologists. Businessmen, 
mathematicians, engineers, chemists, and physicists were all 
appointed to the commissions; but it was not until 1973 that 
a biologist joined the AEC. And, the conservationists did 
not raise the issue either. To the contrary, the Eisenhower 
Administration replaced Albert Day, a career biologist, with 
a businessman as Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service. 
To their credit, the conservationists unsuccessfully protested 
this move. Further, water pollution received little real at-
tention. The Water Pollution Control Act of 1956 did little 
to advance the cause of clean water. Instead of creating a 
new agency to deal specifically with the problem, the respon-
sibility was turned over to the Public Health Service, an 
agency that could be counted upon not to rock the cradle. 6 
Moreover, the Administration--as well as many of its critics--
ignored the attendant problems of technology, population, 
growth, and water and air pollution. 
From the study of par~nership politics there also emer-
ges a glimpse of the Eisenhower personality. Far from being 
a bumbling, naive President, Eisenhower was, in fact, a highly 
sophisticated and determined politician. His military-
6Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy 
(New York, 1966), 228-29. 
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background had well prepared him for the Presidency. Both 
as President and Allied Commander during World War II Eisen-
hower believed in establishing a clear chain of command; as 
Chief .Executive he outlined policy and the Cabinet was 
charged with its execution. He had a particularly good 
grasp of foreign policy. Contrary to popular opinion Eisen-
hower ran foreign policy and was far less dependent on his 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, than has been real-
ized. One could hardly imagine even Dulles making a move 
without first consulting with the President for permission. 
Both as Supreme Allied Commander and later as commander of 
the NATO forces, Eisenhower became well versed in the nuances 
and dictates of diplomacy. Moreover, he came away from his 
long sojourns in Europe with definite ideas as to what poli-
cies the United States should pursue. 
Domestic issues, however, were not as important to this 
essentially military-minded man. Yet there is no doubting 
Eisenhower's innate conservatism. Throughout his life he 
remained faithful to the puritan ethic in all of its economic, 
political, and religious implications. He had learned it as 
a youth in Abilene, Kansas, and as he steadily climbed the 
military and political ladder Eisenhower took this ethical 
baggage along. Because domestic affairs did not interest 
him, he delegated much authority in this area to aides who 
shared his philosophical outlook. Sherman Adams, his poli-
tical alter ego, could always be relied upon. Ezra Taft 
Benson, a Taftite, was personally recruited by the President, 
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for their views on domestic issues coincided perfectly. The 
appointment of Governor Douglas McKay to the interior depart-
ment came upon the recommendation of Senator Cordon after 
Governor Arthur Langlie had turned down the post. 
Furthermore, contrary to many misconceptions, Eisenhower 
was shrewd in ~anipulating men and his public image. He cer-
tainly was aware that his untarnished image bequeathed him a 
singular advantage over his political opponents. Once again, 
his military experience helped. There was no more egotistical 
and obstreperous an individual than General George Patton, 
yet Eisenhower was one of the few men who could handle him. 
Likewise, there is little reason to believe that he abandoned 
this forte upon becoming President. Quite the contrary, while 
giving the public impression of not participating in politi-
cal infighting, Eisenhower conveniently let willing surro-
gates do his bidding. In rather scathing terms Vice Presi-
dent Richard Nixon and Secretary Dulles attacked the Presi-
dent's foreign policy critics while McKay was let loose on 
the Administration's domestic policy critics. And discreetly 
Eisenhower gave Senator Joseph McCarthy enough rope to hang 
himself. 
McKay's senatorial bid in 1956 was part of this pattern. 
The Secretary of Interior was given credit for helping fashion 
the partnership policy and had been one of the Administra-
tion's most vocal defenders. If the New Deal had not been 
exactly socialism, according to this view, it came dangerous-
ly close. By 1956 McKay's outspokenness perhaps had become 
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a political liability. Thus Adams and Leonard Hall of the 
Republican National Committee encouraged McKay to seek Wayne 
Morse's seat in the Senate. The Administration, it seems, 
had everything to gain and very little to lose. If Morse 
lost, the Administration would have one more sure vote in 
the Senate; in any case, should McKay be defeated, a dis-
tinct possibility, a political liability would be eliminated. 
By contrast, McKay's successor, Fred Seaton, was remarkably 
low key, less abrasive, and more tactful. Nixon also came 
close to meeting the same fate, as there were serious signs 
of Eisenhower bowing to liberal pressure to dump his vice 
president in 1956. Evidently Eisenhower tolerated McCarthy 
until he too had become an embarrassment. In other words, 
once McKay and McCarthy had outlived their political useful-
ness, they became expendable. 
The picture of Eisenhower that can now be sketched 
reveals a man well on top of the situation. So long as 
Nixon, Dulles, McKay and McCarthy operated in the forefront 
as a political shield the Democrats could hardly lay a glove 
on Eisenhower; his image was as unblemished in 1960 as it had 
been when he first took office. Had the Constitution not pre-
vented it, there is little doubt he easily would have won a 
third term. But when one of these men became an embarrass-
ment he was expended. 
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